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Abstract

Essays on the Economics of Education and Health in Developing
Countries
Kritika Narula
2021

In my dissertation, I examine topics related to education and health in the context of developing countries.
In Chapter 1, I study the impact of a large and unique public policy in India, known as
the Right to Education (RTE) Act, on the educational outcomes of children. The RTE Act
made education a fundamental right for every child between the ages of six and fourteen by
guaranteeing free admission in a neighborhood school. It simultaneously reduced the cost
of attending private school for the disadvantaged children by reserving 25% of the seats in
the entry grades in private schools for them, and reduced the accountability of schools by
eliminating the existing examination system for all children in primary and secondary grades.
Using variation at the cohort level in the eligibility to take advantage of the private school
reservation as well as the variation in access to a private school within a cohort, I find that the
private school access provision of the RTE Act was successful in improving learning outcomes.
Mathematics outcomes improved by 0.03 s.d, and Reading outcomes improved by 0.04 s.d for
children in entry grades who had access to a private school in the village. Moreover, private
school enrollment increased by 24% for these children. Furthermore, exploiting variation in
implementation at the grade level, I find that learning outcomes declined in response to a
decline in the importance of school accountability. Mathematics scores declined by 0.06 s.d
and Reading scores declined by 0.10 s.d, accounting for about a quarter and two-thirds of the
decline observed in the aggregate scores for Mathematics and Reading, respectively, after the
implementation of the RTE Act. Heterogeneity analyses reveal that the private school access
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provision of the RTE Act did not benefit the disadvantaged children any more than the nondisadvantaged children. The worsening of educational outcomes in response to a diminution of
the importance of school accountability was larger for the disadvantaged, for those residing
in areas with lower school competition levels, and for those attending public schools. An
exploration of the response of the households and schools to the RTE Act reveals that the
time spent by children doing homework decreased and teacher absenteeism in public schools
increased. This is suggestive of a reduction of effort on the part of schools and teachers. Thus,
the policy designed with the aim of redistributing educational opportunity and preventing
discrimination of children from disadvantaged backgrounds had the unintended consequence
of worsening educational standards. It was, however, able to partially shield the children in
entry grades by reducing the costs of attending private school for a few, resulting in schools
improving their quality.
In Chapter 2, which is joint work with Nathan Fiala, Ana Garcia-Hernandez and Nishith
Prakash, we study the impact of a program that provides a bicycle to a girl who lives more
than 3 km from her school. We randomized whether the girl received a bicycle with a small
cost to her family to cover replacement parts, a bicycle where these costs were covered by
the program and therefore cost nothing for the family, or did not receive a bicycle and was
part of the control group. We find that the bicycle reduced the average commuting time
to school by 35% and late arrival by 66%. It decreased absenteeism by 27% in the shortand medium-term and improved perceived safety by 0.10 s.d. In terms of actual safety, the
intervention was successful in reducing the probability that the girl was teased or whistled at
on the way to school by 22%, and more importantly, the intervention reduced the probability
that the girl missed school or left school early to get home due to concerns about safety
by 33%. We also find evidence of increased grade transition in the medium-term, improved
math test scores, girls expressing feelings of enhanced control over their lives and, for those
who received bicycles with a small cost to the family, higher levels of aspiration, self-image,
and a desire to delay marriage and pregnancy. Heterogeneity analysis by distance to school
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shows an inverted U-shape for most of the schooling and empowerment results, suggesting
these impacts are larger for girls that live further away from school. This also suggests that
empowerment outcomes came about as a result of increased attendance at school.
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Arul Mishra, Himanshu Mishra and Shelly Rathee,
we study the impact of providing ambiguous information related to a patient’s position in
the queue on the perception of waiting time, pain, and satisfaction in a healthcare setting in
India. We conduct three field studies in two separate physicians’ clinics in India to provide
evidence that when patients are given information about waiting times that is ambiguous and
open to multiple interpretations, as opposed to being precise, patients pay more attention to
figuring out their position in the queue. This has the effect of distracting them from the pain
and the time spent waiting in line, thus leading to an overall increase in patient satisfaction.
However, we show that such ambiguity has its limits. When ambiguous information cannot
be resolved, people focus less on the token sequence, leading to a higher perception of both
pain and prolonged waiting time.
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Chapter 1
(Un)Intended Consequences of the Right to
Education Act in India
1.1

Introduction

Motivated by a desire to create a society that is more diverse and representative, a large number of countries across the world use some form of affirmative action policies. By increasing
funding or changing the criteria for entry, these policies aim at reducing the barriers to entry
for the underrepresented. Affirmative action is however a contentious issue. Not only are
there concerns of fairness of these policies but also of their effectiveness in terms of targeting
the truly disadvantaged and benefitting the beneficiaries. In the light of these concerns, I
examine a large and unique public policy in India, known as the Right to Education (RTE)
Act, which made education a fundamental right of every child between the ages of 6 and
14. As part of the Act, it required all private schools to reserve 25% of their seats in entry
grades for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Further, to keep the disadvantaged
in school and prevent them from getting discriminated against, the Act introduced a series
of provisions for all students related to grade promotion and student evaluation, and laid
down norms for school infrastructure. In this paper, I study the impact of the RTE Act
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on enrollment decisions and learning outcomes of the intended beneficiaries as well as the
non-beneficiaries.
I first conduct a series of event-study analyses to examine the impact of the Act on enrollment, learning outcomes, and school infrastructure in rural India. I document that private
school enrollment is on a rise, and learning levels decline after the implementation of the
RTE Act in 2010. I do not find any change in learning levels in the one state - Jammu &
Kashmir, where the Act was not implemented. The decline in learning levels is observed for
children belonging to both disadvantaged backgrounds as well as non-disadvantaged backgrounds. Learning outcomes worsen for children attending both public and private schools.
School infrastructure appears to be improving throughout the period.
I next develop a stylized model of school and student behavior that helps rationalize
the patterns in the data, and disentangle the mechanisms responsible for the observed declining learning levels. In this setup, there are two types of families, disadvantaged and
non-disadvantaged, as well as two types of schools, private and public. Families choose
between the schools based on their random tastes for private and public schools, and the
relative differences in quality and costs (both monetary and travel) of attending each type
of school. Schools choose costly effort, which determines school quality, to maximize their
payoffs. Schools care about their revenues as well as their quality because of the accountability systems in place. The RTE Act decreased the cost of attending private school for the
children belonging to disadvantaged backgrounds in entry cohorts by implementing the 25%
reservation rule,1 and reduced the importance of school accountability in the schools’ payoff
function by eliminating the existing examination system and replacing it with Continuous
and Comprehensive Education (CCE) system.2 The model makes two predictions. First, it
1

Under the 25% reservation rule, disadvantaged students could gain admission in a neighborhood private
school, for which they would not have to pay any admission fee, capitation fee or even tuition fee. The
government reimburses the private schools at a rate which is the lower of the actual private school fee and
the per-pupil expenditure in the state public school.
2
CCE focuses more on documenting assessment, and by removing the existing year-end examination
system, it makes it difficult to diagnose a child’s learning needs and the quality of teaching in the schools
(KPMG, 2016).
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predicts that a reduction in the cost of attending private schools for children belonging to
disadvantaged families should increase equilibrium school quality for cohorts directly affected
by the provision. And second, equilibrium school quality, and thus learning outcomes should
decline in response to a decline in the importance of school accountability.
I test these implications using the data from the Annual Status of Education Report
(ASER), which is a nationally representative household-survey conducted in every rural district of India since 2005 (except 2015) with an aim to provide reliable estimates of the status
of children’s schooling and basic learning in rural India. For the main analysis in this paper,
I use the pooled cross-section data from the years 2006 to 2014, which gives four years of prepolicy data and five years of post-policy data. I use standardized scores in both Mathematics
and Reading in the local language to test for predictions regarding learning outcomes. Further, I use data from the two rounds of India Human Development Survey (2004-05, 2011-12)
to understand the household response to the RTE Act, and from the ASER School Surveys
(2007, 2009-2014) to understand the school response to the RTE Act.
The main empirical challenge in estimating the impact of the different provisions of the
RTE Act is to truly isolate the impact of one provision from the other. To examine the
impact of the 25% reservation rule on overall education outcomes, I exploit variation at
the cohort level in the eligibility to take advantage of the private school reservation as well
as the variation in access to a private school within a cohort. Specifically, I devise a tripledifference strategy that compares the changes in relative outcomes of children in entry grades
with those in other grades, interacted with the variation in private school access at the
village level. Comparing the relative outcomes of children in entry grades with those in
other grades differences out any time-varying omitted variables that affect all children. And,
comparing the relative outcomes in villages with a private school with villages without a
private school differences out any omitted variables that differentially affect outcomes of
children in entry grades. Further, to examine the impact of the 25% reservation rule on
the education outcomes of the intended beneficiaries, I use a quadruple-difference strategy,
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which provides the intent-to-treat estimates by comparing the changes in relative outcomes
of children in entry grades with those in other grades belonging to disadvantaged families,
relative to the changes in relative outcomes of children in entry grades and other grades
belonging to non-disadvantaged families, interacted by the variation in private school access
at the village level.
To identify the impact of the Continuous and Comprehensive Education (CCE) provision
of the RTE, I exploit the variation in its implementation at the grade level. I implement
a difference-in-difference strategy, comparing grades required to implement CCE with those
not required before and after the implementation of the policy. Further, I drop the grades
for which both the 25% rule and CCE were implemented at the same time, so as to isolate
the impact of the CCE provision of the RTE Act. I control for district-grade specific linear
time trends in addition to controlling for a rich set of individual characteristics, district
fixed effects, grade fixed effects and year fixed effects. To check for the validity of this
difference-in-difference strategy, I examine the evolution of the learning outcomes of those
in the (eventually) treated grades (CCE only) and the untreated grades in the pre-policy
period, and conclude that the parallel trends assumption holds.
In line with the predictions of the model, I find that a reduction in the cost of attending
private school, implemented via the 25% rule, led to an improvement in the average education
outcomes for children in the entry grades with access to a private school in the village.
Mathematics outcomes improved by 0.03 s.d, and Reading outcomes improved by 0.04 s.d.
Further, private school enrollment increased by 24%. In line with the second prediction of
the model, equilibrium school quality, as observed in learning outcomes, declined in response
to a decline in the importance of school accountability. Mathematics scores declined by 0.06
s.d and Reading scores declined by 0.10 s.d, explaining about a quarter and two-thirds of the
decline observed in the aggregate scores for Mathematics and Reading, respectively, after the
implementation of the RTE Act. Thus overall, I find that the 25% reservation rule of the
RTE Act was successful in improving learning outcomes for students in disadvantaged and
4

non-disadvantaged backgrounds in entry cohorts. However, these gains were offset by the
CCE provision of the RTE Act. The vast majority of the student population not targeted
by the school choice policy experienced a decline in learning achievement.
To understand if the 25% rule benefitted the disadvantaged groups, who were the intended beneficiaries of the provision, more than the non-disadvantaged groups, I conduct
heterogeneity analysis by the type of household. I do not find any differential impacts of the
25% rule on the education outcomes of the intended beneficiaries. Further, to examine the
distributional impact of the CCE provision of the RTE Act, I conduct heterogeneity analyses
by the type of household, by the market structure as well as by the type of school. I find
that the CCE provision negatively affected the learning outcomes of students belonging to
both disadvantaged as well as non-disadvantaged households, but the impact was larger (and
negative) for those intended to be the direct beneficiaries of the RTE Act. Further, learning
outcomes worsened less in areas with higher school competition. Specifically, in districts
with higher school competition, the decline in Mathematics and Reading scores was 40% and
70% of the respective decline observed in lower school competition districts. Also, learning
outcomes worsened for students in both private as well as public schools exposed to the CCE
provision, but the extent of decline was larger in public schools. For children in both private
and public schools, learning outcomes worsened less in areas with higher school competition.
The government implemented the RTE Act as a way to redistribute educational opportunity, and introduced different provisions within the Act so as to prevent any discrimination
against the students belonging to the disadvantaged groups. However, these results suggest
there were unintended consequences for not just the students belonging to non-disadvantaged
groups but also for those belonging to disadvantaged groups in higher grades, who could not
take advantage of the spillovers experienced as a result of the 25% rule.
I explore two mechanisms which could plausibly explain the results in this paper. First,
it could be that students and households respond to the lack of incentives by reducing in-
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vestment in education. I find that after the implementation of the Act, children spent less
hours per week doing homework for school, but there was no difference by the level of competition in the local school market. The decline in time spent doing homework may reflect a
reduction of effort on the part of the schools and teachers to assign it and encourage students
to do it. Further, I do not find any difference in student absenteeism, hours spent attending
supplementary private tuitions, or parental involvement in their children’s school activities
after the implementation of the Act. Even though this is not an exhaustive list of ways in
which households can reduce investment in education, it does seem like that the main results in the paper are not driven by how households responded to the Act. Second, it could
be that schools respond strategically to the lack of accountability by reducing costly effort.
I find that the level of physical infrastructure in public schools improved after the implementation of the Act, but teacher absenteeism also went up. The improvements in physical
infrastructure in the public schools do not vary by the level of competition in the local school
market. However, I find that the decline in teacher attendance was lower in public schools
that faced competition from the presence of a private school in the village. Thus, it seems
like schools improved physical infrastructure after the implementation of the Act, but the
quality of teaching went down, more so in areas without any threat to competition. In so far
as teaching quality matters more for student learning as compared to physical infrastructure,
these results are suggestive of strategic school response to a decline in the importance of
school accountability.
This paper contributes to several literatures. First, this paper relates to the literature
on affirmative action. A rich body of empirical literature has examined the impact of affirmative action on enrollment and attainment of the intended beneficiaries, spillovers on the
non-beneficiaries as well as issues of potential mismatch in the U.S. in the context of college
admissions (Bowen and Bok, 1998; Long, 2004; Howell, 2010; Backes, 2012; Antonovics and
Backes, 2014; Kapor, 2015), as well as “selective" high school and elementary school admissions (Treschan, 2015; Ellison and Pathak, 2016; Cestau et al., 2017; Corcoran and Baker-
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Smith, 2018). In the context of India, the literature has largely focused on understanding
the impact of affirmative action in higher education on college attendance, academic performance and graduation rates of the intended beneficiaries (Kochar, 2010; Bagde et al., 2016;
Frisancho and Krishna, 2016), implications for labor market outcomes for the targeted minorities (Bertrand et al., 2010), and the impact on human capital investment for potential
future beneficiaries (Khanna, 2020). I contribute to this literature by examining the impact
of a unique affirmative action policy in primary education in India on enrollment decisions
and academic performance of the intended beneficiaries as well as the consequences for the
non-beneficiaries.
My work also relates to the literature examining the impact of school accountability
policies on student outcomes (surveyed in Figlio and Loeb (2011)), and more generally to
the literature examining the role of information on product quality. Accountability policies,
by implementing incentives and negative sanctions tied to the student test scores, have in
general led to an improvement in student performance. In the case of the U.S., Cronin et al.
(2005); Wong et al. (2009); Neal and Schanzenbach (2010); Dee and Jacob (2011) find positive
impacts of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, and Figlio and Rouse (2006); Chiang
(2009); Rouse et al. (2013) find positive effects of Florida’s system of imposing sanction
threats. However, tying incentives to proficiency can lead to an incentive to only focus on
high-stakes exams (Klein et al., 2000; Jacob, 2005). Andrabi et al. (2017) find that even
in the absence of explicit incentives and sanctions, giving information to parents on test
scores led to an increase in student performance and shutting down of lower quality private
schools in rural Pakistan. In the case of Gambia, Blimpo et al. (2011) find that making
teachers accountable to the local community can help increase student learning outcomes,
but only when the local community has high literacy rates. My research contributes to this
literature by examining the impact of a policy that eliminated existing high-stakes year-end
exams for students in elementary grades, replaced it by a system of poorly executed system
of school-based evaluations, thereby removing the familiar indicators of child’s learning.
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Additionally, I contribute to the empirical literature evaluating the role of school competition on student performance. The literature has found mixed results on the role of traditional
private school competition on public school performance, with Card et al. (2010) finding significant effects of competitive pressures on test score gains in Canada, and Jepsen (2002,
2003) concluding weak effects for the U.S. In the context of rural Pakistan, Bau (2019) finds
that an increase in the number of private schools within villages had a heterogenous impact
on learning outcomes of students within private schools, thereby increasing within-school
inequality in achievement. The literature has also found mixed results for improving competition directly through giving out vouchers (surveyed in Rouse and Barrow (2009) ). More
recently, Neilson (2020) finds that the the academic achievement of underprivileged students
improved in response to a targeted voucher program in Chile, which diminished the local
market power of schools in poor neighborhoods, forcing them to improve school quality. I
contribute to this literature in two ways. First, I provide evidence of how schools responded
to an increase in competitive pressures experienced due to a decline in the costs of attending
private schools for a subgroup. And second, I provide evidence of how schools’ response to a
reduction in the importance of accountability, which affects student learning outcomes, varies
by the degree of school competition in the local market.
Lastly, this paper contributes to a growing body of literature examining the Right to
Education Act in India. Rao (2019) uses natural variation induced by a policy change from
a pilot program in urban Delhi, which reserved 20 percent of seats in 395 private schools for
students from disadvantaged backgrounds, to identify how mixing wealthy and poor students
in schools makes wealthy students more prosocial and generous. Ahsan et al. (2018) exploit
variation in pre-existing grade retention rules across states to examine the impact of the No
Detention Policy clause of the RTE Act on learning outcomes of students in public schools.
Shah and Steinberg (2019) investigate whether national trends in education outcomes and
school quality measures changed around the time of the passage of the RTE Act. Chatterjee
et al. (2020) estimate the impact of RTE on private supplemental education. And, Berry
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et al. (2020) conduct a randomized evaluation of CCE in the state of Haryana to examine if
frequent evaluations improve learning outcomes. I add to this literature by providing the first
causal estimates of the impact of the 25% reservation rule on the overall education outcomes
and the education outcomes of the intended beneficiaries, as well as the first causal estimates
of the impact of the CCE provision, as implemented in practice, on learning outcomes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides an overview of the
Indian education system. Section 1.3 introduces the data sources and discusses the construction of the main variables in the analyses. Section 1.4 describes the empirical patterns in
the education outcomes in rural India. Section 1.5 presents the underlying conceptual framework. Section 1.6 presents a discussion of the empirical strategy. Section 1.7 discusses the
results from testing the model’s predictions and explores the mechanisms. Lastly, Section
1.8 concludes.

1.2
1.2.1

Background and Context
Schooling and Learning in India

In this subsection, I briefly provide context of the Indian education system. The Indian
education system is one of the largest in the world, comprising of about 1.5 million schools
catering to over 250 million students, more than 70 percent of which are in the rural areas
(DISE 2016). Due to a series of interventions and programs adopted in the 1990s aimed at
expanding access to schooling, India now has an almost universal access to primary schooling,
with enrollment over 96 percent since 2009 (ASER 2016). While the majority of the students
are enrolled in the public school system, enrollment in private sector schools is high and
has been rapidly rising at least since the late 1970s (Kingdon, 2007). Earlier believed to be
mostly an urban phenomenon, Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) find that in their national
survey of 20 states, 28 percent of the rural population had access to a private primary school,
9

with the number being as high as 50 percent in some states.3 This high access to private
schools in the rural areas is also mirrored in household-based surveys, with the ASER Report
(2018) finding that 30.9 percent of children aged 6-14 in rural India attend a private school,
up from 18.7 percent in the ASER Report (2006).
Most of the recent rise in the number of schools has come from private school expansion,
with the official data revealing a growth rate of 7.5 percent per annum in the number of
rural private primary schools between 2005 and 2015 compared to a growth rate of 1 percent
per annum in the number of rural public primary schools during the same period. This
rapid growth in private schools and consequently private school enrollment is driven by both
demand and supply side factors. Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) find that private schools
are more likely to be present in larger villages after controlling for district level consumption
as well as state fixed effects. Using PROBE survey data from five north Indian states, Pal
(2010) finds that private schools are more likely to be present in communities that also
have access to other village infrastructural facilities. However, the presence of rural private
schools is also commonly perceived as a response to low quality public schools, particularly
a manifestation of higher teacher absenteeism (Muralidharan and Kremer, 2006; Kingdon,
2007; Pal, 2010) as well as a household preference for English-medium teaching in private
schools (Kingdon, 1996).
In terms of infrastructure, private schools are no better than public schools, and in fact
have poorer facilities and significantly lower per student spending compared to public schools
(Muralidharan and Kremer, 2006; Tooley, 2009). On an average, rural public primary schools
are larger - both in terms of enrollment and number of classrooms, are more likely to have
an electricity connection, a playground, a computer lab, and have a higher proportion of
teachers with graduate or professional degrees compared to rural private primary schools (The
District Information System for Education (DISE) statistics, 2015). Despite these differences
in infrastructure, students in private schools tend to perform better in terms of learning
3

Rajasthan, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and Haryana.
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outcomes after controlling for observable student characteristics (Muralidharan and Kremer,
2006; Desai et al., 2009; French et al., 2010). However, Muralidharan and Sundararaman
(2015) find no differences in the test scores of most subjects for the lottery winners and losers
in a school choice experiment conducted in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, suggesting
that omitted variables might be responsible for the observed cross-sectional differences in
test scores across public and private schools. They do, however, find that private schools
deliver similar results at much lower costs, and are thus more productive. In a similar vein,
Kingdon et al. (2016) evaluate the cost-effectiveness of private schools and public schools by
comparing the learning outcomes of students along with the per pupil expenditure in each
school type in eight major states of India, and conclude that private schools are at least twice
as cost-effective.
Overall, the quality of education in Indian schools in dismal. In rural India, only about
50 percent of children enrolled in the fifth grade were able to read a simple paragraph at the
grade 2 level, and less than 55 percent of children were able to solve a two digit subtraction
problem (ASER 2018). Although international comparisons are inexact, learning levels in
India have been at the bottom of the international chart. The two Indian states, Tamil Nadu
and Himachal Pradesh, ranked second to last among the 73 countries that participated in
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA4 ) in 2009. Further, Das and Zajonc (2010) use statistical methods from Item Response Theory along with publicly released
questions from TIMSS5 (1999) to benchmark the learning outcomes of Indian children, and
find that secondary students from the two Indian states, Orissa and Rajasthan, fall below 43
of the 51 countries for which data exist in terms of mathematics achievement. They further
find that the bottom 5 percent of children rank higher than the bottom 5 percent in only
three countries.6
4

The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an international assessment that measures
15 year old students’ reading, mathematics, and science literacy every three years.
5
The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) is an international comparative
study of student achievement, used to measure the mathematics and science knowledge and skills of fourth
and eighth graders over time.
6
South Africa, Ghana and Saudi Arabia.
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Using the 71st Round National Sample Survey (NSS) of 2014-15, Kingdon (2020) computes the median private unaided school fee7 for children aged 6-14 in rural India to be Rs.
275 (∼ USD 3.5) per month, which is 47 percent of the per pupil expenditure in public
schools, and on average around 10.2 percent of the state’s annual minimum wage of daily
wagers. Despite the low fee nature of most private schools, serious equity concerns have been
raised in regards to access to educational opportunities (Tooley and Dixon, 2006; Kingdon,
2007; Härmä, 2009, 2011). In the light of these equity considerations coupled with the costeffective nature of private school education, the government of India enacted the Right to
Education (RTE) Act in 2009.

1.2.2

Policy Background

The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act or Right to Education Act
(RTE), is an Act of the Parliament of India enacted in August 2009, which makes education a
fundamental right of every child between the ages of six and fourteen, since it came into force
in April 2010. The Act specifies minimum norms in elementary schools, and was enacted in
an effort to make the enrollment of children in schools a state prerogative.
In an effort to make education a fundamental right of every child, the Act assigned duties
to the appropriate Government to ensure that it provides free and compulsory elementary
education to every child, in a neighborhood school. Specifically, Section 8 of Chapter 3 of
the RTE Act (Government of India, 2009) states that “The appropriate Government shall - (a) provide free and compulsory elementary education to every child: Explanation - The term “compulsory education" means obligation of
the appropriate Government to - (i) provide free elementary education to every child of the
age of six to fourteen years; and (ii) ensure compulsory admission, attendance and completion of elementary education by every child of the age of six to fourteen years; (b) ensure
7

There is no official data on private school fee levels.
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availability of a neighborhood school as specified in section 6; (c) ensure that the child belonging to weaker section and the child belonging to disadvantaged group are not discriminated
against and prevented from pursuing and completing elementary education on any grounds;
(d) provide infrastructure including school building, teaching staff and learning equipment;
(e) provide special training facility specified in section 4; (f ) ensure and monitor admission,
attendance and completion of elementary education by every child; (g) ensure good quality
elementary education conforming to the standards and norms specified in the Schedule; (h)
ensure timely prescribing of curriculum and courses of study for elementary education; and
(i) provide training facility for teachers.”
In order to reach these objectives, specifically, the Act laid down the following provisions
- (i) 25% rule: It requires all private schools to reserve 25 percent of seats in entry grades
to children (to be reimbursed by the state as part of the public-private partnership plan8 )
belonging to disadvantaged backgrounds. Disadvantage is based on economic status or caste
based reservations, and the exact definition varies by state. In addition, the Act makes
provisions that the disadvantaged pay no donation or capitation fees, and that they or their
parents are not subject to any admission related interviews. (ii) No Detention Policy (NDP):
The Act provides that no child shall be held back, expelled, or required to pass a board
examination until the completion of elementary education (grade 8). (iii) Continuous and
Comprehensive Education (CCE): The Act overhauled the existing process of assessment that
focused on term- and annual examinations, and replaced it with a grading system aimed at
evaluating curricular and extra-curricular activities throughout the year. The intention was
to shift the focus from proficiency in academics to measuring student’s ability by evaluating
them on work experience skills, dexterity, innovation, steadiness, teamwork, public speaking,
and behavior, etc. (iv) Infrastructure Norms: The Act also laid down several provisions
with regard to school inputs. Specifically, it laid down norms for pupil teacher ratio and
the qualification of teachers in schools, as well as standards for physical infrastructure in the
8

Private schools are reimbursed at a per-child expenditure amount decided by the state (and central)
government or the actual child expenditure in the private school (whichever is lower).

13

schools.

1.3

Data

I use several data sets to examine the impact of the Right to Education Act on educational
outcomes in India. I explain below each of these data sets in some detail.

1.3.1

Annual Status of Education Report

The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) has been prepared every year since 2005
(except 2015), facilitated by the NGO Pratham, with an aim to provide reliable estimates
of the status of children’s schooling and basic learning in rural India. ASER has a twostage sampling design, which is nationally representative. In the first stage, 30 villages9
are randomly selected in every rural district using the village directory of the 2001 census
and in the second stage 20 households are randomly selected in each of the 30 randomly
selected villages. The household survey collects demographic information like household size,
education status of parents and school-going status of all children between the ages of 3 and
16, irrespective of whether or not they attend school. All children between the ages of 5 and
16 are tested for proficiency in Reading in the local language as well as in their arithmetic
skills. The test is administered to all children irrespective of their school-going status, age,
grade or the type of school they attend. In addition, since 2008, information on village
infrastructure like the presence of bank, ration shop, paved road, etc, and household assets
like the type of house, phone, television, etc is also collected.
The practical administration of each test - Reading and Mathematics - involves a surveyor
orally giving the test to the child in the local language. For each of these tests, there are
five levels of proficiency, which are measured sequentially. For Reading, the lowest level is
9

Except in ASER 2005, wherein 20 villages were sampled in each rural district
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an inability to even recognize letters, followed by the ability to identify letters, words, read a
grade 1 level text, and the highest level is the capacity to fluently read a grade 2 level text.
For Mathematics, the lowest level is an inability to recognize single digits, followed by the
ability to recognize single digit numerals, double digit numerals,10 perform simple two digit
subtraction, and the highest is correctly solving simple long-division problems. The child is
marked at the highest level which she can do comfortably. I standardize the learning levels
for each age-group using their 2009 mean and standard deviations. See Appendix 1.9.4 for
an example of the tools in the Hindi language for Reading and Mathematics.
In addition to the household survey, ASER also provides information on a public primary
or upper primary school in each sampled village. The school information includes observational data on teacher and student attendance, availability and usability of the facilities as
well as self reported data on grants. School observations have been reported in 2005, 2007
and every year since 2009.
For the main analysis in this paper, I use the pooled cross-section data from the years
2006 to 2014. I exclude the year 2005 from the analysis as it followed a different sampling
strategy compared to the other years. I also restrict the data until 2014 because of a change
in the focus and scope of the data collection in the later years.11 For the learning outcomes in
Mathematics, I exclude the year 2006 from the analysis because the ASER testing tools did
not differentiate between the ability to read single digit numerals or double digit numerals
in 2006. Further, since the RTE Act was applicable for children in the age group of 6-14,
I use this subsample for depicting all the empirical patterns in the data, but use other age
groups for comparisons in some empirical specifications. Overall, there are about 4.2 million
children above the age of 5 in the pooled sample with complete data on learning outcomes.
10

ASER 2005 and 2006 does not differentiate between the ability to read single digit numerals or double
digit numerals.
11
In 2015, ASER Survey was conducted in only two states - Punjab and Maharashtra. In 2017, the ASER
Survey focused on an older age group (14-18 year olds). And in 2019, the ASER Survey focused on a younger
age group (4-8 year olds).
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1.3.2

India Human Development Survey

The India Human Development Survey (IHDS) is an Indian nationwide multi-topic panel
study of 41,554 households from 33 states and union territories across India. The survey
was designed to be nationally representative at its inception. The IHDS-I sample, collected
in 2004-05, consists of 26,734 rural and 14,820 urban households spread across 1503 villages
and 971 urban blocks. The IHDS-II survey, conducted in 2011-12, re-interviewed 83% of the
original households as well as split households residing within the same neighborhood. The
final sample size for IHDS-II is 42,152 households; 27,579 rural and 14,573 urban, spread
across 1420 villages and 1,042 urban blocks in 33 states and union territories across India.
Both waves of IHDS tested all children aged 8-11 in the household in Reading and Mathematics using tools developed by the NGO Pratham, providing a sample of 12,288 and 11,631
children who completed both the tests respectively in the first and second wave. I standardize the learning levels in Reading and Mathematics for each age group using the mean and
standard deviation in the first wave.
In addition, the IHDS also collected information on each village, including caste composition and availability of infrastructure facilities. Within each village and urban block, detailed
facilities assessment of one government and one private primary school was also collected.
These included self-reported data on school management, costs, infrastructure and operations
from the school principal as well as some observational data on school facilities.

1.3.3

District Information System for Education

The District Information System for Education (DISE) statistics provide the census of primary and upper primary schools in all of more than 600 districts in India. Since 2005-06,
self-reported data on enrollment (by grade, gender and caste), repetition (by grade, gender and caste), institution type (public vs. private), infrastructure (number of instructional
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rooms, presence of blackboard, drinking water facility, playground, toilet etc), teacher indicators (supply and qualifications) and some examination outcomes (for middle-school board
exams) is provided in the School Report Cards. These data however are known to have
issues in terms of quality and completeness (Adukia, 2017), and thus, I use them primarily to
generate broad trends in the level of school infrastructure across public and private schools.

1.4

Empirical Patterns in the Rural Indian Education
System

In this section, I document a series of empirical patterns about the education system in rural
India, and how it has changed over time. The first stylized fact is that overall enrollment for
6-14 year olds has not risen much during this time, while enrollment in private schools has
grown at a rate of over 5.5 per cent per year between the years 2006 and 2014. The top panel
of Figure 1.1 shows the probability of being enrolled in a public or private school for any
child between the age of 6-14, while the panel on the bottom shows the probability of being
enrolled in a private school conditional on being enrolled in a school for children in the same
age-group. Both these probabilities have been standardized relative to the 2009 level. Figure
1.10 in Appendix 2.8.2 provides the same probabilities for children in the primary-school
age-group, 6-10. While enrollment doesn’t seem to be moving much during this period due
to almost universal primary school enrollment, private school enrollment has had a steady
uptrend during the entire period, with no evidence of a structural break around the adoption
of the RTE Act.
The second stylized fact is that there has been a decline in the learning outcomes for
school-going children in the age-group 6-14 in both mathematics and reading in the local
language since the adoption of the RTE Act. Test scores12 are standardized relative to the
12

See Section 1.3 on details of the tests
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Figure 1.1: Trends in Enrollment and Private School Enrollment
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all children between the age of 6-14, and all states
except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the probability of being
enrolled in any school, and the bottom panel shows the probability of being enrolled in a private school
conditional on being enrolled in any school.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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baseline test score results in 2009 for children in the same grade. The top panel of Figure
1.2 shows the evolution of mathematics test scores, while the bottom shows the trend in
the reading score. Performance in both Mathematics and Reading is continuously declining
after the adoption of the RTE Act, and falls by an average of 0.24 s.d in Mathematics and
by 0.15 s.d in Reading in local language after the implementation of the Act.1314 These
effects are large, especially since test scores are hard to move in developing countries even
through interventions specifically targeted to move test scores (Glewwe et al., 2011; Kremer
et al., 2013; McEwan, 2015; Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2016a). Further, Figures 1.3 and 1.4
show the trends in the tails of the Mathematics and Reading performance respectively. The
top panel of Figure 1.3 shows the probability of being in the left tail of the Mathematics
distribution, which is the ability to not recognize single-digit numbers, and the bottom panel
shows the probability of being in the right tail, which is the ability to successfully solving
simple long-division problems. Similarly, the top panel of Figure 1.4 shows the probability
that the child is unable to identify letters in the local language, and the bottom panel
shows the probability that the child is able to successfully read a grade 2 level text in the
local language. The probabilities are standardized relative to the 2009 levels. There is
deterioration in learning at both the ends of the distribution, with it becoming particularly
severe after the adoption of the RTE Act.
The decline in learning outcomes of school-going children could be a result of changing
composition in the schools. Increased enrollment of students from more disadvantaged backgrounds after the RTE Act could explain some of the drop in the learning outcomes.15 As a
robustness check, Figure 1.11 in Appendix 2.8.2 examines the trend in learning outcomes for
all the children in the age-group of 6-14, i.e., inclusive of children not enrolled in school. The
pattern for this sample is almost identical to that of just the school-going children, which is
13

See Appendix Table 1.12 for the aggregate changes in the learning outcomes after the implementation of
the RTE Act.
14
These trends are in line with Shah and Steinberg (2019), who conduct a similar event-analysis to examine
trends in test scores around the enactment of the RTE Act.
15
See Sirin (2005) for a review on the literature showing a link between socioeconomic background and
student learning outcomes.
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Figure 1.2: Trends in Learning Outcomes
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all school-going children between the age of 6-14, and
all states except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the z-score for
Mathematics, while the bottom panel shows the z-score for Reading. These have been standardized relative
to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Figure 1.3: Trends in Mathematics Performance, Distribution at the Tails
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all school-going children between the age of 6-14, and
all states except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the probability of
being in the left tail of the distribution for Mathematics, which is the inability to recognize single-digit numbers. The bottom panel shows the probability of being in the right tail of the distribution for Mathematics,
which is the ability to successfully solving simple long-division problems.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Figure 1.4: Trends in Reading Performance, Distribution at the Tails
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all school-going children between the age of 6-14, and
all states except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the probability
of being in the left tail of the distribution for Reading in the local language, which is the inability to to
identify letters in the local language. The bottom panel shows the probability of being in the right tail of the
distribution for Reading, which is the ability to successfully read a grade 2 level text in the local language.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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not surprising given there was no evidence of change in enrollment after the adoption of the
RTE Act. Another concern in attributing the decline in learning outcomes to the adoption
of the RTE Act in 2010 is the presence of other confounding events that could have occurred
at the same time. Since the RTE Act was applicable for the entire country except for the
erstwhile state of Jammu & Kashmir, I do a placebo analysis by examining the trends in
learning outcomes for Jammu & Kashmir in Figure 1.5. There is no evidence of a change in
trend in learning outcomes around the time of the adoption of the RTE Act in either Mathematics, as shown in the top panel, or Reading in the local language, as shown in the bottom
panel. To account for the possibility of changes in the severity of grading over time in the
ASER data, I corroborate these patterns in learning outcomes by using a different data set.
I use the IHDS panel data, which has test outcomes on the same tools as ASER in Reading
and Mathematics both before (2005) and after (2012) the adoption of the RTE Act in 2010,
for all children aged 8-11 in the household. Table 1.1 confirms the pattern of a decline in the
learning outcomes for both Reading and Mathematics. The magnitude of decline is about
0.22 s.d in both Mathematics and Reading, which is comparable to the magnitude of decline
in the ASER data.
Table 1.1: Trends in Learning Outcomes

After (2012)
Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2005)

(1)
Mathematics

(2)
Reading

-0.22***
(0.02)

-0.22***
(0.02)

19725
0.45
0.02

19805
0.43
0.03

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions include
controls for individual characteristics - age, gender, birthorder; household characteristics - mother’s education,
household size, caste, per capita income, per capita consumption, per capita food expenditure; and PSU fixed
effects. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test, and in (2) it
is the standardized z-score for Reading test in the local language. These have been standardized relative to
the 2005 level of test scores for every grade. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: IHDS Panel Data
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Figure 1.5: Trends in Learning Outcomes, Jammu & Kashmir
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all school-going children between the age of 6-14, and
students from only the state of Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the zscore for Mathematics, while the bottom panel shows the z-score for Reading. These have been standardized
relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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The third relevant fact is that learning outcomes have declined for children belonging to
both the disadvantaged background as well as non-disadvantaged background. Disadvantage
as defined by the RTE Act varies by each state, but mostly depends on the caste-category and
the income of the household. Since the ASER data does not have information on either of
these variables, I use mother’s education instead as a proxy. I use education up to and including grade 4 as the threshold for classifying households as disadvantaged or non-disadvantaged
.16 The top panel of figure 1.6 shows the trend in Mathematics test scores, while the bottom
shows the trend in Reading score for children belonging to the two types of households, separately. Learning levels decline in both Mathematics and Reading for children belonging to
both disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged background, with the decline being more severe
for those belonging to the disadvantaged background. Further, I use the IHDS panel data,
which has information on both caste as well as household income, to examine the pattern in
learning outcomes for the more precisely measured17 disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged
groups. The results in table 1.2 corroborate the findings from the ASER data.
The fourth stylized fact is that learning outcomes have declined for children attending
both public and private schools. The top panel of figure 1.7 shows the trend in Mathematics
test scores, and the bottom panel shows the trend in Reading scores for children attending
the two different types of schools. Though learning outcomes worsen for both school types,
the students in public schools suffer a relative decline of more than twice of that of students
attending private schools. These results do not control for the change in composition of
students attending private and public schools, and should thus be interpreted cautiously.
Finally, there have been significant improvements to the school-level infrastructure, both
in private as well as public schools. I use the DISE data at the school-level, and find that
16

I use mother’s education as a proxy for disadvantage, which has been consistently measured in the ASER
surveys since 2006. Other household assets like the type of dwelling, electricity connection, ownership of
television have been measured since 2008. I use these to construct an index of household assets using the
Principal Component Analysis, and show trends in learning achievement for students above and below the
median index in Figure 1.12 of Appendix 2.8.2. The results are robust to the definition of disadvantage.
17
I classify households as disadvantaged if they belong to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST)
group or if their income puts them in the “Below Poverty Line" category.
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Figure 1.6: Trends in Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by Mother’s Education
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all school-going children between the age of 6-14, and
all states except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the heterogeneity in
z-score for Mathematics for students belonging to disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged background, while
the bottom panel shows the same heterogeneity for z-scores in Reading. Disadvantage is defined as the
mother having less than primary level of education.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Figure 1.7: Trends in Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by School Type

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Year
Public School
95% CI

Private School
95% CI

-.3

-.2

-.1

0

.1

(a) Mathematics

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

Year
Public School
95% CI

Private School
95% CI

(b) Reading

NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all school-going children between the age of 6-14, and
all states except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the heterogeneity in
z-score for Mathematics for students belonging to public schools and private schools, while the bottom panel
shows the same heterogeneity for z-scores in Reading.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Table 1.2: Trends in Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by Disadvantage
(1)
(2)
Disadvantaged

After (2012)
Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2005)

(3)
(4)
Non-disadvantaged

Mathematics

Reading

Mathematics

Reading

-0.21***
(0.03)

-0.27***
(0.04)

-0.24***
(0.03)

-0.18***
(0.03)

9054
0.49
-0.24

9087
0.48
-0.19

10671
0.49
0.23

10718
0.47
0.22

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions include
controls for individual characteristics - age, gender, birthorder; household characteristics - mother’s education,
household size, caste, per capita income, per capita consumption, per capita food expenditure; and PSU fixed
effects. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (3) is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test,
and in (2) and (4) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test in the local language. These have been
standardized relative to the 2005 level of test scores for every grade. The first two columns provide results for
children belonging to Disadvantaged households, and the next two columns provide results for the children
belonging to Non-disadvantaged households. Households belonging to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe category or with income below the poverty line are categorized as Disadvantaged. *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10%.
Source: IHDS Panel Data

the trend in the number of schools with an electricity connection, ramp for the disabled, a
playground, as well as the number of books in the school library, the proportion of classrooms
in good condition and the proportion of teachers with a higher education degree has been
consistently rising in both private and public schools over the entire period under consideration, with no evidence of a structural break around the time of the adoption of the RTE
Act. Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show these patterns for the public and private schools respectively,
with the variables standardized relative to the 2009 level. These results are in line with those
found by Shah and Steinberg (2019) using the DISE state-level data as well as those found
by Muralidharan et al. (2016) from an all-India panel study of village schools that in 2010
revisited the rural sample of the nationally representative school survey conducted in 2003.
This dramatic decline in the aggregate learning outcomes has created an uproar not just
in the national media but also international media, with the Right to Education Act targeted
as the root of the problem (Kingdon, 2015). This has led to several policy debates in the
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Figure 1.8: Trends in School-level Infrastructure, Public Schools
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, which includes district fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the district-grade. 2009 is the base category. The sample includes
the census of rural public schools. It shows the probability that the school has an (a) electricity connection,
(b) a playground, (c) a ramp for the disabled, (d) the proportion of classrooms in good condition, (e) the
number of books in the school library, (f) and the proportion of teachers with a higher education degree. All
variables are standardized relative to the 2009 level.
Source: DISE School Report Cards, 2005-2015
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Figure 1.9: Trends in School-level Infrastructure, Private Schools
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, which includes district fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the district-grade. 2009 is the base category. The sample includes
the census of rural private schools. It shows the probability that the school has an (a) electricity connection,
(b) a playground, (c) a ramp for the disabled, (d) the proportion of classrooms in good condition, (e) the
number of books in the school library, (f) and the proportion of teachers with a higher education degree. All
variables are standardized relative to the 2009 level.
Source: DISE School Report Cards, 2005-2015
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Indian Parliament, with the government initially reluctant to recognize the declining trend
in the learning levels to it finally amending the Act to do away with the compulsory No
Detention Policy in 2019.
The Right to Education Act was enacted to provide equal access to quality education
to all, and prevent any discrimination towards students belonging to disadvantaged backgrounds. It however led to a massive decline in the aggregate learning levels. The RTE Act
was not one policy but in fact a package of several policies. It is thus important to disentangle the mechanisms so as to better understand the implications of the various policy arms.
In the next Section, I develop a model of school demand and school effort to put forth the
incentives that schools and households face, and how they react in response to the RTE Act.

1.5

Conceptual Framework

In this section, I present a conceptual framework to understand how disadvantaged and
non-disadvantaged households choose between a private and a public school in the schooling
market. I assume that there are no capacity constraints in the schools, and a child can attend
any school in the market if they are able to pay for the schools’ tuition and are able to travel
to the school. Private school charges a tuition fee to the students, while public school does
not. Private and public schools differentiate themselves on quality, and compete for students.

1.5.1

Setup

School Demand
Consider a schooling market with two types of families - Disadvantaged and Non-disadvantaged,
each with total population 1. I assume for the sake of simplicity that each family has one
child of school-going age. There are two schools available - a public school with quality QG
and a private school with quality QP . Family i (i = {D, A}) derives utility Uis from school
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type (s = {G, P }) as Uis = βQs − γCis + is
where, Cis represents the cost of attending school type s, and includes both the price of attending school as well as travel costs associated with attending school; is is the i.i.d. random
shock. The travel costs are a proxy for the amount of competition in the schooling market.
In high competition markets, the travel costs would be low due to greater availability of
schools in the neighborhood. And, these costs would be infinite if a certain type of school is
not present in the neighborhood.

School Effort and Quality
Suppose school quality Qs (s = {G, P }) is determined by the effort level es set by the school
s. School quality is determined according to an increasing concave production function q(es )
that transforms effort into school quality. Further, assume that school s chooses effort es so
as to maximize the payoff πs = R(es , ρs Es ) + θQs
which has three components, the effort choice of the school (es ), the revenues earned by the
school (ρs Es ), and the visible quality of the school (θQs ). ρs > 0 is the sensitivity of the
school s0 s revenue to its own enrollment (Es ).18 Since private schools earn all of their revenue
from tuition while public schools are paid by the government using a staffing ratio model,
which is less sensitive to enrollment, it is safe to assume that ρP > ρG in this case. Further,
θ (> 0) is the weight on school quality, or the visibility of school quality, that reflects the
accountability of schools and teachers.19 I assume that R is decreasing in es , increasing in
18

In this model, private schools do not optimize on the tuition they charge. This is because private
schools in India do not have complete flexibility to choose the tuition fee. For instance, The Rajasthan
Schools (Regulation of Collection of Fee) Bill, 2013 entrusts the government to constitute a committee for
the purpose of determination of the fee for admission to any standard or course of study in private schools
in the Indian state of Rajasthan.
19
See Figlio and Loeb (2011) for a summary of the theory and the literature on the effects of accountability
on students and teachers.
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ρs Es , and concave in each, i.e., R1 (.) < 0, R2 (.) > 0, R11 (.) < 0, and R22 (.) < 0. I also
assume that R12 (.) < 0 and

∂ 2 πs
∂Es ∂es

< 0. Intuitively, this means that as enrollment increases,

the schools have less incentive to exert additional effort.

Student Achievement
Let Yj be the outcome of achievement of student j in school s, which depends on -

Yj = f (Xj , Qs , uj )

where Xj is the vector of observed characteristics of j that include family and neighborhood
characteristics of j in addition to individual characteristics, Qs is the quality of school s that
the individual j attends, and uj is an index of unobservable individual factors uncorrelated
with Xj and Qs . I assume that Yj is increasing in Qs . For simplicity, I do not formally model
students’ strategic behavior that influences learning.

1.5.2

Equilibrium

In equilibrium, schools choose quality, and households choose what school to attend so as to
maximize their utility, such that all children are enrolled in some school20 and there is no
excess demand for any particular school given the school capacity.
Household’s Problem
Conditional on school quality (QG , QP ) and costs associated with attending school (CiG , CiP ),
household type i will select public school if -

U (QG , CiG , iG ) > U (QP , CiP , iP )
20

(1.1)

There is no outside option in this case, which is consistent with almost universal enrollment in primary
schools in India.
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Market Shares
Then, given a distribution F for (iG − iP ), the total fraction of household type i who choose
public school is E i (∆Q, ∆Ci ) = F [β∆Q − γ∆Ci ]

(1.2)

where, ∆Q = QG − QP is the difference in quality between the public and private schools,
and ∆Ci = CiG − CiP is the difference in costs of attending the two schools (inclusive of
school fees and travel costs).
And consequently, the total market share for public and private schools is -

EG = E D (∆Q, ∆CD ) + E A (∆Q, ∆CA )

(1.3)

EP = [1 − E D (∆Q, ∆CD )] + [1 − E A (∆Q, ∆CA )]

(1.4)

Equilibrium Quality Choice
Conditional on the quality of the competing private school (QP ), and the local market structure (reflected in ∆CD and ∆CA )), public school maximizes its payoff by choosing effort
max R(eG , ρG (E D (q(eG ) − QP , ∆CD ) + E A (q(eG ) − QP , ∆CA ))) + θq(eG )
eG

(1.5)

Similarly, conditional on the quality of the competing public school (QG ), and the local market
structure (reflected in ∆CD and ∆CA )), private school maximizes its payoff by choosing effort
-

max R(eP , ρP ((1 − E D (QG − q(eP ), ∆CD ) + (1 − E A (QG − q(eP ), ∆CA )))) + θq(eP ) (1.6)
eP
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The first order condition is -

R1 (.) + R2 (.)ρs q 0 (es )(E1D (.) + E1A (.)) + θq 0 (es ) = 0

(1.7)

At the optimal effort level, the marginal disutility from supplying effort equals the
marginal utility from supplying effort, which includes the accountability effects of increasing
school quality as well as the increased enrollment resulting from the increase in relative school
quality.
Since q(e) is increasing and concave in e, q 0 (e) is decreasing in the amount of effort
e. Thus, equilibrium effort is increasing in the strength of incentives (ρs ), the sensitivity
of disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged families to switch schools in response to change
in relative school quality (E1i (.)), and the importance of school accountability (θ). The
sensitivity of households’ demand for schools with respect to quality depends on the local
market structure through ∆CD and ∆CA . Intuitively, if there are no private options, i.e.,
relative travel costs between public and private schools are (negative) infinite, households will
not be able to switch schools in response to a reduction in public school quality. Thus, the
effort choice of the school will depend on the local market structure, through its dependence
on households’ demand sensitivity to relative quality differences.

1.5.3

Comparative Statics

The empirically testable comparative statics of this model is the choice of quality by the
schools in response to a change in the cost of attending private school and a change in
the importance of accountability in the schools’ payoff function respectively. I provide the
intuition for each of the claims below, and full proofs in Appendix 1.9.3.
Claim 1: A reduction in the cost of attending private schools for the disadvantaged
families will increase equilibrium school quality.
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Equation 1.7 shows the link between schools’ choice of optimal quality and the sensitivity of
disadvantaged households to switch schools in response to change in relative school quality.
A reduction in the cost of attending private schools for the disadvantaged, which is akin
to the market structure becoming more competitive, makes their demand for school more
sensitive to relative quality differences, and thereby increase the equilibrium school quality
for both types of schools.
Claim 2: Lower accountability will lower equilibrium school quality.
Equation 1.7 shows the link between schools’ choice of optimal quality and the importance
of accountability (θ) in the school’s payoff function. It follows directly that equilibrium
school quality will decline in both private and public schools in response to a decline in the
importance of school accountability.

1.6

Empirical Strategy

To test the implications of my model, I exploit the variation brought about by the different
provisions of the Right to Education Act. I explain below my empirical strategy to test each
claim from the model.

1.6.1

Reduction in the Cost of Attending Private School (25% rule)

Overall Impact
To identify the effect of the 25% rule on education outcomes, I exploit the variation in the
eligibility of the cohort to take advantage of the private school reservation as well as the
variation in access to a private school within a cohort. Though the 25% rule was applicable
for children in entry grades, they could take its advantage only if they had access to a
private school in their neighborhood. Thus, I use a triple-difference strategy that compares
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the change in relative outcomes of the treated versus untreated cohorts in villages with and
without access to a private school. Formally, I use the specification Yidgt = α + β1 Treated Cohortgt ∗ Private School in Villagei
+β2 Treated Cohortgt + β3 Private School in Villagei

(1.8)

+θXidgt + δdg + γdt + ρ ∗ tdg + idgt ,

where Yidgt is the education outcome of student i in grade g of district d in year t. Here,
Treated Cohortgt is 1 for students in Grade 1 in the year 2010, in Grades 1 and 2 in the year
2011, in Grades 1, 2 and 3 in the year 2012 and so on. Private School in Villagei is a dummy
for if student i has access to a private school in his village. Xidgt includes a rich set of child
specific controls like age, gender, birthorder, number of siblings, household size, mother’s
education, if the child’s house had a solid construction (pucca), an electricity connection,
a television, and if the village of residence had a public primary school, public secondary
school, a bank, electricity connection, pucca roads, a post office, and a ration shop, as well
as fixed-effects for the district of child i0 s residence. This specification controls for any timeinvariant effects at the district-grade level (δdg ) and at the district-year level (γdt ) that might
affect education outcomes. In addition, ρ ∗ tdg controls for any district-grade specific linear
time trends. I cluster the standard errors at the district-grade level. β1 is the triple-difference
estimator of interest.
The exclusion restriction for this triple-difference strategy is very hard to violate. The
causal identification of the above specification requires that after controlling for time-invariant
effects at the district-grade level and at the district-year level, as well as the differential trends
in the evolution of educational outcomes at the district-grade, there is no omitted timevarying, cohort specific effect correlated with the presence of private schools in the village.
This is different from the assumption that there is no time varying effect correlated with the
presence of private schools in the village, which is likely to get violated if private schools are
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more likely to open or close in response to changes in the outcomes (learning outcomes) of the
students in the village. In contrast, the exclusion restriction for equation 1.9 is substantially
harder to violate, especially since the threat to identification due to differential migration of
households is low.21

Impact on the Intended Beneficiaries
To identify the effect of the 25% rule on the intended beneficiaries, I use a quadruple-difference
strategy, which provides the intent-to-treat estimates by comparing the change in relative
outcomes of the treated versus untreated cohort from disadvantaged backgrounds with the
change in relative outcomes of the treated versus untreated cohorts from non-disadvantaged
backgrounds in villages with and without access to a private school. Formally, I use the
specification Yidgt = α + β1 Treated Cohortgt ∗ Disadvantagedi ∗ Private School in Villagei
+β2 Treated Cohortgt ∗ Disadvantagedi + β3 Treated Cohortgt ∗ Private School in Villagei
+β4 Disadvantagedi ∗ Private School in Villagei
+β5 Treated Cohortgt + β6 Disadvantagedi + β7 Private School in Villagei
+θXidgt + δdg + γdt + ρ ∗ tdg + idgt ,
(1.9)

where all variables are defined as in Equation 1.8. And, Disadvantagedi is a dummy for if
student i belongs to a disadvantaged household. Standard errors are clustered at the districtgrade level. β1 is the quadruple-difference estimator of interest, which uses variation in treatment at the grade-year level for students belonging to disadvantaged vs. non-disadvantaged
backgrounds in villages with and without access to a private school.
21

Rural-rural migration rates in India are low, and happen mostly for the purpose of marriage (Government
of India, 2017).
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1.6.2

Reduction in Accountability (CCE )

Overall Impact
To identify the impact of reduction in accountability on education outcomes, I exploit the
variation in the implementation of the Continuous and Comprehensive Education (CCE)
provision of the RTE at the grade level. I implement a difference-in-difference strategy,
comparing grades required to implement CCE with those not required before and after the
implementation of the policy. I use the specification -

Yidgt = α + β1 Treated Cohortgt + θXidgt + δg + γt + µd + ρ ∗ tdg + idgt ,

(1.10)

where Yidgt is the educational outcome (learning achievement) of student i in grade g
and year t. Since CCE is applicable for only grades up to 8, Treated Cohortgt is 1 for if
the students belong to grades 1-8 in the year 2010 and above, and 0 before. For students
belonging to grades 9-12, Treated Cohortgt is always 0. In order to isolate the impact of CCE
on educational outcomes, I remove grades affected by the 25% rule from the analysis.22 Xigt
includes the full set of child specific controls like age, gender, birthorder, number of siblings,
household size, mother’s education, household assets, and access to village public goods. µd
controls for fixed effects for the district of residence, which captures unobserved characteristics
of the district, including the quality of schooling. δg are grade fixed effects that control for
time invariant factors at the grade level that might affect educational outcomes. Similarly, γt
controls for the year fixed effects. ρ ∗ tdg controls for district-grade specific linear time trends.
Standard errors are clustered at the district-grade level. β1 is the difference-in-difference
estimator of interest.
The causal identification of the above difference-in-difference specification relies on the
22

Grade 1 in 2010, Grades 1 and 2 in 2011, Grades 1-3 in 2012 and so on.
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assumption that after controlling for time-invariant differences across the treated and the
untreated cohorts, as well as controlling for any district-grade specific linear time trends, any
relative difference between the treated and the untreated cohorts after the implementation of
the CCE provision of the RTE (β1 ) is a measure of its causal effect. The main challenge to this
identification is that if there were any other policy changes at the time of the implementation
of the RTE that had a differential impact on students in the treated cohorts, these will be
attributed as the causal effects of the CCE provision.

Heterogeneity
To examine the distributional impact of the CCE provision of the RTE Act, I explore heterogeneity in the impact of CCE on enrollment decisions and learning outcomes. I use the
following triple-difference specification -

Yidgt = α + β1 Treated Cohortgt ∗ Hi + β2 Treated Cohortgt + β3 Hi
(1.11)
+θXidgt + δg + γt + µd + ρ ∗ tdg + idgt ,

where all variables are defined as in Equation 1.10. And, Hi is the dimension of heterogeneity of interest. The main parameter of interest is the triple-difference estimate, β1 .
Standard errors are clustered at the district-grade level.
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1.7
1.7.1

Results
Impact of 25% rule

Table 1.3 presents results from the estimating Equation 1.8. The outcome variables covered in this table are the (linear) probability of enrollment in private school, the z-score of
Mathematics learning outcomes and the z-score of Reading learning outcomes.
Claim 1 states that equilibrium school quality should increase in response to a decrease in
the costs of attending private school for the disadvantaged. Columns (2) and (3) examine the
impact of the reduction in the cost of private school enrollment on overall learning outcomes.
Mathematics outcomes improved by 0.03 s.d (column (2)) and Reading outcomes improved
by 0.04 s.d (column (3)) for the children in villages with access to a private school and in
cohorts affected by the 25% rule. Further, Column (1) examines if a reduction in the cost of
attending private school results in an overall rise in private school enrollment. The coefficient
from column (1) is positive 0.06, with it being different from zero at p < 0.01 level. Thus,
children in entry cohorts with access to a private school in the village experience an increase
of 0.06 percentage points in the probability of private school enrollment, which translates to
an increase of 24 percent. The RTE Act improved the outcomes for the children in entry
cohorts residing in villages with access to a private school by reducing the cost of private
schools for the disadvantaged, leading to an improvement in overall school quality, thereby
having positive spillovers for all.

1.7.2

Impact of 25% rule on the Intended Beneficiaries

Table 1.4 presents results from the estimating Equation 1.9. The outcome variables covered
in this table are the (linear) probability of enrollment in private school, the z-score of Mathematics learning outcomes and the z-score of Reading learning outcomes. I define household
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Table 1.3: The Effect of 25 percent Reservation on Overall Learning Outcomes
(1)
Pvt. Enrollment

(2)
Mathematics

(3)
Reading

Treated Cohort
× Pvt. School in Village

0.06***
(0.00)

0.03***
(0.00)

0.04***
(0.00)

Treated Cohort

-0.01***
(0.00)

0.01***
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

2393642
0.31
0.25

2210501
0.55
0.10

2217833
0.55
0.07

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for
the individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, and district fixed effects. The
regressions also include district-grade fixed effects, district-year fixed effects and district-grade specific linear
time trends. The dependent variable in Column (1) is a dummy for if the child is enrolled in a private school,
in (2) it is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test, and in (3) it is the standardized z-score for Reading
test in the local language. These have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every
grade. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014

type to be disadvantaged if the mother of the student has less than primary-school education.
Column (1) examines if the 25% rule resulted in a rise (or fall) in private school enrollment
for children belonging to disadvantaged groups with access to a private school over and
above its impact on the private school enrollment of children belonging to non-disadvantaged
groups with access to a private school in the village. I cannot reject the hypothesis that
there was no differential impact on the private school enrollment for the disadvantaged in
entry grades. Columns (2) and (3) examine the heterogeneity in the impact of the 25% rule
on the learning outcomes for the children belonging to the disadvantaged groups. Again,
I cannot reject the hypothesis that there was no differential improvement or worsening in
Mathematics or Reading learning outcomes for the disadvantaged in entry grades. Thus,
even though overall learning outcomes improved for the children in entry cohorts residing in
villages with access to a private school, the subset of children who were most likely to take
advantage of the reduction in the cost of private school enrollment did not experience any
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differential improvements in the learning outcomes or private school enrollment.
Table 1.4: The Effect of 25 percent Reservation on Enrollment and Learning Outcomes of
the Disadvantaged
(1)
Pvt. Enrollment

(2)
Mathematics

(3)
Reading

0.00
(0.00)

-0.01
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

2393642
0.31
0.19

2210501
0.56
0.01

2217833
0.56
-0.02

Treated Cohort×Disadvantaged
×Pvt. School in Village
Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for
the individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, and district fixed effects. The
regressions also include district-grade fixed effects, district-year fixed effects and district-grade specific linear
time trends. The dependent variable in Column (1) is a dummy for if the child is enrolled in a private school,
in (2) it is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test, and in (3) it is the standardized z-score for Reading
test in the local language. These have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every
grade. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014

1.7.3

Impact of CCE

Table 1.5 presents results from the estimating Equation 1.10. Again, the outcome variables
covered in this table are the (linear) probability of enrollment in private school (column (1)),
the Mathematics test z-score (column (2)) and the Reading test z-score (column (3)).
Claim 2 states that equilibrium school quality should decline in response to a decline in the
importance of school accountability. In as far as school quality is a determinant of student
learning, there should be a deterioration in learning outcomes. Thus, Claim 2 predicts
that column (2) and column (3) should be negative. Learning outcomes in Mathematics
and Reading indeed decline for the cohorts affected by the introduction of Continuous and
Comprehensive Education (CCE) provision of the RTE Act. Mathematics scores declined by
0.06 s.d (p < 0.01) and Reading scores declined by 0.10 s.d (p < 0.01). There is however no
impact on the probability of private school enrollment, which could be either because there
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was no change in relative school quality or the sensitivity of families to switch schools in
response to a change in relative school quality was low.
Table 1.5: The Effect of CCE on Enrollment and Learning Outcomes

Treated Cohort
Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

(1)
Pvt. Enrollment

(2)
Mathematics

(3)
Reading

-0.00
(0.00)

-0.06***
(0.01)

-0.10***
(0.00)

2334574
0.22
0.25

2186675
0.43
0.10

2194131
0.44
0.07

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for
the individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, district fixed effects, grade
fixed effects, year fixed effect, and district-grade specific linear time trends. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is a dummy for if the child is enrolled in a private school, in (2) it is the standardized z-score
for Mathematics test, and in (3) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test in the local language. These
have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014

1.7.4

Heterogeneity in the Impact of CCE

Household type
The government implemented the RTE Act as a way to redistribute educational opportunity.
All the different provisions within the Act were introduced so that children belonging to
non-disadvantaged groups are not discriminated against. Thus, it is essential to evaluate if
the CCE provision of the RTE Act, which negatively affected overall learning outcomes, had
differential effects on children belonging to disadvantaged versus non-disadvantaged households.
Table 1.6 presents results from estimating Equation 1.11, where the dimension of heterogeneity examined is the household type of the child, i.e., whether the child belongs to a
disadvantaged or non-disadvantaged household. Here, as in the main analysis, disadvantage
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is defined by mother’s education. The CCE provision of the RTE Act negatively affected the
learning outcomes of children belonging to both disadvantaged as well as non-disadvantaged
households, with the impact being larger (and negative) for those intended to be the direct
beneficiaries of the RTE Act. Mathematics z-scores did not change, but Reading z-scores
went down by 0.03 s.d (p < 0.01) for children belonging to non-disadvantaged households.
For children belonging to disadvantaged households, Mathematics z-scores (row 1 of column
(2)) were an additional 0.11 s.d (p < 0.01) and Reading z-scores (row 1 of column (3))
were an additional 0.12 s.d (p < 0.01) below the respective z-scores for children from nondisadvantaged households. The probability of enrollment in a private school went up by 0.01
percentage points (p < 0.01) for children belonging to non-disadvantaged households (row 2
of column (1)), while children belonging to disadvantaged households experienced a decline
(row 1 of column (1)).
Table 1.6: The Effect of CCE on Enrollment and Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by
Household type
(1)
Pvt. Enrollment

(2)
Mathematics

(3)
Reading

Treated Cohort
× Disadvantaged

-0.03***
(0.00)

-0.11***
(0.00)

-0.12***
(0.00)

Treated Cohort

0.01***
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.01)

-0.03***
(0.00)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean, Disadvantaged
Dep. Variable Mean, Non-disadvantaged

2334574
0.22
0.19
0.32

2186675
0.43
0.01
0.22

2194131
0.45
-0.02
0.18

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for
the individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, district fixed effects, grade
fixed effects, year fixed effect, and district-grade specific linear time trends. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is a dummy for if the child is enrolled in a private school, in (2) it is the standardized z-score
for Mathematics test, and in (3) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test in the local language. These
have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade. Disadvantage is defined as
the mother having less than primary school level education. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Market Structure
In this subsection, I examine how market structure affects schools’ optimal response to a
reduction in the importance of accountability. I use the variation in the school competition
levels at the district level in 2009 as the dimension of heterogeneity of interest. Specifically,
I define Hi = High Competitiond as a dummy = 1 for if child i resided in district d, which
had rural private school enrollment rate above the median level in the year 2009 for grade 1
children.
Table 1.7 presents results from the estimating Equation 1.11. Though overall learning
outcomes declined for cohorts affected by the CCE provision of the RTE Act, test scores
for Mathematics (first row of column (2)) were 0.06 s.d (p < 0.01) higher and those for
Reading (first row of column (3)) were also 0.04 s.d (p < 0.01) higher in districts with higher
school competition compared to those in lower school competition districts. The reduction
in school quality did not affect overall private school enrollment for cohorts affected by the
CCE provision of the RTE Act, but private school enrollment rose by 0.03 percentage points
(p < 0.01), or 12 percent, in districts with higher school competition compared to those
in lower school competition districts. This suggests that equilibrium school quality declined
relatively less in areas with overall higher school competition. And, families did switch schools
in response to a change in relative school quality in areas where families were more sensitive
to relative quality differences between schools due to the presence of private options. These
results are robust to alternate definitions of High Competition. See Table 1.15, where I use
the presence of a private school in the village as a measure of high competition.

School type
Overall, the results suggest that schools choose quality strategically and they responded to a
decline in the importance of school accountability by reducing quality. However, the extent
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Table 1.7: The Effect of CCE on Enrollment and Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by
Market Structure
(1)
Pvt. Enrollment

(2)
Mathematics

(3)
Reading

Treated Cohort
× High Competition

0.03***
(0.00)

0.06***
(0.01)

0.04***
(0.01)

Treated Cohort

-0.02***
(0.00)

-0.10***
(0.01)

-0.13***
(0.01)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean, High Competition
Dep. Variable Mean, Low Competition

2267755
0.22
0.33
0.15

2126247
0.43
0.08
0.11

2133392
0.44
0.07
0.06

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for
the individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, district fixed effects, grade
fixed effects, year fixed effect, and district-grade specific linear time trends. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is a dummy for if the child is enrolled in a private school, in (2) it is the standardized z-score for
Mathematics test, and in (3) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test in the local language. These have
been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade. High Competition is a dummy
for if the district was above the median in 2009 for rural private school enrollment rate of grade 1 children,
computed using DISE 2009. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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of the decline depended on the market structure and competition from other schools. In this
subsection, I explore if there is heterogeneity in response by the type of school.
Table 1.8 presents results from estimating Equation 1.11, where the dimension of heterogeneity examined is the school type of the child, i.e., whether the child attends public
school or private school. The outcome variables covered in this table are the Mathematics
test z-score (column (1)) and the Reading test z-score (column (2)). There are no results for
private school enrollment since the regression results are conditional on being enrolled in a
public school or a private school. Learning outcomes worsened for children in both public
as well as private schools, but the extent of decline was larger in public schools. Students
in public schools experienced a decline that was 0.10 s.d (p < 0.01) in Mathematics (row
1 of column (1)) and 0.09 s.d (p < 0.01) in Reading (row 1 of column (2)) larger than the
respective declines for children in private schools. In private schools, children experienced a
decline of 0.04 s.d (p < 0.01) in Reading (row 2 of column (2)).
Further, in Table 1.9, I present results from the estimating Equation 1.11, where the
dimension of heterogeneity examined is market structure as defined in the previous subsection,
run separately for public and private schools. The purpose of this table is to examine if
market structure moderated the effect of a decline in the importance of accountability for
both private and public schools. The top panel shows regression results for children enrolled
in a public school, and the bottom panel shows results for children enrolled in a private school.
In districts with high competition, cohorts affected by the CCE provision of the RTE Act
experienced a smaller decline in learning outcomes in both public and private schools vis-à-vis
districts with lower competition. For public school children in grades affected by CCE, test
scores for Mathematics were 0.05 s.d (p < 0.01) higher and those for Reading were 0.03 s.d
(p < 0.10) higher in high competition districts compared to low competition districts. For
private school children in grades affected by CCE, test scores for Mathematics were 0.04 s.d
(p < 0.01) higher and those for Reading were 0.02 s.d (p < 0.01) higher in high competition
districts. These results are robust to the alternate definition of school competition (see Table
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1.16).
The results in this subsection must be interpreted with the caveat that these are conditional on the choice of schools of the children after the implementation of the Act, and will
thus include the effect of any compositional changes. However, these compositional changes
will be small since the CCE provision did not increase the probability of private school
enrollment on average (Table 1.5).
Table 1.8: The Effect of CCE on Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by School type
(1)
Mathematics

(2)
Reading

Treated Cohort
× Public School

-0.10***
(0.00)

-0.09***
(0.00)

Treated Cohort

0.00
(0.01)

-0.04***
(0.00)

2166769
0.39
0.12
0.30

2174103
0.40
0.09
0.26

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean, Public Schools
Dep. Variable Mean, Private Schools

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for the
individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, district fixed effects, grade fixed
effects, year fixed effect, and district-grade specific linear time trends. The dependent variable in Column (1)
is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test, and in (2) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test
in the local language. These have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade.
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014

1.7.5

Robustness

Defining Disadvantage
I test for the robustness of the results in Table 1.14 for an alternate definition of disadvantage. I use information on household assets like the type of dwelling, electricity connection,
and ownership of television to construct an index of household assets using the Principal
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Table 1.9: The Effect of CCE on Enrollment and Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by
Market Structure and School type
(1)
Mathematics

(2)
Reading

Treated Cohort
× High Competition

0.05***
(0.01)

0.03***
(0.01)

Treated Cohort

-0.11***
(0.02)

-0.15***
(0.02)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean, High Competition
Dep. Variable Mean, Low Competition

1530826
0.45
0.10
0.14

1536037
0.46
0.09
0.09

Treated Cohort
× High Competition

0.04***
(0.02)

0.02***
(0.01)

Treated Cohort

-0.05***
(0.01)

-0.07***
(0.02)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean, High Competition
Dep. Variable Mean, Low Competition

575942
0.39
0.26
0.40

577758
0.41
0.22
0.36

School type - Public School

School type - Private School

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for the
individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, district fixed effects, grade fixed
effects, year fixed effect, and district-grade specific linear time trends. The dependent variable in Column
(1) is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test, and in (2) it is the standardized z-score for Reading
test in the local language. These have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every
grade. The top panel provides results for students enrolled in a public school, and the bottom panel provides
results for students enrolled in a private school. High Competition is a dummy for if the district was above
the median in 2009 for rural private school enrollment rate of grade 1 children, computed using DISE 2009.
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Component Analysis. I next define disadvantage to be a dummy= 1 for households below the
median household assets index, and re-estimate Equation 1.9. These results are presented in
Table 1.13. Overall, these results are very similar to those in 1.4, implying the results are not
sensitive to the definition of disadvantage. Further, the results in Table 1.6 are also robust
to this alternate definition of disadvantage. See Table 1.14.

Parallel Trends
The validity of the results in Table 1.5 using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy
depends on the assumption that there are parallel trends in the evolution of the learning
outcomes of those in the treated group and the untreated group. Since there is an overlap
of the 25% rule and the CCE provision of the RTE Act for certain grades, I eliminate these
overlapping grades from the analyses and compare the learning outcomes of those who are
always treated by the CCE provision with those who are never treated by the CCE provision.
Figure 1.13 provides a visual inspection for the parallel trends assumption. The top panel
plots the trends for standardized (relative to 2009 level) test scores for Mathematics for those
in the (always) treated and untreated grades after controlling for the individual characteristics
of the student and including grade and district fixed effects. Similarly, the bottom panel shows
the same trends for the standardized (relative to 2009 level) test scores in Reading. Overall,
there seems to be a parallel trend in the pre-treatment for learning outcomes in both Math
and Reading.

1.7.6

Mechanisms

So far, the results indicate that the 25% rule had a positive impact on the learning outcomes
of those eligible to take advantage of this provision of the RTE Act. This is driven by the
increased enrollment of the affected population in private schools. On the other hand, the
CCE provision of the RTE Act negatively affected the learning outcomes of those affected by
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the provision. There could be several possible mechanisms driving this result. Students and
households could be responding to the lack of incentives by reducing investment in education.
Or, schools could be responding strategically to the lack of accountability and reducing costly
quality. I explore some of these mechanisms in this section.
Table 1.10 explores how public schools responded to the RTE Act, in villages with and
without competitive pressures from the presence of a private school. I use observational
data on teacher attendance and school infrastructure from the ASER school survey. In my
empirical specification, I control for the presence of other village-level public goods, and
include district fixed effects. Focusing on just physical infrastructure (columns (1)-(3)), it
seems that schools improved their quality after the implementation of the RTE Act, with no
heterogeneity by the presence to a private school in the village. In villages without a private
school, after the implementation of the RTE Act, the probability that a public school had tap
for water went up by 0.02 percentage points (second row of column (2)) or 2.6 percent, and
the probability that a public school had a functioning toilet went up by 0.2 percentage points
(second row of column (3)) or 25.9 percent. There was no change in the probability of having
a blackboard, which could be because almost all schools (∼ 94%) had a blackboard before
RTE was implemented. The pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) also improved (second row in column
(4)), falling from 52 pupils per teacher in 2009 to just under 44 after the implementation of
the Act. There were also improvements in the pupil-classroom ratio (PCR), with it falling
by 4.9 pupils per classroom (second row of column (5)). However, teacher absenteeism
increased after the implementation of the RTE Act. In villages without a private school,
teacher attendance went down by 0.04 percentage points (second row of column (6)) or 4.5
percent. Moreover, this decline in teacher attendance was lower in public schools that faced
competition from the presence of a private school in the village. Teacher attendance was
0.01 percentage point (first row of column (6)) higher in public schools in villages with a
private school as compared to villages without a private school. Thus, it seems that after the
implementation of the RTE Act, schools improved physical infrastructure, which was also a
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provision of the Act, but the quality of teaching went down, more so in areas without any
threat of competition. The results on teacher absenteeism are especially enlightening since
teacher absenteeism represents the extensive margin of the response from teachers, with data
on intensive margin like changes in teaching practices hard to measure. A few caveats apply
to these results. First, the data from ASER school survey is not representative of Indian
schools. And second, we cannot say anything about the response of private schools to the
Act.
Table 1.10: Public School Response
(1)
Board

(2)
Tap

(3)
Toilet

(4)
PTR

(5)
PCR

(6)
Tchr Attd.

After
× Pvt. School in Village

0.01
(0.00)

0.00
(0.01)

0.01
(0.02)

0.77
(0.92)

0.96
(0.83)

0.01***
(0.00)

After

0.00
(0.00)

0.02**
(0.01)

0.20***
(0.02)

-8.60***
(0.74)

-4.90***
(0.76)

-0.04***
(0.00)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

76760
0.04
0.94

77646
0.14
0.76

82827
0.12
0.77

72083
0.25
52.25

61020
0.30
44.27

74916
0.06
0.89

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. All regressions control for village
characteristics, and district fixed effects. The dependent variable in Column (1) is a dummy for if the school
has a blackboard, in (2) it is a dummy for if the school has a tap for water, in (3) it is a dummy for if the
school has a toilet, in (4) it is the pupil-teacher ratio, in (5) it is the pupil-classroom ratio, and in (6) it is
the attendance rate of the teachers. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER School Survey 2007, 2009-2014

In Table 1.11, I explore how households responded to the RTE Act, and if their response
varied by the market structure. I use the IHDS panel data for this table, and restrict the
sample to children affected by the provisions of the RTE Act, i.e., below grade 8. In my empirical specification, in addition to controlling for individual level characteristics (age, gender
and birthorder), I control for a rich set of household characteristics (household size, mother’s
education, caste, per capita income, per capita consumption, and per capita food expenditure), and include district fixed effects. As a measure of the presence of competitive pressures
between schools, I use a dummy for if the village has multiple schools. The outcome variables
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covered in this table are the hours spent per week in school (column (1)), hours spent per
week doing homework (column (2)), hours spent per week attending supplementary paid private tuition (column (3)), average number of days missed at school in a month (column (4)),
and whether parents were involved in discussions about their pupils with teachers (column
(5)). After the implementation of the Act, in villages with just one school, children spent
0.57 less hours per week doing homework (second row of column (2)), a decline of 7.4 percent.
There is however no statistical difference in hours spent doing homework in villages with just
one school or with multiple schools. Thus, spending less time doing homework could explain
some of the decline observed in learning outcomes, but it cannot explain why the decline was
lower in areas with higher competitive pressures. Also, households don’t seem to respond
negatively on any other margin. This is of course not an exhaustive list of ways households
can reduce investment in education, but the lack of response in some of the most obvious
ways households could have reduced investment does seem to show that the observed decline
in learning outcomes is not driven by a change in household or student behavior.

1.8

Conclusion

This paper examines the impact of a large and unique public policy in India, the Right to
Education Act, which simultaneously reduced the cost of attending private school for the
disadvantaged and reduced accountability for schools by eliminating the existing examination system for all students in primary and secondary grades, on enrollment decisions and
learning outcomes. I find that the policy was successful in increasing private school enrollment by 24% for children in entry grades. This also led to an improvement in their learning
outcomes in both Mathematics and Reading. There were no differential improvements for
the subset of the children intended to be the direct beneficiaries of the reduction in the cost
of attending private schools. A majority of the children, not affected by the reduction in the
cost of attending private schools, suffered because of the elimination of the standard year-end
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Table 1.11: Household Response
(1)

(2)
(3)
Hours per week
School Hwork Pvt Tuition

(4)

(5)

Absent

Tchr disc.

After
× Multiple Schools in Village

1.06**
(0.41)

-0.09
(0.31)

-0.15
(0.16)

0.16
(0.30)

-0.03
(0.02)

After

0.43
(0.40)

-0.57**
(0.27)

0.08
(0.16)

0.17
(0.25)

0.03
(0.02)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

19794
0.25
31.32

19759
0.21
7.63

18951
0.24
1.52

19630
0.17
2.95

20171
0.17
0.69

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. All regressions include controls for
individual characteristics - age, gender, birthorder; household characteristics - mother’s education, household
size, caste, per capita income, per capita consumption, per capita food expenditure; and PSU fixed effects.
The dependent variable in Column (1) is the hours spent per week by the child in school, in (2) it is the
hours spent per week doing homework, in (3) it is the hours spent per week attending supplementary paid
private tuition, in (4) it is the average number of days missed at school in a month, and in (5) it is a dummy
for if the parents were involved in discussions about their pupils with teachers. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: IHDS Panel Data

examination system. The decline in learning outcomes was moderated by the competition
levels in the local school market. Specifically, learning outcomes declined less where the
level of competition in the local school market was high. Children in public schools experienced larger declines in learning outcomes compared to those in private schools. Children
belonging to disadvantaged backgrounds but ineligible to take advantage of the reduction
in private school costs experienced larger declines in learning outcomes compared to those
from non-disadvantaged backgrounds. Thus, the policy designed with the aim of redistributing educational opportunity and preventing discrimination of children from disadvantaged
backgrounds had the unintended consequence of worsening learning levels. It was, however,
able to partially shield the children belonging to both disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged
backgrounds in entry grades by reducing the costs of attending private school for a few,
resulting in schools improving their quality in equilibrium.
The results in this paper are consistent with a model where schools choose quality strate-
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gically and respond to a decline in accountability pressures by reducing quality. Using data
for public schools, I find that teacher absenteeism increased after the implementation of the
Act, and the rise in absenteeism in public schools was lower in villages that had a private
school. These findings open new avenues for research. The current results explain changes in
teaching quality at the extensive margin. Future research could examine the impact of the
Act on the intensive margin of teaching quality, i.e., how did teaching practices change in
response to the Act. Further, future research could examine the extensive margin of school
response, i.e., how did school entry/exit decisions as well as location decisions respond to the
Act. This could be a particularly interesting exercise given that the reimbursement formula
in the RTE Act for the private schools affected the low-fee private schools and high-fee private
schools differentially.
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1.9.1

Appendix
Additional Figures
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Figure 1.10: Trends in Enrollment and Private School Enrollment for 6-10 Age-group

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2012

2014

Year

-.05

0

.05

.1

(a) Enrollment

2004
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Year

(b) Pvt. School Enrollment

NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all children between the age of 6-10, and all states
except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the probability of being
enrolled in any school, and the bottom panel shows the probability of being enrolled in a private school
conditional on being enrolled in any school.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Figure 1.11: Trends in Learning Outcomes, inclusive of out-of-school students

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2012

2014

Year

-.2

-.15

-.1

-.05

0

.05

(a) Mathematics
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(b) Reading in Local Language

NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all children between the age of 6-14 (irrespective of
school-going status), and all states except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel
shows the z-score for Mathematics, while the bottom panel shows the z-score for Reading. These have been
standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every age.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Figure 1.12: Trends in Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by Household Assets
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(a) Mathematics
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95% CI
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(b) Reading

NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. The sample includes all school-going children between the age of 6-14, and
all states except for Jammu & Kashmir. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the heterogeneity in
z-score for Mathematics for students belonging to disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged background, while
the bottom panel shows the same heterogeneity for z-scores in Reading. Disadvantage is defined as the
household being below the median of the household assets index.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014

59

-.4

-.3

-.2

-.1

0

Figure 1.13: Testing for Parallel Trends
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NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients from an event-study regression, with controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics, district fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the district-grade. 2009 is the base category. The top panel shows the evolution of the Math
z-score for students who belong to the (always) treated grades compared to the students who belong to the
grades never affected by the CCE provision of the RTE Act. Similarly, the bottom panel shows these patterns
for the Reading z-score.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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1.9.2

Additional Tables
Table 1.12: Trends in Learning Outcomes, ASER household survey
(1)
Mathematics

(2)
Reading

After

-0.24***
(0.01)

-0.15***
(0.01)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

3161642
0.46
0.10

3282117
0.46
0.07

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for the
individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, grade fixed effects, and district
fixed effects. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test, and
in (2) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test in the local language. These have been standardized
relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014

Table 1.13: The Effect of 25 percent Reservation on Enrollment and Learning Outcomes of
the Disadvantaged - Robustness to the Definition of Disadvantage
(1)
Pvt. Enrollment

(2)
Mathematics

(3)
Reading

-0.00
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.01)

2393642
0.30
0.19

2210501
0.55
0.01

2217833
0.55
-0.02

Treated Cohort× Disadvantaged
×Pvt. School in Village
Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for
the individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, and district fixed effects. The
regressions also include district-grade fixed effects, district-year fixed effects and district-grade specific linear
time trends. The dependent variable in Column (1) is a dummy for if the child is enrolled in a private school,
in (2) it is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test, and in (3) it is the standardized z-score for Reading
test in the local language. These have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every
grade. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Table 1.14: The Effect of CCE on Enrollment and Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by
Household type - Robustness to the Definition of Disadvantage
(1)
Pvt. Enrollment

(2)
Mathematics

(3)
Reading

Treated Cohort
× Disadvantaged

-0.03***
(0.00)

-0.11***
(0.00)

-0.12***
(0.00)

Treated Cohort

0.01***
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.01)

-0.03***
(0.00)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean, Disadvantaged
Dep. Variable Mean, Non-disadvantaged

2334574
0.22
0.19
0.32

2186675
0.43
0.01
0.22

2194131
0.45
-0.02
0.18

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for
the individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, district fixed effects, grade
fixed effects, year fixed effect, and district-grade specific linear time trends. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is a dummy for if the child is enrolled in a private school, in (2) it is the standardized z-score
for Mathematics test, and in (3) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test in the local language. These
have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade. Disadvantage is defined as
the household having assets below the median of the household asset index. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014

Table 1.15: The Effect of CCE on Enrollment and Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by
Market Structure - Robustness to the Definition of High Competition
(1)
Pvt. Enrollment

(2)
Mathematics

(3)
Reading

Treated Cohort
× High Competition

0.03***
(0.00)

0.04***
(0.00)

0.04***
(0.00)

Treated Cohort

-0.02***
(0.00)

-0.08***
(0.01)

-0.12***
(0.01)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

2334574
0.22
0.25

2186675
0.43
0.10

2194131
0.44
0.07

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for
the individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, district fixed effects, grade
fixed effects, year fixed effect, and district-grade specific linear time trends. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is a dummy for if the child is enrolled in a private school, in (2) it is the standardized z-score for
Mathematics test, and in (3) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test in the local language. These have
been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade. High Competition is a dummy for
if the village had a private school in the given year. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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Table 1.16: The Effect of CCE on Learning Outcomes, Heterogeneity by Market Structure
and School type - Robustness to the Definition of High Competition
(1)
Mathematics

(2)
Reading

Treated Cohort
× High Competition

0.02***
(0.00)

0.02***
(0.00)

Treated Cohort

-0.09***
(0.01)

-0.14***
(0.01)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

1570842
0.45
0.12

1576281
0.46
0.09

0.01
(0.00)

0.02***
(0.00)

Treated Cohort

-0.02***
(0.01)

-0.06***
(0.01)

Observations
R-squared
Dep. Variable Mean (2009)

595927
0.39
0.30

597822
0.41
0.26

School type - Public School

School type - Private School
Treated Cohort
× High Competition

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district-grade level. All regressions control for the
individual characteristics, household characteristics, village characteristics, district fixed effects, grade fixed
effects, year fixed effect, and district-grade specific linear time trends. The dependent variable in Column (1)
is the standardized z-score for Mathematics test, and in (2) it is the standardized z-score for Reading test
in the local language. These have been standardized relative to the 2009 level of test scores for every grade.
The top panel provides results for students enrolled in a public school, and the bottom panel provides results
for students enrolled in a private school. High Competition is a dummy for if the village had a private school
in the given year. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: ASER Household Surveys 2006-2014
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1.9.3

Mathematical Appendix

In this section I present the mathematical proofs for the claims discussed in Section 1.5.
Claim 1: A reduction in the cost of attending private schools for the disadvantaged families will increase equilibrium school quality.

Proof : The first order condition for equilibrium effort supplied by school type s (from
Equation 1.7) is -

R1 (.) + R2 (.)ρs q 0 (es )(E1D (.) + E1A (.)) + θq 0 (es ) = 0

Taking the total derivative of the first order condition with respect to ∆CD gives us the
following expression for the derivative of equilibrium effort with respect to ∆CD -

D
(.) + R22 (.)ρ2s q 0 (es )E1D (.)E2D (.) + R12 (.)ρs E2D (.))
de∗s
−(R2 (.)ρs q 0 (es )E12
=
,
d∆CD
A1 + A2 + A3

where
A1 = R11 (.) + R12 (.)ρs E1 (.)q 0 (es )
A2 = R22 (.)(ρs E1 (.)q 0 (es ))2 + R12 (.)ρs E1 (.)q 0 (es ) + R2 (.)ρs E11 (.)(q 0 (es ))2 + R2 (.)ρs E1 (.)q 00 (es )
A3 = θq 00 (es )

Using the implicit function theorem, it can be shown that R1 (.) < 0, R2 (.) > 0, R11 (.) < 0,
R22 (.) < 0, R12 (.) < 0 and

∂ 2 πs
∂Es ∂es

< 0 implies that E11 (.) < 0 and E12 (.) > 0.

And further, since E1 (.) > 0, E2 (.) < 0, q 0 (es ) > 0, and q 00 (es ) < 0, it follows that

64

de∗s
>0
d∆CD
Thus, as ∆CD = CDG − CDP increases, i.e., private schools become relatively cheaper for
the disadvantaged children, the effort supplied by schools increases.
Claim 2: Lower accountability will lower equilibrium school quality.
Proof : The first order condition for equilibrium effort supplied by school type s (from Equation 1.7) is -

R1 (.) + R2 (.)ρs q 0 (es )(E1D (.) + E1A (.)) + θq 0 (es ) = 0

Taking the total derivative of the first order condition with respect to θ gives us the
following expression for the derivative of equilibrium effort with respect to the importance of
school accountability θ -

de∗s
−q 0 (es )
=
,
dθ
A1 + A2 + A3
where
A1 = R11 (.) + R12 (.)ρs E1 (.)q 0 (es )
A2 = R22 (.)(ρs E1 (.)q 0 (es ))2 + R12 (.)ρs E1 (.)q 0 (es ) + R2 (.)ρs E11 (.)(q 0 (es ))2 + R2 (.)ρs E1 (.)q 00 (es )
A3 = θq 00 (es )

Using the implicit function theorem, it can be shown that R1 (.) < 0, R2 (.) > 0, R11 (.) < 0,
R22 (.) < 0, R12 (.) < 0 and

∂ 2 πs
∂Es ∂es

< 0 implies that E11 (.) < 0.

And further, since E1 (.) > 0, E2 (.) < 0, q 0 (es ) > 0, and q 00 (es ) < 0, it follows that
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de∗s
>0
dθ
Equilibrium effort is increasing in the importance of school accountability θ. Thus, as
the importance of accountability decreases, the optimal effort for each school type decreases,
thereby decreasing school quality.
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1.9.4

ASER Tools (in Hindi)
Figure 1.14: Reading Tool
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Figure 1.15: Mathematics Tool
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Chapter 2
Wheels of Change: Transforming Girls’
Lives with Bicycles
(with Nathan Fiala, Ana Garcia-Hernandez and Nishith Prakash)

2.1

Introduction

In the last two decades, developing countries have made considerable progress in closing
the gender gap in education: women have more education today than they did fifty years
ago in every country in the world (Barro and Lee, 2013). Despite this, adult women have
less education than men in more than two-thirds of the world’s countries (Evans et al.,
2020). There are several binding constraints for girls around the world, including the cost of
schooling, social norms of schooling, safety, and distance to school. This is especially true in
Zambia, where girls need to walk long distances to school and face harassment along the way
(DHS, 2002). Starting in higher grades of primary school, adolescent girls are more likely
to drop out of school than their male counterparts (Bank, 2018). Though long-distances to
school is a problem for everyone, it is especially critical for girls who reach puberty around
this age and face additional risks, including the danger of being assaulted on the way to school
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(Hawke, 2015). In this paper, we evaluate the impact of a conditional in-kind transfer program
that provides a bicycle to a school-going girl on measures of education and empowerment in
rural Zambia.
Reducing gender disparities in education is an important policy question for developing
countries. In addition to being one of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
in 2030, it is also considered to be an important pathway to women’s empowerment (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Although Zambia has reduced the gender gap in primary schooling
dramatically over the past decade, gaps still exist in school enrollment, attendance, and
dropouts, and this gap increases with age.1 Moreover, parity in education access has not
translated to parity in effective education attainment and learning (Saito, 2011). One of the
main reasons cited by researchers is the long distance to school, which affects girls differentially than boys (Hawke, 2015), and is a larger problem in rural areas compared to urban
areas (DHS, 2002).2
Almost 98% of the students in our sample walk to school, and on an average they travel
approximately 110 minutes one way. Walking such long-distances to school can affect the
intensive margin of learning through its impact on student absenteeism, punctuality and
tiredness. National Assessment results in Zambia show that the longer the distance pupils
traveled to school, the lower their learning achievement UNICEF (2014). In so far as gender
parity in human capital acquisition is necessary for long-term growth and a high standard
of living (Duflo, 2012), a policy aimed at improving girls’ effective education attainment is
important for a country like Zambia, with one of the highest levels of gender inequality in
the world.3
We study the impact of providing bicycles to adolescent girls in rural Zambia by exper1
For example, starting in grade 6, significantly more girls leave school than boys. In 2013-14 girls dropped
out of school more than double the rate of boys in grade 7 and three times the rate of boys in grade 11
(McConnell and Mupuwaliywa, 2015).
2
The low population density in rural Zambia presents a challenges of access to school because homes are
isolated from each other, causing children to walk more than 5 km to school UNICEF (2014).
3
Zambia is ranked 116 out of 145 in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index for 2015.

70

imentally varying the distribution of bicycles to girls in school. We hypothesize that the
provision of bicycles will have an impact on their educational attainment and empowerment.
First, by decreasing the daily distance cost of school attendance, we expect a direct impact
on access to education.4 Further, we expect bicycles to provide a safer way of traveling to
school, which could also improve girls’ access to education.5 Second, the provision of bicycles
could directly improve empowerment outcomes for girls. Scholars of the women’s suffrage
movement, including Susan B. Anthony in the United States, have highlighted the role that
bicycles played in empowering women in the 19th century by enhancing their independence,
control, self-reliance, self-respect, mobility, and freedom (Macy, 2011). Improvement in educational attainment could also feed into women’s empowerment (Samarakoon and Parinduri,
2015; Cannonier and Mocan, 2018; Kaffenberger et al., 2018).
We implement a randomized controlled trial in 100 schools in cooperation with World
Bicycle Relief (WBR). WBR provides bicycles to adolescent girls in grades 5, 6, and 7 who
live more than 2.5 km away from school. The bicycle is given on the condition that it
will be used primarily for attending school.6 We randomly divided the schools into two
treatment groups and a control group. The two treatment arms differ in the obligation of
the parents/guardians to pay a small upfront payment at the time of receiving the bicycle.
In the ‘Payment Arm’ (25 schools), the parent pays a small upfront amount (≈ $5)7 , while
in the ‘No Payment Arm’ (20 schools) parents pays nothing ($0). The remaining 55 schools
are in the control group.
Optimal pricing of goods with large spillovers is of considerable policy interest (Morgan,
4

Muralidharan and Prakash (2017) study a state-wide cycling program in the Indian states of Bihar and
find that the policy increased girls’ enrollment in secondary schools by 32% and reduced the gender gap by
40%. The study also finds an 18% increase in the number of girls who appear for the high-stakes secondary
school certificate exam and a 12% increase in the number of girls who pass the exam.
5
Borker (2018) finds that women in Delhi, India choose worse education outcomes for themselves in order
to avoid street harassment, and that they are willing to incur an additional expense of USD 310 per year to
travel by a route that in one SD safer.
6
This is enforced by a Bicycle Supervisory Committee (BSC), which includes members of the community
and the school, using their own set of rules.
7
This is about 6.5% of the average rural monthly household expenditure in Southern Province (CSO,
1991-2017).
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2010). Prices affect not just the demand for goods, but also their utilization. Proponents
of the “cost-sharing” method argue that usage intensity will be higher as charging positive
prices can have a psychological effect on consumers, inducing them to commit the “sunk cost
fallacy” (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980).8 Thus, charging a small upfront cost in the
‘Payment Arm’ could induce parents to push their girls to use the bicycle more. On the other
hand, charging a “zero price” can reduce improper usage of the product by invoking norms
of social exchange (Ariely et al., 2018). This can reduce occurrences of misuse of bicycles by
the parents, making the ownership of bicycles more salient for the girls in the ‘No Payment
Arm’. Therefore, conceptually it is not obvious if the impact of the program will be larger
for the ‘Payment Arm’ or the ‘No Payment Arm’.
We measure the impact of the intervention on three first-stage outcomes. First, girls in
the pooled treatment group were 88% more likely to have access to a bicycle vis-à-vis girls
in the control group. Second, we find that the intervention reduced the number of days
the girls arrived late to school by 1.45 days in the previous week measured at the endline,
which translates to a 66% reduction vis-à-vis the girls in the control group. Third, we find
that the intervention reduced the daily distance cost of attending school. The time taken to
commute to school decreased by about 35 minutes one way in the previous week measured
at the endline, which translates to a 33% decrease from the baseline commuting time.
The intervention improved educational outcomes for girls in the treatment schools. We
find that the intervention reduced overall absenteeism in the previous week by 28%, which
translates to an addition of about 5 school days per academic year. These effects last for at
least two years after the intervention.9 In addition, we also find impacts on dropout, and grade
transition two years after the intervention. Further, we find that the intervention increased
8

There are also additional selection effects of charging positive prices, which can increase usage intensity
by screening individuals with the greatest propensity to consume (Oster, 1995; Ashraf et al., 2010), but can
also dampen demand and reduce program coverage substantially (Cohen et al., 2010). These effects are not
applicable in our context since take up is 100% in all treatment arms.
9
Students in primary school miss an average of 18 days in a school year in the Southern Province (DHS,
2002).
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the score for girls on a mathematics test by 0.11 s.d, but we find no impact on English
test scores.10 The effect size we find is consistent with the conditional and unconditional
cash transfer literature, which concludes that the effects of these interventions on student
achievement are small at best (Baird et al., 2013).11 We also find a small but positive effect
on medium-run grade transition.
We find that the provision of bicycles led to an increase in empowerment outcomes for the
girls in our treated schools. The intervention improved index of locus of control, bargaining,
pro-sociality, and self-image, but it did not have a significant impact on the index of mobility,
aspirations, or desired fertility. In particular, we find that the index of locus of control
increased by 0.16 s.d for girls in the treatment schools for the pooled treatment (Payment
and No Payment combined). However, the intervention improved aspirations by 0.11 s.d and
desired fertility by 0.18 s.d only for girls in the Payment Arm but not in the No Payment
Arm.
Another important impact of the cycle intervention was on girls’ safety. The intervention
improved the perception of safety for the girls in the treated schools by 0.10 s.d. More
importantly, measures of actual safety improved. Approximately 35% of the girls in baseline
reported being teased on their way to school. We find that the intervention reduced the
probability of girls being teased or whistled at on the way to school by about 22%, and the
probability that a girl missed school or left for home early from school due to concerns of
safety by about 33%.12
The translation of improvement in first-stage outcomes to an impact on educational attainment and empowerment outcomes crucially depends on the household response to bicycle
10
Although moving test scores is non-trivial in the education literature, the strong association of the
intervention with Mathematics test scores is consistent with the literature that finds Mathematics achievement
to be more responsive to interventions changing curriculum or instruction time (see Cronin et al. (2005)).
11
The meta-analysis by Baird et al. (2013) suggests a pooled effect sizes in the range of 0.04–0.08 standard
deviations, respectively, for Unconditional Cash Transfer and Conditional Cash Transfer interventions.
12
The results on safety are particularly important since any kind of violence negatively impacts access to
education and a safe environment for learning and is part of the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence against Women.
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provision.13 In particular, the impact of the bicycle depends crucially on how girls are able to
spend the time they save from commuting to school. We find that the intervention leads to
a decrease in time spent on income-generating activities and school chores (for e.g. cleaning)
for the girls in the treatment schools.
Finally, we also examine the heterogeneity in the impact of the program by baseline
time taken to travel to school. Results suggest that the intervention relaxed the distance
constraints for girls living further away from the school (as measured by the presence in the
middle and top tercile), who experience a greater reduction in time taken to travel to school,
and in the number of days they arrive late to school. However, it is the girls in the middle
tercile who experience the greatest reduction in absenteeism compared to the bottom tercile.
It is possible that in spite of the access to bicycles, the distance costs are still large for girls
living the furthest from the school or that these girls face additional constraints.
This paper contributes to several related literatures, including to the literature on school
access for female students. A standard policy response to address the problem of school
access has been to construct schools. Several studies have shown the positive impact of
school construction programs on enrollment and completion (Birdsall et al., 1985; DeTray,
1988; Lillard and Willis, 1994; Lavy, 1996; Duflo, 2001; Burde and Linden, 2013; Kazianga
et al., 2013; Azam and Saing, 2017; Khanna, 2019). Our findings suggest that policies such
as providing bicycles that directly improve school access by reducing the distance, and time
cost of attending school, can be a viable short-to-medium run solution, especially when the
trade-off between school access and scale is of first-order concern.
We also contribute to the large number of papers on the impact of conditional transfers
on schooling outcomes. The majority of the well-identified studies on conditional transfer
programs focus on cash transfers and find a positive impact on girls’ enrollment and attainment (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011; Baird et al., 2011; Filmer
13

Das et al. (2013) find that household inputs are substitutes to school inputs, and that households reduce
their spending to offset anticipated grants in the case of Zambia and India.
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and Schady, 2011; Heath and Mobarak, 2015; Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2010), however, the
evidence on test scores is weak (Baird et al., 2013).14
Our findings also complement a limited number of experimental papers that directly aim
at improving women’s empowerment, however that evidence is mixed. Some of these interventions have looked at the impact of relaxing women’s human capital constraints (Bandiera
et al., 2018), effect of role models (Beaman et al., 2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012; Riley, 2017),
or strengthening women’s financial control (Field et al., 2019) on measures of economic empowerment, fertility, education, and labor force participation. Although the above-mentioned
papers directly attempt to change women’s empowerment, ours does this in a less-salient way
through an improvement in education, aspiration, locus of control, desired fertility choices,
and bargaining.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the growing debate on external validity around experimental and non-experimental studies (Dehejia et al., 2019; Gechter, 2015; Vivalt, 2019;
Kowalski, 2019). The results we obtain here complement well with findings from Muralidharan and Prakash (2017), which was a non-experimental study of a large-scale cycling program for adolescent girls on enrollment and learning outcomes in India. The similarity of
results suggests that identifying the underlying mechanisms can play an important role in
understanding the challenges around replicability and external validity in international development.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss the rural
Zambian context. In Section 2.3 we present the design and methods we employ in this study.
In Section 2.4 we discuss the data collection process and validity of the design. Section 2.5
details our empirical strategy and in Section 2.6 we present our results. Section 3.5 concludes
with a discussion of the ways forward.
14
See Fiszbein and Schady (2009); Rawlings and Rubio (2005) for a review of this literature, and Baird
et al. (2013) for a review on relative effectiveness of conditional and unconditional cash transfers for schooling
outcomes in developing countries.
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2.2

Context

Zambia is a landlocked country and home to over 17 million people. The national education
system in Zambia is divided into the following levels of education: primary education, lower
secondary education or upper basic education, upper secondary education and tertiary or
post-secondary education. Further, primary education is is divided into into lower basic
grades (1-4) and middle basic grades (5-7). Primary education starts at the age of 7, lower
secondary education starts at the age of 14, upper secondary education begins at 16 years of
age, and tertiary education begins at age 19.
Zambia has made remarkable progress in improving access and equity in education, and
provides close to universal education at the primary level, with the gross enrollment ratio
(GER) of 108% at the primary level in 2013 (UNESCO, 2016). This puts Zambia’s primary
level GER above average for sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, despite this progress, there remain
several challenges in Zambia, especially at the above primary level and for girls in rural
areas: absenteeism, dropout, and performance (Mwanza, 2015). These disparities are further
exacerbated between boys and girls throughout adolescence. For example, Zambia’s GER
for girls drops to 61% in the lower secondary level (Bank, 2015) and, starting in grades
6, significantly more girls leave school than boys (Bank, 2015), and students performance
is among the lowest in the region according to the 2007 Southern Africa Consortium for
Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ).
Overall, despite striking progress in increasing overall enrollment, Zambia needs to reduce
gender gaps in absenteeism, dropout, and educational attainment, for adolescents, especially
at the above primary level. This will require addressing both the supply of and demand for
education constraints. In this study, we partnered with World Bicycle Relief (WBR) and
Ministry of General Education in Zambia to test the impact of a program that provided a
bicycle to a school-going girl on measures of education and empowerment. This intervention
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mimics a conditional in-kind transfer program and had features of both demand and supplyside interventions (Muralidharan and Prakash, 2017). WBR provided bicycles if a student
was enrolled, which is similar to demand-side conditional cash transfer programs, but access
to bicycles reduces the daily distance cost and improves the safety of girls while going to
school, which are similar to supply-side interventions.

2.3
2.3.1

Design and Methods
Treatment Arms

This experiment is a multi-treatment design with 100 schools randomly allocated to one of
two treatment groups or a control group.

Payment Arm (T1)
The first treatment uses the same model as the Bicycle Education and Empowerment Program (BEEP) intervention that World Bicycle Relief (WBR) has rolled out in 19 districts in
Zambia since 2009.15 Students received a bicycle on the condition that the bicycle is used
primarily to travel to school. A Bicycle Supervisory Committee (BSC) is in charge of monitoring the program at the school. A field mechanic was trained for each school, who provided
maintenance checks and repairs for a fee borne by the recipient of the bicycle. Each school
was then provided with a startup spare parts kit and the family of each beneficiary student
was required to pay a contribution of 50 Kwacha (≈ $5) toward this kit. We randomly
selected 25 schools for the Payment Arm.
15

World Bicycle Relief, an organization that has worked in Zambia since 2009, and distributed over 183
thousand bicycles worldwide.
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No Payment Arm (T2)
The second treatment is a slight modification of the BEEP intervention. Students still
received a bicycle on the condition that the bicycle be used primarily to travel to school, a
BSC was formed, and a field mechanic was trained for each school. Each school was provided
with a startup spare parts kit, but no contribution was obtained from the beneficiary students’
families. We randomly selected 20 schools for the No Payment Arm.
We are thus removing only one part of the first treatment arm here: the upfront cost.
The motivation behind this treatment arm comes from our focus group meetings and the
psychology literature. A key take-away from the focus group meetings was that the ownership
of the bicycle is more likely to be salient for a girl when parents do not have to pay any upfront
cost. Ariely et al. (2018) suggests that charging a “zero price” can reduce improper usage
of the product by invoking norms of social exchange. This is likely to reduce occurrences of
misuse of bicycles by the parents, making the ownership of bicycles more salient for the girls
in the ‘No Payment Arm’.

Control Group
Students in the control group did not receive a bicycle. We randomly selected 55 schools for
the control group.

2.3.2

Sample Selection and Randomization

World Bicycle Relief conducted an initial needs assessment in several districts in Zambia to
identify three districts where students walked long distances to school, and where the program
was not already being implemented. The three districts were Monze, Mazabuka, and Kalomo.
The province that these three districts belong to is characterized by low population density
and rural settlements, which makes distance a barrier for accessing basic services.
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Within the three districts, a total of 100 schools were randomly selected from all public
schools that met the following criteria.16 First, each school had at least 20 girls enrolled in
grades 5, 6 and 7, who walk more than 3 kms to school. Second, schools are basic schools,
i.e., their starting grade is 1 or lower and their last grade is beyond grade 7 (end of primary)
up to grade 9 (last grade before secondary education). WBR worked with the schools to
compile a list of students in grades 5, 6 and 7, who walked more than 3 kms to school. The
teachers generally knew the distance students walk and were able to reference information on
where girls lived. In addition, we also confirmed the distance indicators during the baseline
survey. From the list of eligible girls, in each school we randomly selected 25 of them to be
part of our survey, for a total sample of 2,471 girls. Finally, within each district, the schools
were randomly assigned to one of the two treatment arms or control.17 Randomization was
stratified by district. We describe the sampling procedure in detail in Appendix Section 2.8.4.
In schools assigned to receive the intervention, WBR worked with the schools to select a
Bicycle Supervisory Committee (BSC), consisting of 10-12 members; teachers, Parents and
Teachers Association (PTA) members, local leaders and student representatives. All girls
belonging to the original list of eligible girls (not only the 25 that were part of the survey)
received a bicycle.18

2.3.3

Timeline

Baseline data was collected during the second term of the 2017 school year (July to August
2017).19 The baseline was first launched in the district of Monze and our team spent 9 days
visiting all of the 44 schools. The team then moved to Mazabuka and spent 4 days to visit
all of the 20 schools in the district in 4 days. Finally, the team spent 8.5 days to visit all of
16

Monze (44 schools out of a total of 135 schools), Mazabuka (20 schools out of 81), and Kalomo (36 schools
out of 124).
17
Appendix Figure 2.1 shows the study districts and the selected schools for the sample.
18
If there were multiple girls from the same household, only one bicycle was given to them.
19
It took place between 5th July and 10th August 2017, and the team (supervisors and surveyors) worked
21.5 days in the schools, over a period of 5 weeks.
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the 36 schools in the district of Kalomo.
The girls were asked questions on school attendance, mobility, and measures of bargaining
power. In addition, they were tested on basic skills in Mathematics and English, and a
measure of focus/attention. School characteristics like enrollment and infrastructure were
collected from the headteachers. After the collection of the baseline, schools were randomly
assigned to one of the two treatment arms or control.
The bicycles were distributed to girls in schools during the third term of the 2018 school
year (September to November 2018). Distribution was done with all girls at the same time
in a special event organized by WBR.
The endline survey was implemented one school year after the bicycles were distributed.
Similar to baseline, the girls were asked questions on school attendance, mobility, and measures of bargaining power, as well as tested on basic skills in Mathematics and English,
and a measure of focus/attention. School characteristics like enrollment and infrastructure
were collected from the head teachers during the endline. In a sub-sample of schools, we
also collected non-survey measures of girls’ bargaining power within the household and their
willingness to share an opinion in a group.
See Figure 2.2 for the timeline of the intervention.

2.4

Data Collection and Validity

The empirical analysis uses both survey and administrative data collected from schools,
students, and head-teachers, over the course of the study. The research team used a variety
of methods to collect data from students, and head-teachers (or acting head-teachers).
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2.4.1

Surveys

We administered a 40 minute face-to-face survey to girls in the sample using a tablet to
collect data on primary outcomes (see Appendix Section 2.8.3 for list of variables collected),
and a paper-based survey to collect data on sustained attention (D2 Test) which lasted 10
minutes, learning assessment in English and mathematics which lasted 25 minutes, and a
semi self-administered survey to collect data on questions that were sensitive, which lasted
10 minutes. We also administered a 40 minute face-to-face survey to head-teachers (or acting
head-teachers) using a tablet to collect data on school characteristics. Throughout the girls
surveys, particular care was taken to ensure privacy: girls’ were interviewed by themselves,
without interference from teachers, head-teachers, or classmates. In particular, only after the
face-to-face survey ended with a girl in the school, the enumerator started the next survey.

2.4.2

School Records Data

The research team collected administrative data on student attendance, enrollment, and
dropout in 2019 (two years after the start of the intervention). The survey team took pictures
of the attendance registers which were entered manually for the analysis, and also collected
data on girls enrollment, dropout, and grade transition from the District Education Boards
Secretaries (DEBS).

2.4.3

Primary Outcome Variables

We pre-specified the following primary outcomes for the endline (see Appendix Section 2.8.3
for list of primary outcomes) in the pre-analysis plan (PAP) registered at RCT ID: AEARCTR0003339.
Educational Outcomes: We use three measures of educational outcomes. They are: (i)
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Days Absent, which is a self-reported data on days absent in the previous week (ii) Dropout,
which is a dummy variable is the girl dropped from the school at the endline and (iii) Grade
Transition, which is a dummy variable if the girl progressed to a higher grade, conditional
on not dropping out.
Empowerment Outcomes: We use girls’ responses to 23 individual questions (Appendix
Section 2.8.3 lists the individual variables used in the indices) on various indicators of empowerment to construct the following 4 indices: (i) Index of Mobility and Safety (ii) Index of
Aspiration (iii) Index of Locus of Control and (iv) Index of Marriage and Fertility.20 These
indices include variables in which the higher value indicates a better or positive outcome.
We interpret a positive value in the index as higher empowerment. The variables used to
measure empowerment of girls has been validated and used by Kabeer (1999); Laszlo and
Grantham (2017); Dhar et al. (2018).21
Each index mentioned above is constructed by aggregating responses to several individual
questions into an index, which is a weighted average value of the individual variables, with
weights constructed by normalizing the variables to have the same s.d, and then recovering
the weights from the inverse covariance matrix, following the approach described in Anderson
(2008) (for details on the steps for index construction see Appendix Section 2.8.5).

2.4.4

Secondary Outcome Variables

Similar to the primary outcomes, we pre-specified the following secondary outcomes for the
endline (see Appendix Section 2.8.3 for list of primary outcomes) at RCT ID: AEARCTR0003339.
First Stage Outcomes: We first report the impact of cycles on various measures of distance
20

The research team used a self-administered survey for questions related to safety, security, marriage, and
fertility to allow more privacy to the respondent and to avoid social desirability bias.
21
See Glennerster et al. (2018) for a practical guide to measuring women’s and girls’ empowerment in
impact evaluations.
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cost of attending school: (i) Days late to school in the previous week (ii) Access to the cycle
and (iii) Travel time to school.
Behavioral Outcomes: We use girls’ responses to 16 individual questions (Appendix Section 2.8.3 lists the individual variables used in the indices) on various indicators of behavior
to construct the following 3 indices using Anderson (2008): (i) Index of Bargaining (ii) Index
of Pro-Sociality and (iii) Index of Pro-Sociality.
Test Scores: We administer (i) English and (ii) Mathematics test to measure student
learning outcomes. Both tests were based on the tests administered at the national level by
the Examination Council of Zambia for Grade 5 (see Appendix Section 2.8.6 for the list of
questions).
Index of Focus: We measure focus of girls, using D2 test. The D2 test consists of 14 lines
with 47 characters in each line. This character is a letter “d” or “p” marked with small dashes
either above or below. The respondent has 30 seconds per line to circle the letter “d” with
two marks, above or below in any order (see Appendix Section 2.8.7 for an example of the
test).
The D2 test measures (i) Speed, which is the total number of observations processed in
the D2 test and (ii) Accuracy, which is the correct number of observations processed in the
D2 test. We also combine these to create an Index of Focus using Anderson (2008).
Time Use: We measure how girls spend their time on different activities during a normal
weekday (Appendix Section 2.8.3 lists the individual variables to measure various activities).
These activities are: (i) School Chores (ii) Extra-curricular Activities (iii) Studying and
Homework (iv) Household Chores (v) Engaging in Income Generating Activities and (vi)
Spending time with Friends.
These are categorical variables that specify the amount of time spent by the girl on a
particular activity. They take the value of 0 if the girl spent no time doing that activity, 1
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if she spent less than 30 minutes, 2 for between 30 and 60 minutes, 3 for between 60 and 90
minutes, 4 for between 90 and 120 minutes, and 5 for more than 120 minutes.

2.4.5

Integrity of the Experimental Design

Baseline Balance
We report the baseline characteristics of the schools by treatment status in Appendix Table
2.11 and find that the sample is balanced across most variables, except the number of girls’
toilets in the school. The first panel reports the mean and the standard deviations of the
baseline variables for the schools in the respective treatment arms, and the second-panel tests
for statistical difference across the two arms. The schools in our sample on average have an
enrollment of 680 students, equally split between boys and girls. They employ an average of
about 13 teachers, also equally split between male and female teachers, about three-quarters
of who reside at the school premises. A large fraction of the schools (∼ 60%) have a sanitation
program running, which is also confirmed by the presence of separate toilets for girls and
boys. Most schools have a computer lab (∼ 95%). The schools are similar in the degree of
“remoteness”, as can be seen from the distance to closest town (47 km), tarmac road (25 km),
and secondary school (20 km).
Similarly, we report the baseline characteristics of the girls in the two treatment arms in
Appendix Table 2.12 and find that the sample is balanced across most variables, except grade,
number of times girls eat meat in the meal, socio-economic index, and self-esteem index. The
first panel reports the mean and the standard deviations of the baseline variables for the girls
in the respective treatment arms, and the second-panel tests for statistical difference across
the two arms. The average age for girls in our sample is 13, with about 15% of them currently
engaged or married, and 5% being ever pregnant. The girls have a family size of at least 6
members, and 80% of them have both parents alive. A third of the girls have repeated a grade
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in the past. These girls come from extremely impoverished backgrounds, where they have not
had enough food to eat in 1 out of the last 7 days. The girls are similar across the treatment
arms in terms of the indices on the locus of control, self-esteem, and gender attitudes. These
indices have been constructed using Principal Component Analysis. Appendix Section 2.8.3
has a description of the variables in each of these indices, and their spread across treatment
arms.
We present a detailed description of the sampling of schools and girls in Appendix Section
2.8.4. Overall, we conclude the randomization was successful.

Compliance
The allocation of the bicycles was carried out by World Bicycle Relief, in partnership with
the Ministry of General Education in Zambia in the 45 schools in treatment group. The
distribution took place within the schools and was considered successful by WBR and the
research team. Only one girl out of 2,471 refused the cycle.

Attrition
Attrition on outcome measures is below 9%. In baseline, we interviewed 2,471 girls. In the
endline, we used a two-stage tracking method. This method consists of a first step in which
we attempt to interview the girls in the school where they were enrolled at baseline. We
found 72% of the girls in this phase. From those not found in school, we select 50% randomly
to track in their households, villages, and, if necessary, in other districts. We weight the
answers from those girls interviewed in the second phase depending on the probability of
being sampled in the analysis. This method allows us to maximize the resources available
and keeping the effective attrition rate as low as possible. In the first line of Appendix
Table 2.13, we present the attrition rate if we do not take into consideration the weighting
of the girls found in the second stage of tracking by treatment arm. In the last row, we show
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the effective rate of attrition, using the method described. The tracking rate of girls in the
control group is lower (90%) than the one in the two treatment arms (94% and 92%).22 We
find significant differential attrition between the control group and the No Payment Arm.
However, this difference is not a concern given that the tracking rate is above 90% for all the
groups.
Nevertheless, we check if the attritors are different from those that we interviewed in
the endline in any of the observable characteristics from baseline. In Appendix Table 2.14,
we see that none of the indices of observable at baseline (socioeconomic characteristics of
the household, index of self-esteem, index of locus of control, and index of gender attitudes)
are significantly different for those students interviewed at baseline and for those missing.
Finally, we also estimate Lee bounds of the treatment effects using Lee (2009) to consider
the possibility that other non-observable are endogenous to the treatments. We present the
results in Appendix Tables 2.15–2.17 and find minimal differences between upper and lower
bounds of the treatment effects. Overall, due to the low amount of attrition, our main results
are robust to Lee bounding.

Data Analysis
We evaluate the impact of providing a bicycle to a school-going girl on various measures of
education and empowerment outcomes. We collected a large number of outcomes through a
primary survey to study the impact of the intervention. For complete transparency, we follow
the Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP) which is available and timestamped at RCT ID: AEARCTR0003339.23 The PAP specifies the variables to be analyzed, construction of indexes, how
we plan to address multiple inferences, the empirical specifications we plan to use, and our
approach for tracking and the handling of attrition. The empirical analysis reported in this
22

In Appendix Figure 2.3 we present the numbers of girls that we interviewed in different phases of the
project by treatment.
23
PAP registered at AEA RCT Registry: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3339/
history/34596
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paper follows the PAP. The paper also reports results where we deviated from the PAP. In
such cases, we report these deviations and provide reasons for them while discussing those
results.24

2.5
2.5.1

Empirical Strategy
Reduced-Form Specifications

We estimate the intent-to-treat (ITT) impact of the cycles program for both the treatments
together (Payment Arm and No Payment Arm combined, relative to the control), and separately using the following specification:

Yi,s,t=1 = α0 + α1 Ts + α2 Yi,s,t=0 + Xi,s θ + Cs γ + ei,s ,

(2.1)

where Yi,s,t=1 is the outcome variable of student i in school s measured in post treatment,
and Yi,s,t=0 is its baseline value. Ts is an indicator for the school assigned to the treatment
group, Xi,s is a vector of individual level controls, Cs is a vector of school level controls, and
ei,s is the error term. We cluster the standard errors at the school level in order to account
for unobservable correlation in girls in the same school, and also because the treatment was
assigned at the school level. For outcomes where we do not have baseline values, we do not
include Yi,s,t=0 in the estimation. Finally, β1 is our main coefficient of interest and provides
the ITT effect, which is the effect of being given a bicycle in 2017 on the outcome variable.
We further present the ITT impact of the cycles program by the two treatment arms,
24

A recent paper by Banerjee et al. (2020) discusses the costs and benefits of adhering to PAP, and
recommends that the final research paper be written and judged as a distinct object from the “results of the
PAP”.
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relative to the control using the following specification:
Yi,s,t=1 = β0 + β1 P ayment Arms (T 1) + β2 N o P ayment Arms (T 2)
(2.2)
+β3 Yi,s,t=0 + Xi,s θ + Cs γ + ei,s ,
where P ayment Arms (T 1) and N o P ayment Arms (T 2) are indicators for being assigned
to each of the treatment groups and all other variables are the sample as in Equation 2.1.
Finally, β1 and β2 will provide the ITT effects for each of the two treatment groups.

2.5.2

Accounting for Multiple Comparisons

This study entails a large number of outcome variables, therefore it is important to address
the concern of false positives. We address this using two methods.
First, to control the probability of Type I errors, we use the Benjamini and Hochberg
(1995) False Discovery Rate correction (as specified in the PAP).25 We show results with
the corrected p-values, where the corrections are made within outcome groupings. So, the
primary outcomes will all be corrected together, secondary outcomes corrected together, and
heterogeneity tests will be corrected together. Second, we compute standardized indexes
using Anderson (2008) for several primary and secondary outcome variables, as specified in
the PAP. We do not apply this correction and use the conventional statistical significance
levels while discussing individual variables within particular outcome variables.

2.5.3

Minimum Detectable Effect Sizes

We present the minimum detectible effect sizes (MDEs) in Appendix Table 2.18 for our
primary outcome variables. Due to very low intra-cluster correlation, the MDEs are generally
very low. We are powered to observe changes at or well below 20% for all outcomes.
25

In addition, we also use Westfall et al. (1993) and Holm (1979) to address the concern of false positives
(not specified in the PAP).
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2.6
2.6.1

Results
Impact of Cycles on First Stage Outcomes

We first report the impact of cycles on first stage outcomes: (i) Days late to school in the
previous week (ii) Access to the cycle and (iii) Travel time to school, in Table 2.1.26
Table 2.1: First Stage Outcomes
Dependent variable:

Days Late
(1)

Pooled Treatment

-1.45***
(0.10)
0.00
0.00
0.20

W-Y p-value
B-H p-value
R-squared
Payment Arm
No Payment Arm
Observations
W-Y p-value (Payment Arm)
B-H p-value (Payment Arm)
W-Y p-value (No Payment Arm)
B-H p-value (No Payment Arm)
R-squared
Control group mean
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)

-1.39***
(0.11)
-1.53***
(0.10)
1952
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.20
2.19
0.13

Bike Access Time to school
(2)
(3)
Panel: A
0.88***
-34.82***
(0.02)
(2.94)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.79
0.13
Panel: B
0.89***
-36.44***
(0.03)
(3.33)
0.88***
-33.17***
(0.02)
(4.04)
2001
1879
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.80
0.13
0.02
103.77
0.92
0.45

NOTES: Standard errors clustered at the school level. All regressions include controls for demographics and
baseline value of the dependent variable (wherever available). The dependent variable in (Column 1) is the
number of days in the last week the girl arrived late to school, in (2) is a dummy indicating whether the girl
has access to a bicycle, and in (3) is the time spent traveling to school (in minutes) each way. W-Y p-value
gives the p-value adjusted for multiple hypothesis tests using the methodology of Westfall et al. (1993), and
B-H p-value gives the p-value adjusted for multiple hypothesis tests using the methodology of Holm (1979).
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Panel A in Table 2.1 reports the results for the pooled treatment estimated using Equation 2.1. We find that the intervention reduced the number of days the girls arrived late to
school by 1.45 days (Column 1) in the past week, which translates to a 66% reduction vis-à26

Table 2.19 provides the means and standard deviations of the variables in the estimation sample.
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vis the girls in the control group, and is a direct result of the decline in the average commute
time to school. Most importantly, we find that the girls in the treatment group were 88%
(Column 2) more likely to have access to a bicycle vis-à-vis girls in the control group. Finally,
the intervention reduced the commute time to school by 35 minutes (Column 3) one way.
This corresponds to a decrease of one-third of the control group (baseline) commuting time.
Overall, it is reassuring to find that the intervention had large and statistically significant
impact first stages outcomes.27
Panel B reports the impact of the intervention by the two treatment groups separately
using Equation 2.2. We do not find any statistical difference in the outcome measures between
the two treatment groups. This is not surprising since the impact of cycles on first stage
outcomes should not vary by Payment and the No Payment treatment arms. All estimated
impact remains significant when the p-values are corrected for multiple hypotheses testing.

2.6.2

Impact of Cycles on Educational Outcomes

Table 2.2 reports the impact of the intervention on educational outcomes pre-specified in the
PAP.28 Panel A presents the results for the pooled treatment and Panel B reports the same
separately by the two treatment groups.
We find that the cycles intervention reduced overall absenteeism in the previous week
(Column 1 in Panel A) by 28%, with the effect sizes being identical for the two treatment
arms (Panel B). The impact is sizable, as this translates to an addition of about 5 additional
school days for girls in the Southern Province, where students in primary school miss an
average of 18 days in a school year (DHS, 2002). We do not find any impact on dropouts
27

Primarily motivated by the likely decrease in time taken to reach school due to cycles, we present the
impact of the intervention on an index of focus in Table 2.20. This index measures (i) Speed and (ii) Accuracy
using a D2 test. We do not find a statistically significant impact on index of focus, however, the signs are
positive.
28
We pre-specified Days Absent, Dropout and Grade Transition are registered as primary outcomes; and
test score on English and Mathematics as secondary outcomes in the PAP registered at RCT ID: AEARCTR0003339.
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Table 2.2: Impact on Educational Outcomes
Dependent variable:

Pooled Treatment
W-Y p-value
B-H p-value
R-squared
Payment Arm
No Payment Arm
Observations
W-Y p-value (Payment Arm)
B-H p-value (Payment Arm)
W-Y p-value (No Payment Arm)
B-H p-value (No Payment Arm)
R-squared
Control group mean
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)

Days Absent
(1)
-0.28***
(0.08)
0.00
0.00
0.04
-0.27***
(0.09)
-0.27***
(0.10)
1952
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.04
1.01
0.98

Dropouts Grade Transition Mathematics
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel: A
-0.02
-0.03
0.11*
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.06)
0.64
0.73
0.42
0.99
0.61
0.89
0.34
Panel: B
-0.03
-0.02
0.13*
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.07)
-0.01
-0.03
0.07
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.06)
2448
1931
2001
0.64
0.73
0.42
0.73
0.92
0.42
0.99
0.61
0.89
1.00
0.85
1.00
0.34
0.06
0.94
0.00
0.43
0.69
0.44

English
(5)
0.03
(0.05)
0.73
1.00
0.35
0.06
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.07)
2001
0.73
0.92
1.00
1.00
0.35
0.00
0.30

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent variable (wherever available). The dependent variable in
Column (1) is the number of days the girl missed school in the last week, in Column (2) is a dummy = 1 if
the girl dropped out of school, in (3) is a dummy = 1 if the girl progressed to a higher grade, conditional
on not dropping out, in (4) and (5) is the standardized learning assessment score in Mathematics and English self administered test. W-Y p-value gives the p-value adjusted for multiple hypothesis tests using the
methodology of Westfall et al. (1993), and B-H p-value gives the p-value adjusted for multiple hypothesis
tests using the methodology of Holm (1979). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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(Column 2) and grade transition (Column 3), although the sign of the coefficient is negative
and in the right direction. The result on dropouts is not surprising given the low level of
dropout in the study sample (the control group mean is 6%). Similarly, grade transition is
automatic up to grade 7 in our sample schools. Although statistically insignificant, taken
together, the results suggest that girls in treatment are more likely to be enrolled in school, but
they do not necessarily graduate to higher grades. Given that grade transition is automatic
up to grade 7, this implies that the intervention is successful in keeping those girls in school
who would have otherwise dropped out during the transition to secondary school from grade
7 to grade 8.
Given the sizable reduction on days late to school in the previous week (Column 1 in
Table 2.1) and days absent (Column 1 in Table 2.2), it is imperative to look at the impact
on test scores. We administered tests in English and Mathematics to girls in the baseline
and the endline.29 We find that the intervention increased the Mathematics score for the
girls by 0.11 s.d (Column 4), which is statistically significant. However, we do not find any
impact on English test scores (Column 5). These results are in line with the literature that
finds Mathematics achievement to be more responsive to interventions changing curriculum
or instruction than English (Cronin et al., 2005). Results in Panel B suggests that the
improvements in learning outcomes are driven by girls in the Payment Arm, although there
is not enough evidence to support the differential treatment effect between the two treatment
arms.
Overall, the impact on Mathematics tests score is noteworthy. First, theoretically, it
is not obvious if the reduction in days late to school and days absent (mechanically both
increase the instruction time) will necessarily improve test scores, as it depends on how
this enters the students’ education production function.30 This is particularly challenging
29

The English and Mathematics tests were based on tests administered at the national level by the Examination Council of Zambia for grade 5.
30
Non-experimental evidence from developing countries suggests weak evidence of an increase in additional
days of instruction on test scores (Aguero and Beleche, 2013; Bellei, 2009).
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at the post-primary level. In fact, the review paper by Glewwe and Muralidharan (2016b)
suggests that many expensive standard school inputs are often not effective at improving
learning outcomes, compared to the interventions that focus on improved pedagogy and
school governance. Second, the effect size we find is consistent with the conditional and
unconditional cash transfer literature, which conclude that the effects of these interventions
on student achievement are small at best (Baird et al., 2013).31

2.6.3

Medium Run Impact of Cycles on Educational Outcomes

To study the medium-run impact of the intervention on girls’ education, we collected administrative data on students’ attendance, enrollment, dropout, and grade transition two years
after the cycle intervention.
Table 2.3: Medium Run Impact on Girls Attendance in 2019
Dependent variable:

Days Absent in 2019
Term I
Term II
(1)
(2)
Panel: A
Pooled Treatment
-3.27*** -3.13***
(0.78)
(0.74)
Panel: B
Payment Arm
-2.91*** -2.82***
(0.99)
(0.94)
No Payment Arm
-3.69*** -3.51***
(0.75)
(0.77)
Observations
1469
1467
R-squared
0.10
0.09
Control group mean
8.37
8.44
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)
0.38
0.45
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and grade fixed effects. The dependent variable in Column (1) and (2) is number of days missed by
a girl in a term in 2019. All the columns use administrative data from the school registers collected by the
District Educational Board Secretaries and coordinated by the World Bicycle Relief. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
31

The meta-analysis by Baird et al. (2013) suggests a pooled effect sizes in the range of 0.04–0.08 s.d,
respectively, for Unconditional Cash Transfer and Conditional Cash Transfer interventions.
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Table 2.3 reports the impact of the intervention on girls’ attendance in the term I and
term II of 2019. Panel A presents the results for the pooled treatment and Panel B reports
the same separately by the two treatment groups. We find that the intervention continued
to improve girls’ attendance two years after the cycles program. In particular, girls in the
treatment schools miss 3.27 days less (39% reduction) in term I, and 3.13 (37% reduction)
days less in term II, compared to the girls in the control school in Panel A of Table 2.3. We
do not find the impact to vary by the two treatment groups in Panel B of Table 2.3.
Table 2.4 reports the impact on girls enrollment, dropout and grade transition (enrollment
and dropout are the same). Panel A presents the results for the pooled treatment and Panel
B reports the same separately by the two treatment groups. We find that the girls in the
treatment schools are 11% more likely to be enrollment (or 18% less likely to be dropped out)
than the girls in the control schools. More importantly, the intervention increased the rate
of grade progression of girls in the treatment schools by almost 3% compared to the control
schools. Once again, we do not find the impact to vary by the two treatment groups in Panel
B of Table 2.4.
From a policy standpoint, these are very encouraging results since the intervention continued to improve girls’ educational outcomes in medium run.

2.6.4

Did Bicycles Transform Girls’ Lives?

Impact on Measures of Empowerment
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 reports the impact of the intervention on indices of empowerment prespecified in the PAP. Index of Mobility and Safety, Index of Aspiration, Index of Locus of
Control and Index of Marriage and Fertility are registered as primary outcomes, and Index of
Bargaining, Index of Pro-Sociality and Index of Pro-Sociality as secondary outcomes. Panel
A presents the results for the pooled treatment and Panel B reports the same separately by
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Table 2.4: Medium Run Impact on Girls Educational Outcomes in 2019
Dependent variable:

Enrollment
(1)

Pooled Treatment

0.07**
(0.03)

Payment Arm

0.06*
(0.04)
0.08**
(0.04)
2467
0.05
0.63
0.42

No Payment Arm
Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)

Dropout Grade Transition
(2)
(3)
Panel: A
-0.07**
0.02
(0.03)
(0.02)
Panel: B
-0.06*
0.04*
(0.04)
(0.02)
-0.08**
0.00
(0.04)
(0.03)
2467
1808
0.05
0.03
0.37
0.75
0.42
0.83

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and grade fixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether the
girl is still in enrolled in school in the third term of 2019. All the columns use administrative data from
the school registers collected by the District Educational Board Secretaries and coordinated by the World
Bicycle Relief. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

the two treatment groups.
Overall, estimates from the pooled treatments (Panel A in Tables 2.5 and 2.6) suggests
that the intervention did not have any impact on the indices of: mobility and safety, aspiration, and marriage and fertility. However, the intervention did improve the indices of:
locus of control, bargaining, pro-sociality, and self-image. In particular, the index of: locus
of control improved by 0.16 s.d (Column 3 in Table 2.5), bargaining improved by 0.19 s.d
(Column 1 in Table 2.6), pro-sociality improved by 0.14 s.d (Column 2 in Table 2.6), and
self-image improved by 0.11 s.d (Column 3 in Table 2.6) for girls in the treatment schools.
These are important results as the index of locus of control measures the degree of control
the girls believe they have over outcomes in their lives, and how satisfied they are with their
life in general. Similarly, the index of bargaining measures whether girls have access to
and control over small amounts of resources, the clothes they wear, the food they eat, and
whether they are able to discuss matters pertaining to their lives with their parents.32 The
32

This index is slightly different from the one we registered in the PAP. In particular, we excluded two
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Table 2.5: Impact on Measures of Empowerment
Dependent variable:

Pooled Treatment
W-Y p-value
B-H p-value
R-squared
Payment Arm
No Payment Arm
Observations
W-Y p-value (Payment Arm)
B-H p-value (Payment Arm)
W-Y p-value (No Payment Arm)
B-H p-value (No Payment Arm)
R-squared
Control group mean
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)

Mobility & Safety
(1)
0.00
(0.06)
0.94
1.00
0.01
-0.01
(0.07)
0.02
(0.07)
1935
0.94
0.92
1.00
1.00
0.01
0.33
0.73

Aspirations Control
(2)
(3)
Panel: A
0.06
0.16***
(0.05)
(0.06)
0.37
0.16
1.00
0.46
0.02
0.02
Panel: B
0.11**
0.18**
(0.05)
(0.07)
-0.00
0.13*
(0.08)
(0.07)
1919
2005
0.37
0.16
0.33
0.16
1.00
0.46
1.00
0.55
0.03
0.02
1.44
0.50
0.16
0.55

Fertility & Marriage
(4)
0.10
(0.07)
0.37
1.00
0.07
0.18**
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.08)
1945
0.37
0.33
1.00
1.00
0.07
0.95
0.08

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent variable (wherever available). The dependent variable in
Column (1) is the index on mobility, in Column (2) is the index on aspirations, in Column (3) is the index on locus of control, and in Column (4) is the index on fertility and marriage. All indices have been
variance-weighted using the methodology of Anderson (2008). Endline indices contain imputed values if less
than 10% of the variables in the index had missing values for an observation. The p-values adjusted for
multiple hypotheses testing are corrected with the outcome variables in Table XX of the main outcomes in
empowerment. W-Y p-value gives the p-value adjusted for multiple hypothesis tests using the methodology
of Westfall et al. (1993), and B-H p-value gives the p-value adjusted for multiple hypothesis tests using the
methodology of Holm (1979). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 2.6: Impact on Behavioral Outcomes
Dependent variable:

Bargaining
(1)

Pooled Treatment

0.19***
(0.05)
0.05
0.14
0.05

W-Y p-value
B-H p-value
R-squared
Payment Arm
No Payment Arm
Observations
W-Y p-value (Payment Arm)
B-H p-value (Payment Arm)
W-Y p-value (No Payment Arm)
B-H p-value (No Payment Arm)
R-squared
Control group mean
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)

0.18***
(0.06)
0.18***
(0.07)
1988
0.05
0.06
0.14
0.08
0.05
0.40
0.98

Pro-Sociality
(2)
Panel: A
0.14**
(0.06)
0.45
0.46
0.05
Panel: B
0.11*
(0.06)
0.16*
(0.08)
1874
0.45
0.42
0.46
0.55
0.05
0.77
0.58

Self-Image
(3)
0.11*
(0.06)
0.41
0.85
0.04
0.13*
(0.07)
0.09
(0.07)
1889
0.41
0.36
0.85
1.00
0.04
0.68
0.59

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent variable (wherever available). The dependent variable in
Columns (1) and (2) is an index of bargaining, in Columns (3) and (4) is an index of pro-sociality, and in
Columns (5) and (6) is an index of self-image. All indices have been variance-weighted using the methodology
of Anderson (2008). Endline indices contain imputed values if less than 10% of the variables in the index had
missing values for an observation. The p-values adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing are corrected with
the outcome variables in Table XX of the main outcomes in empowerment. W-Y p-value gives the p-value
adjusted for multiple hypothesis tests using the methodology of Westfall et al. (1993), and B-H p-value gives
the p-value adjusted for multiple hypothesis tests using the methodology of Holm (1979). *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10%.
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index of pro-sociality measures the participation of girls in local clubs, their willingness to
help out their friends, and their knowledge of the local leadership, while the index of selfimage measures what girls think of themselves vis-à-vis their peers in term of academic
achievement, and their probability to succeed in future.
Panel B in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 reports the impact by Payment Arm and No Payment Arm
separately. We find that the intervention improved the index of aspiration and fertility and
marriage for girls in the Payment Arm. In particular, we find that the cycles intervention
improved the index of aspiration by 0.11 s.d, and index of fertility and marriage by 0.18
s.d (Columns 2–3 in Panel B of Table 2.5). The index of aspiration measures the girls’
aspirations with regard to the years of education they want to receive, and their future
participation in the workforce. Similarly, the index of fertility and marriage measures the
girls’ desired fertility behavior, and preferences on the age of marriage.
Improvements in the index of aspiration, and fertility and marriage suggest that the girls
in the Payment Arm aspire to continue education and participate in the workforce in the
future, and have a lower preference to get married early and having many children. In our
context, when a credit-constrained household spends money ex-ante to acquire the bicycles
for their girl child, this might be a signal for the girls in the Payment Arm that their parents
are invested in their education and general well-being. Furthermore, charging a small upfront
cost in the Payment Arm is likely to induce parents to push their girls to use the bicycle
more. This is consistent with the “sunk cost fallacy” which argues that usage intensity is
higher when consumers are charged positive prices (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Thaler, 1980).
Taken together, these results provide the first causal evidence on the transformative role
a bicycle can play on women empowerment, which was first highlighted by scholars of the
women’s suffrage movement.33 The positive impact of the intervention on the empowerment
variables that measure rebellion. The estimated coefficient for the pooled treatment was 0.10 (0.06) and
statistically significant at 10 percent, for Payment Arm was 0.07 (0.07) but not statistically significant, and
for No Payment Arm was 0.14 (0.07) and statistically significant at 5 percent.
33
In 1895, at the age of 80, suffragist leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton claimed that “the bicycle will inspire
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of girls in rural Zambia is likely to have a lasting impact on their future living standards as
argued by Duflo (2012). More importantly, the results on measures of empowerment directly
contribute to the policy debate on interventions that can improve female empowerment,
which is a priority for policymakers in developing countries (UN Sustainable Development
Goal No. 5).34

Impact on Safety
Table 2.7 reports the impact of the intervention on measures of safety. We disaggregate the
index of mobility and safety (Column 1 in Table 2.5) into sub-indices of mobility and safety
separately. These were not pre-specified in the PAP. Panel A presents the results for the
pooled treatment and Panel B reports the same separately by the two treatment groups.
The index of mobility and safety estimated in Column 1 of Table 2.5 contains questions
related to whether (and the intensity) the girl is allowed to visit friends, family members or
going to the market by herself; and questions related to whether the girl feels safe moving
around in the village and traveling to school. Using these two sets of questions, we create subindices of mobility and perceived safety to separately report the impact of the intervention in
Table 2.7 (Columns 1–2). We find that the intervention did not have an impact on the subindex of mobility (Column 1), but improved the perceived safety of girls in the treatment
schools by 0.10 s.d. Once again, we do not find any statistical difference in the outcome
measures between the Payment and No Payment Arm. Although it is surprising that the
intervention did not improve the mobility of girls in the treatment schools, upon further
investigation, we found out that parents of the girls in the treatment schools as well as the
women with more courage, self-respect, self-relianceâĂę” Stanton predicted the power of the bicycle in transforming the lives of women, realizing that the independence women were gaining because of this invention
would allow for growth in other areas of their character. Having the ability to be fully self-reliant, often for
the first time in their lives, would encourage women to be more courageous in other areas, such as demanding
voting rights.
34
The Gender Parity Goals of the UN Sustainable Goal No. 4 aims to achieve gender equality and empower
all women and girls. Similarly, Goal No. 4 aims to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and
promote life-long learning opportunities for all.
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Table 2.7: Impact on Safety Outcomes
Dependent variable:

Sub-Index of
Mobility
(1)

Safety
(2)

Pooled Treatment

-0.02
(0.06)

0.10*
(0.05)

Payment Arm

-0.03
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.07)
1989
0.01
0.25
0.81

0.12*
(0.06)
0.09
(0.06)
1936
0.02
0.31
0.68

No Payment Arm
Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)

Teased
(3)
Panel: A
-0.08***
(0.03)
Panel: B
-0.08***
(0.03)
-0.08**
(0.04)
1954
0.03
0.37
0.90

Missed School
(4)
-0.06***
(0.02)
-0.06***
(0.02)
-0.06**
(0.02)
1953
0.01
0.18
0.80

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent variable (wherever available). The dependent variable in
Columns (1) and (2) is the sub-index of mobility, in Columns (3) and (4) is the sub-index of perceived safety,
in Columns (5) and (6) is the probability of the girl being teased or whistled at on the way to school, and in
Columns (7) and (8) is the probability that a girl misses school or leaves early for home for safety concerns.
All indices have been variance-weighted using the methodology of Anderson (2008). Endline indices contain
imputed values if less than 10% of the variables in the index had missing values for an observation. *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%.

100

members of the Bicycle Supervisory Committee (BSC) considered the bicycle to be a precious
asset, to be used by the girls only for the purpose of traveling to school. These restrictions
on how the bicycle should be used by the girls explain why we do not find an impact on girls’
mobility.
In this study, we also asked questions on two measures of actual safety.35 We find that the
intervention reduced the probability that a girl is teased or whistled at on the way to school
by 22% (Column 3). More importantly, we find that the intervention reduced the probability
that a girl missed school or left for home early from school due to concerns of safety by 33%
(Column 4). Reassuringly, we do not find these results (Columns 3–4 in Panel B) to differ
by the treatment arm.
The results on girls’ safety are particularly important as approximately 35% of the girls
report having been sexually harassed on their way to school in the baseline. There is strong
evidence that violence against women, including sexual harassment, has a negative impact
on psychological costs (Langton and Truman, 2014), human capital investments (Borker,
2018), and labor force participation (Siddique, 2018). Also, harassment by strangers strongly
impacts women’s perception of safety across social contexts (Ross et al., 2000). We believe
that the improvements in safety due to bicycles is likely to have a far-reaching impact on
girls’ well-being.

2.6.5

Impact of Cycles on Time Use

Table 2.8 reports the impact of the intervention on measures of time-use pre-specified in the
PAP. School Chores, Extra-curricular Activities, Studying and Homework, Household Chores,
Engaging in Income Generating Activities, and Spending time with Friends are registered
as secondary outcomes. Panel A presents the results for the pooled treatment and Panel B
35

These two outcomes are not part of the index of mobility and safety and were not pre-specified in the
PAP.
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reports the same separately by the two treatment groups.
Table 2.8: Impact on Time Use
Dependent variable:

School Chores
(1)

ECA
(2)

Home Work
(3)

Pooled Treatment

0.77
(0.14)

1.03
(0.13)

0.93
(0.11)

Payment Arm

0.91
(0.20)
0.62**
(0.13)
1938
0.15

1.15
(0.17)
0.89
(0.15)
1925
0.17

1.02
(0.15)
0.81
(0.11)
1931
0.14

No Payment Arm
Observations
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)

Household Chores
(4)
Panel: A
1.02
(0.12)
Panel: B
1.01
(0.16)
1.02
(0.14)
1997
0.95

Income Generation
(5)

Friends
(6)

0.75**
(0.10)

1.04
(0.11)

0.78
(0.13)
0.73**
(0.11)
2000
0.72

1.06
(0.15)
0.99
(0.12)
2005
0.66

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent variable (wherever available). All columns report odds ratio
from an ordered logit model. The dependent variable is the time spent by the girl doing various activities,
and takes the following values: 0 - no time spent, 1 - less than 30 minutes, 2 - between 30 and 60 minutes,
3 - between 60 and 90 minutes, 4 - between 90 and 120 minutes, 5 - more than 120 minutes. The activities
are: School chores like cleaning in column (1), Extra curricular activities (ECA) in column (2), Studying
and homework in column (3), Household chores in column (4), Engaging in income generating activities in
column (5), and Spending time with friends in Column (6). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

In Table 2.8 we estimate the impact of the intervention on changes in the way the girls
spend their time on different activities during a normal weekday. The dependent variables are
categorical variable, specifying the amount of time spent by the girl on a particular activity.36
The estimated coefficients are odds ratio from an ordered logit specification. We do not find
any impact of the intervention on most of these measures of time use, except time spent in
Engaging in Income Generating Activities (Column 5). The odds of spending time in Income
Generating Activities for the girls in treatment schools is 0.75 times that of girls in the control
group, i.e., girls in treatment are less likely to be engaged in income generating activities.
A plausible explanation could be that the intervention had positive income effects for
the family, thereby not requiring the girl to engage in any income generating activity, or
the intervention changed the value that the family places on education vis-à-vis engaging in
short-term income generating activities, which resulted in a decline in the amount of time
spent by the girls in these activities. However, we do not see an increase in the time spent
36

The dependent variable takes the value 0 if the girl spent no time doing that activity, 1 if she spent less
than 30 minutes, 2 for between 30 and 60 minutes, 3 for between 60 and 90 minutes, 4 for between 90 and
120 minutes, and 5 for more than 120 minutes.
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by girls in studying, but this could be because we measure time in very coarse intervals.

2.6.6

Heterogeneity Analysis

Tables 2.9 and 2.10 reports the heterogeneous impact of the intervention by the baseline
time taken to travel to school (we interact tercile of the baseline time taken to school by the
treatment groups) as pre-specified in the PAP.
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2001
0.79
0.02

Bike Access
(1)
0.87***
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
0.00
(0.03)
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.02)
1952
0.04
0.96

Days Absent
(2)
-0.21**
(0.11)
-0.27*
(0.14)
0.13
(0.19)
0.14
(0.11)
-0.04
(0.13)
1879
0.14
94.00

Time to school
(3)
-28.20***
(4.21)
-9.13*
(5.38)
-15.37**
(6.08)
12.17**
(5.27)
6.16
(7.57)
1952
0.20
2.12

2001
0.34
0.06

Days Late Mathematics
(4)
(5)
-1.27***
0.12
(0.14)
(0.08)
-0.29*
0.01
(0.16)
(0.08)
-0.35*
-0.08
(0.18)
(0.10)
0.14
-0.07
(0.15)
(0.05)
0.07
-0.00
(0.15)
(0.07)
2001
0.35
0.07

English
(6)
0.01
(0.08)
0.09
(0.08)
-0.09
(0.10)
-0.13**
(0.06)
-0.05
(0.08)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent
variable (wherever available). The dependent variable in Column (1) is a dummy for whether the girl has access to a bicycle, in Column (2) is the
number of days the girl missed school in the last week, in Column (3) is the time spent travelling to school (in minutes) each way, in Column (4) is
the number of days in the last week the girl arrived late to school, in Column (5) is the standardised learning assessment score in Mathematics, and
in Column (6) is the standardised learning assessment score in English. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Observations
R-squared
Control group mean (Bottom Tercile)

Top tercile

Middle tercile

Treatment X Top Tercile

Treatment X Middle Tercile

Treatment

Dependent variable:

Table 2.9: Heterogeneous Impact on Educational Outcomes by Baseline Time Taken to School
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0.04
(0.12)
0.01
(0.12)
-0.06
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.09)
1935
0.01
0.36

Treatment X Middle Tercile

Treatment X Top Tercile

Middle Tercile

Top Tercile

Observations
R-squared
Control group mean (Bottom Tercile)

1919
0.03
1.36

0.18**
(0.08)

0.11
(0.08)

-0.03
(0.12)

-0.05
(0.10)

0.09
(0.08)

2005
0.03
0.46

0.15*
(0.08)

-0.02
(0.08)

-0.20*
(0.12)

0.05
(0.11)

0.19**
(0.09)

1945
0.07
1.02

-0.03
(0.08)

-0.08
(0.08)

0.08
(0.12)

-0.07
(0.11)

0.11
(0.09)

1988
0.06
0.35

0.22**
(0.08)

0.08
(0.07)

-0.29**
(0.12)

-0.08
(0.10)

0.29***
(0.08)

Fertility & Marriage Bargaining
(4)
(5)

Index of

1874
0.06
0.80

0.02
(0.07)

-0.06
(0.07)

0.03
(0.11)

0.15
(0.09)

0.08
(0.06)

Pro-Sociality
(6)

1889
0.04
0.66

0.14*
(0.08)

-0.04
(0.09)

-0.16
(0.12)

0.03
(0.12)

0.14
(0.09)

Self-Image
(7)

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent
variable (wherever available). The dependent variable in Column (1) is the index on mobility and safety, in Column (2) is the index on aspirations,
in Column (3) is the index on locus of control, in Column (4) is the index on fertility and marriage, in Column (5) is the index of bargaining (not
including the variables on rebellion), in Column (6) is the index of pro sociality, and in Column (7) is the index of self image. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

-0.01
(0.09)

Mobility Aspiration Locus of Control
(1)
(2)
(3)

Treatment

Dependent variable:

Table 2.10: Heterogeneous Impact on Empowerment Outcomes by Baseline Time Taken to School

We do not find any heterogeneous impact of the intervention on access to cycles (Column
1 of Table 2.9). This is consistent with the theory of change since it implies that after a year,
girls living closer or further away from the school are equally likely to still have access to the
cycle. Girls in the middle tercile experience greater reduction in absenteeism vis-à-vis the
bottom tercile (Column 2 of Table 2.9), however there is no statistically different impact for
girls in the top tercile. As expected, girls living further away from the school (as measured
by the middle and top tercile), experience greater reduction in time taken to travel to school
(Column 3 of Table 2.9). Similarly, girls in the middle and top tercile also experience greater
reduction in the number of days they arrive late to school (Column 4 of Table 2.9). We
cannot reject the null of no impact on absenteeism for the girls in the top tercile (p-value
= 0.59). Finally, we do not find statistically different heterogeneous impact on learning
outcomes (Columns 5–6 of Table 2.9), but the direction of the impact is consistent with our
results on school absenteeism.
We further estimate the heterogeneous impact of the intervention by the baseline time
taken to travel to school on measures of empowerment. We find that this intervention improved the index of locus of control (Column 3 of Table 2.10) and bargaining (Column 5 of
Table 2.10) for girls living in the bottom and middle tercile. However, we do not find an
impact on girls in the top tercile.
Overall, the intervention relaxed the distance constraints for the girls living further away
from the schools the most, which translates to improvements on the intensive margin but does
not necessarily translate to changes in the extensive margin for girls in the top tercile. It seems
like that for girls living furthest from the school the distance costs are still binding, or they
face additional constraints, and a possible long-term solution would be school construction.
Taken together, it seems like the improvement in measures of empowerment is routed through
increased attendance in school and not through the access and ownership of the cycle.
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2.7

Conclusion

In this paper, we find that a conditional kind transfer of a bicycle can be a useful policy
tool to transform the lives of girls: girls in the treatment schools reported less commute time
to school, absenteeism, late arrival to school, and improved test scores and safety, time use,
grade transition, and dropout.
Scholars of the women’s suffrage movement, including Susan B. Anthony in the United
States, have highlighted the role played by bicycles in empowering women in the 19th century.
Consistent with this historical perspective, we find that the provision of bicycles improved
girls’ empowerment through improved locus of control, bargaining, pro-sociality, and selfimage. Policies that aim at improving female empowerment have limited success due to the
deeply rooted cultural norms that lead to discrimination against women in all spheres of life
(Jayachandran, 2015). Work by Duflo (2012) suggests that improving female empowerment
may also have a lasting impact on women’s future living standards. It is worth highlighting
that finding positive impacts on both educational and empowerment outcomes is perhaps the
most unique result of this intervention.
In rural Zambia, approximately 35% of the girls report having been teased on their way
to school (Fiala et al., 2020). We find that the intervention improved the safety of girls in the
treatment schools. In particular, it reduced the probability of whether girls were teased or
whistled at on the way to school by about 22% and reduced the probability that a girl missed
school or left for home early from school due to concerns of safety by about 33%. Given the
negative impact of sexual harassment on women’s access to education and learning (Borker,
2018), improvement in safety due to bicycles is likely to have a far-reaching impact on girls’
well-being.
We further find that the intervention led to a decrease in time spent on income-generating
activities for the girls in the treatment schools. A plausible reason could be that the inter-
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vention had positive income effects for the family, thereby not requiring the girl to engage in
any income-generating activity, or the intervention changed the value that the family places
on education vis-à-vis engaging in short-term income-generating activities. However, we do
not find a change in any other activity, including time spent in performing household chores
or studying, which could be because we only measure time in very coarse intervals.
Results from the two treatments arms – Payment vs. No Payment – suggest that girls
who received bicycles with the small cost to their family had higher levels of aspirations,
self-image, and a desire to delay marriage and pregnancy. Surprisingly, we do not find these
effects in the zero cost treatment. We believe these results are due to girls perceiving the
payment from the family as a desire to increase future investment in them. Although we do
not have measures of how the parents feel about investment in the girls, based on discussions
with parents we do not believe that these expectations from the girls are likely correct. We
believe that future work is needed on the disconnect between parents and child education
expectations.
While an intervention like providing bicycles to students is likely too expensive for most
governments, and there are more cost-effective ways to increase schooling for girls, such as
paying school fees, we believe our results have several important policy implications. First,
we show that a policy like the provision of bicycles that improves access to school through a
reduction in distance costs can improve educational outcomes, at least in the short run. This
is especially important since discriminatory social norms that limit girls’ access to education
and labor force participation remain a challenge in many parts of the world. In addition,
school construction programs, a default approach to address the access to school problems,
is expensive, takes a long time to complete, and might not be cost effective. Second, we
demonstrate that the intervention improved girls’ empowerment, which directly contributes
to the “Gender Parity” objective of the UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030. Third,
we did not find any differential impact between the two treatment arms that is statistically
significant. Many policies are designed with “conditionality”, which is administratively bur108

densome and increases the overall cost, especially from both implementation and monitoring
points of view. In our context, we did not find evidence that a small upfront payment had any
“unintended” impact on girls’ outcomes. Finally, we contribute to existing research on conditional cash transfers, which are increasingly used as a policy tool to increase female schooling
in developing countries, and find that a bicycle improves girls’ educational outcomes.
Taken together, the results from Muralidharan and Prakash (2017), a non experimental
evaluation of a large-scale cycling program for adolescent girls in India, and this paper, a
randomized control trial in Zambia, point to a potential policy tool that can address both
the gender gap in education and improve female empowerment. More broadly, results from
this paper suggest that identifying the underlying mechanisms can play an important role
in understanding the challenges around replicability and external validity in international
development. This is especially important since results of randomized evaluations of the
same intervention vary substantially across trials (Vivalt, 2019), and even within the same
location, causal impact varies due to random variation in conditions over time (Rosenzweig
and Udry, 2020).
Future research could focus on studying the long-term impact of such policies on girls’ age
of marriage, fertility decisions, bargaining, and the community level spillovers on norms and
aspirations from an in-kind transfer that went to a population that does not normally receive
items of relatively high value. More broadly, it is important to study how policies aimed at
improving girls’ education impact community dynamics and norms regarding girls’ education.
This is especially important since communities can have their own norms regarding girls’
education. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, apart from problems of access, income,
and information, girls face additional cultural constraints like early marriage and pregnancy.
Such social expectations and gender bias can lead to certain family practices that deprive
girls of not just educational opportunities, but also alter their aspirations. Finding innovative
ways of changing social norms might prove to be a sustainable way of tackling the problem
of higher dropouts for adolescent girls in developing countries. Though social norms are
109

slow-moving and hard to change, previous research has shown evidence of change in norms
in response to exposure (Dhar et al., 2018).
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2.8
2.8.1

Appendix
Additional Tables
Table 2.11: Balance Table: School Characteristics
Treatment Groups
Control No Payment Arm (T2)
(N = 55)
(N = 20)
(1)
(2)
Enrollment 2017
Enrollment girls 2017
Enrollment boys 2017
# teachers
% teachers living school
Km closest town
Km closest tarmac road
Km closest secondary school
Feeding program
Sanitation program
Other program
# toilets girls
# toilets boys
# classrooms 2017
Access to Library
Access to computers

692.75
(187.74)
344.85
(93.89)
347.89
(96.21)
13.47
(6.46)
78.48
(27.26)
51.02
(57.37)
25.06
(19.39)
19.31
(15.76)
0.04
(0.19)
0.60
(0.49)
0.35
(0.48)
5.78
(2.68)
5.24
(2.83)
8.44
(3.43)
0.31
(0.47)
0.95
(0.23)

643.40
(186.96)
318.70
(91.98)
324.70
(98.60)
13.45
(6.44)
71.98
(29.82)
38.92
(19.19)
24.63
(18.78)
19.82
(18.78)
0.00
(0.00)
0.60
(0.50)
0.45
(0.51)
4.70
(2.34)
3.85
(1.81)
7.95
(3.30)
0.20
(0.41)
0.95
(0.22)

p value for test of:

Payment Arm (T1)
(N = 25)
(3)
686.92
(192.46)
338.04
(95.58)
348.88
(99.31)
12.72
(4.28)
68.97
(28.53)
45.28
(17.77)
25.90
(16.93)
22.10
(22.02)
0.04
(0.20)
0.60
(0.50)
0.24
(0.44)
4.88
(2.40)
4.84
(2.46)
8.08
(2.34)
0.16
(0.37)
0.92
(0.28)

1=2 1=3

1 = (2 ∪ 3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.31

0.90

0.51

0.28

0.77

0.41

0.36

0.97

0.62

0.99

0.54

0.72

0.39

0.16

0.15

0.18

0.50

0.30

0.93

0.84

0.94

0.92

0.58

0.64

0.16

0.94

0.68

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.42

0.33

0.90

0.09

0.14

0.05

0.01

0.53

0.10

0.58

0.59

0.51

0.33

0.13

0.13

0.94

0.69

0.80

NOTES: Balance test of the school characteristics by treatment groups. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 2.12: Balance Table: Girls Characteristics
Treatment Groups

Age
Grade in school
Ever repeated a grade
Both parents alive
Household size
# of biological brothers
# of biological sisters
Currently engaged/married
Ever been pregnant
# of meals with Meat
# of days with more than 1 meal
# of days with not enough food
Socio-economic index (PCA)
Locus of control index (PCA)
Self esteem index (PCA)
Gender attitudes index (PCA)

p-value for test of:

Control
(N = 1357)
(1)

No Payment Arm (T2)
(N = 500)
(2)

Payment Arm (T1)
(N = 614)
(3)

12.88
(1.43)
6.02
(0.82)
0.36
(0.48)
0.80
(0.40)
6.46
(2.88)
1.70
(1.53)
1.36
(1.40)
0.85
(0.36)
0.06
(0.24)
1.62
(1.52)
5.77
(2.36)
0.97
(1.67)
-0.08
(1.51)
0.01
(1.90)
-0.05
(1.51)
-0.03
(1.36)

12.96
(1.44)
6.09
(0.82)
0.37
(0.48)
0.80
(0.40)
6.21
(2.54)
1.79
(1.74)
1.25
(1.30)
0.84
(0.36)
0.06
(0.23)
1.72
(1.63)
5.78
(2.39)
0.81
(1.46)
0.04
(1.50)
-0.14
(1.89)
0.05
(1.55)
0.00
(1.34)

12.85
(1.36)
6.07
(0.81)
0.36
(0.48)
0.83
(0.38)
6.39
(3.23)
1.56
(1.49)
1.35
(1.37)
0.84
(0.37)
0.05
(0.22)
1.78
(1.58)
5.74
(2.41)
0.92
(1.68)
0.14
(2.20)
0.08
(1.87)
0.08
(1.55)
0.07
(1.34)

1 = 2 1 = 3 1 = (2 ∪ 3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

0.27

0.62

0.79

0.07

0.13

0.04

0.59

0.81

0.66

0.99

0.21

0.47

0.08

0.67

0.23

0.31

0.06

0.57

0.12

0.88

0.35

0.85

0.76

0.78

0.77

0.24

0.36

0.24

0.04

0.04

0.96

0.74

0.83

0.06

0.54

0.14

0.12

0.02

0.01

0.13

0.45

0.69

0.22

0.07

0.06

0.64

0.14

0.23

NOTES: Balance test of the school characteristics by treatment groups. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Table 2.13: Tracking and Attrition

Tracked and surveyed
In school
Second stage tracking
Attrition Rate (not weighted)
Effective Attrition Rate (weighted)

Total

Control

Payment

No Payment

2,028
1,789
239
17.9%
8.7%

1,071
920
151
21.1%
10.1%

533
481
52
13.2%
7.8%

424
388
36
15.2%
5.6%

NOTES: The sample analyzed in this table are the 2,471 potential endline respondents.
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Table 2.14: Determinants of Sample Attrition
Attrited Endline
-0.013
(0.026)
No Payment Arm
-0.053*
(0.022)
Payment Arm X Socio-Economic Index (PCA)
-0.007
(0.010)
No Payment Arm X Socio-Economic Index (PCA)
-0.007
(0.011)
Payment Arm X Locus of Control Index (PCA)
-0.008
(0.012)
No Payment Arm X Locus of control Index (PCA)
-0.000
(0.009)
Payment Arm X Self-Esteem Index (PCA)
-0.006
(0.012)
No Payment Arm X Self-Esteem Index (PCA)
0.002
(0.015)
Payment Arm X Gender Attitudes Index (PCA)
0.015
(0.015)
No Payment Arm X Gender Attitudes Index (PCA)
0.018
(0.014)
Socio-Economic Index (PCA)
0.008
(0.007)
Locus of Control Index (PCA)
0.001
(0.008)
Self-Esteem Index (PCA)
0.001
(0.006)
Gender Attitudes Index (PCA)
0.001
(0.009)
Control group mean
0.101
Payment Arm mean
0.089
No Payment Arm mean
0.049
Payment Arm = Control (p-value)
0.632
No Payment Arm = Control (p-value)
0.016
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)
0.054
Observations
2,467
Payment Arm

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the school level. This includes the survey weights
used because of the two-stage sampling procedure. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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1952
0.04
1.01
No

Pooled Treatment

Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Lee Bounding

1923
0.06
1.01
Upper

1952
0.04
1.01
Lower

Days Absent
(2)
(3)
-0.43*** -0.28***
(0.08)
(0.08)
1952
0.20
2.19
No

(4)
-1.45***
(0.10)
1927
0.24
2.19
Upper

1952
0.20
2.19
Lower

1879
0.13
103.77
No

1845
0.22
103.70
Upper

1841
0.12
103.77
Lower

Days Late
Time to School
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
-1.55*** -1.45*** -34.82*** -41.99*** -32.79***
(0.10)
(0.10)
(2.94)
(2.36)
(2.92)
2001
0.34
0.00
No

1982
0.33
0.00
Upper

1973
0.34
0.00
Lower

Mathematics
(10)
(11)
(12)
0.11*
0.08 0.15***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
2001
0.35
0.00
No

(13)
0.03
(0.05)

1963
1986
0.30
0.35
0.00
0.00
Upper Lower

English
(14)
(15)
-0.03
0.06
(0.05) (0.05)

0.93 − 0.89
) ∗ 100 = 4.3
0.93

The tracking rate of the control group = 89.9, and the tracking rate of the pooled treatment = 93. Sample was trimmed such that the share of
observed girls is equal for both groups (we found more girls in the treatment groups than control group, therefore, we trim the treatment group). ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

pT rim = (

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent
variable (wherever available). We follow Lee (2009) and the following two assumptions to do the Lee Bounding: (i) Random assignment of treatment,
and (ii) Monotonicity assumption about selection mechanism (treatment affects attrition only in one direction, and girls would have attrited if in
control but girl does not attrit because of receiving the bicycle). We calculated the proportion of sample to trim with the following formula:

(1)
-0.28***
(0.08)

Dependent variable:

Table 2.15: Lee Bounds: Educational Outcomes
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1935
0.01
0.33
No

Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Lee Bounding

1896
0.01
0.33
Upper

-0.08
(0.06)
1897
0.01
0.33
Lower

0.10*
(0.06)
1919
0.02
1.44
No

0.06
(0.05)
1919
0.02
1.44
Upper

0.06
(0.05)
1881
0.03
1.44
Lower

0.20***
(0.04)

Aspirations
(4)
(5)
(6)

2005
0.02
0.50
No

0.16***
(0.06)

(7)

2005
0.02
0.50
Upper

0.16***
(0.06)

Control
(8)
(10)

1965
0.04
0.50
Lower

1945
0.07
0.95
No

0.26*** 0.10
(0.06) (0.07)

(9)

1905
0.06
0.95
Upper

0.02
(0.07)

1906
0.08
0.95
Lower

0.24***
(0.05)

Fertility
(11)
(12)

0.93 − 0.89
) ∗ 100 = 4.3
0.93

The tracking rate of the control group = 89.9, and the tracking rate of the pooled treatment = 93. Sample was trimmed such that the share of
observed girls is equal for both groups (we found more girls in the treatment groups than control group, therefore, we trim the treatment group). ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

pT rim = (

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent
variable (wherever available). All columns report coefficients from a linear model. The dependent variable in (1-3) is the index on mobility, in (4-6)
is the index on aspirations, in (7-9) is the index on locus of control, and in (10-12) is the index on fertility and marriage. All indices have been
variance-weighted using the methodology of Anderson (2008). Endline indices contain imputed values if less than 10% of the variables in the index
had missing values for an observation. We follow Lee (2009) and the following two assumptions to do the Lee Bounding: (i) Random assignment of
treatment, and (ii) Monotonicity assumption about selection mechanism (treatment affects attrition only in one direction, and girls would have attrited
if in control but girl does not attrit because of receiving the bicycle). We calculated the proportion of sample to trim with the following formula:

0.00
(0.06)

Mobility & Safety
(1)
(2)
(3)

Pooled Treatment

Dependent variable:

Table 2.16: Lee Bounds: Empowerment Outcomes
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(3)

1988
0.05
0.40
No

1988
0.05
0.40
Upper

1948
0.07
0.40
Lower

1874
0.05
0.77
No

1841
0.05
0.77
Upper

0.08
(0.06)

(7)

1843
0.06
0.77
Lower

1889
0.04
0.68
No

0.23*** 0.11*
(0.06) (0.06)

Pro-Sociality
(4)
(5)
(6)

0.19*** 0.19*** 0.31*** 0.14**
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.05) (0.06)

(1)

Bargaining
(2)

1889
0.04
0.68
Upper

0.11*
(0.06)

1851
0.04
0.68
Lower

0.20***
(0.06)

Self-Image
(8)
(9)

0.93 − 0.89
) ∗ 100 = 4.3
0.93

. The tracking rate of the control group = 89.9, and the tracking rate of the pooled treatment = 93. Sample was trimmed such that the share of
observed girls is equal for both groups (we found more girls in the treatment groups than control group, therefore, we trim the treatment group). ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

pT rim = (

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent
variable (wherever available). All columns report coefficients from a linear model. The dependent variable in (1-3) is the index of bargaining (not
including the variables on rebellion), in (4-6) is an index of pro-sociality, and in (7-9) an index of self-image. All indices have been variance-weighted
using the methodology of Anderson (2008). Endline indices contain imputed values if less than 10% of the variables in the index had missing values
for an observation. We follow Lee (2009) and the following two assumptions to do the Lee Bounding: (i) Random assignment of treatment, and (ii)
Monotonicity assumption about selection mechanism (treatment affects attrition only in one direction, and girls would have attrited if in control but
girl does not attrit because of receiving the bicycle). We calculated the proportion of sample to trim with the following formula:

Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Lee Bounding

Pooled Treatment

Dependent variable:

Table 2.17: Lee Bounds: Behavioral Outcomes
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MDE
N
Pooled Control
0.162
1029
0.162
1029
0.154
997
0.124
1356
0.203
1015
0.169
1061
0.176
1023
0.137
1014
0.161
1064
0.201
1039
0.183
1050
0.16
987
0.158
997

Mean
Control
1.013
2.188
103.774
0.065
0.937
3.022
0.327
1.442
0.502
0.954
0.399
0.772
0.68

N
No Payment Arm
410
410
386
483
403
414
404
403
419
420
419
395
397

Mean
No Payment Arm
0.715
0.566
68.422
0.052
0.893
3.94
0.376
1.431
0.664
0.981
0.619
0.945
0.79

N
Payment Arm
517
517
500
613
515
530
514
506
526
518
523
496
499

Mean
Payment Arm
0.683
0.704
63.916
0.039
0.918
3.928
0.347
1.591
0.704
1.173
0.611
0.909
0.832

ICC
0.072
0.072
0.065
0.042
0.114
0.078
0.085
0.051
0.072
0.113
0.093
0.07
0.069

NOTES: This table reports MDEs at (1 − β) = 0.8 and α = 0.05. Define µi as the mean outcome in arm i ∈ {1, 2, c}, then the MDE relies on a t-test
2
with H0 : µ1 +µ
− µcontrol = 0, i.e. the program has an overall effect.
2

# Days absent
# Days Late
Time to school
Drop-outs
Grade Transition
Access
Index of Mobility
Index of Aspiration
Index of Locus of Control
Index of Fertility
Index of Bargaining
Index of Pro-Sociality
Index of Self-image

Outcome Variables

Table 2.18: Minimum Detectable Effects

Table 2.19: Descriptive Statistics

Demographics
Age
Grade in school
Ever repeated a grade
Both parents alive
Household size
# of biological brothers
# of biological sisters
Currently engaged/married
Ever been pregnant
Mobility
Mostly walks to school
Time spent traveling to school (mins/each way)
Mostly travels to school alone
# of people that travel to school together
Ever teased on way to school (last year)
Would walk to school alone if felt safe
Would walk to other places alone if felt safe
Attendance
# of days absent from school (last week)
# of days arrived late to school (last week)
Learning Assessment
Learning assessment score (Overall)
Learning assessment score (English)
Learning assessment score (Maths)

Mean

Std.Dev.

Observations

12.89
6.05
0.36
0.81
6.39
1.68
1.34
0.14
0.06

1.42
0.82
0.48
0.39
2.91
1.57
1.37
0.35
0.23

2461
2469
2469
2467
2468
2469
2469
2431
2434

0.98
109.16
0.27
4.38
0.35
0.79
0.44

0.13
50.52
0.45
3.68
0.48
0.41
0.50

2467
2291
2464
2166
2469
2464
2459

0.88
2.61

1.29
1.69

2459
2412

0.36
0.30
0.44

0.16
0.17
0.20

2468
2468
2468

NOTES: Descriptive statistics of the girls in the estimation sample.
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Table 2.20: Impact on Index of Focus (d2 Test)
Dependent variable:

Pooled Treatment

Payment Arm
No Payment Arm
Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Payment Arm = No Payment Arm (p-value)

Index of Focus Speed
(1)
(2)
Panel: A
0.07
6.11
(0.08)
(9.04)
Panel: B
0.15
14.55
(0.11)
(11.95)
-0.05
-5.73
(0.09)
(9.47)
1932
1932
0.00
0.00
0.55
459.06
0.12
0.12

Accuracy
(3)
9.70
(9.08)
18.45
(12.37)
-2.49
(9.19)
1932
0.00
393.45
0.12

NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school. All regressions include controls for demographics and baseline value of the dependent variable (wherever available). All columns report coefficients
from a linear model. The dependent variable in (1) is the index of focus (variance-weighted index of speed
and accuracy), in (2) is a measure of speed, which is the total number of observations processed in the d2
test, in (3) is a measure of accuracy, which is the correct number of observations processed in the d2 test.
All indices have been variance-weighted using the methodology of Anderson (2008). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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2.8.2

Additional Figures
Figure 2.1: Map of the Distribution of Schools in the Study Sample

120

Figure 2.2: Timeline

Baseline data collection - July to August
2017

Randomization of schools to the two treatment arms
Distribution of bicycles (by World Bicycle Relief) and Implementation (by IPA) September to November 2017
Pre-analysis plan registered - September
2018

Endline data collection - October to December 2018

Data entry endline - January 2019
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Figure 2.3: Tracking and Attrition
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2.8.3

Construction of Outcome Variables

Outcomes

Variables

Primary:
Mobility and Safety

- In the past week, how many times did you go outside the
house alone to..
- Are you allowed to go alone when,
- I feel safe when,

School Attendance

- Self-reported
- Admin data from registers

Grade Transition

- Dropout
- Grade Progression

Aspiration

- When you finish at school (either end of primary, secondary),
what would you like to do?
- How confident are you that you will be able to achieve this?
- If for some reason you cannot (insert answer to previous
question), what would you do?
- In two years of time, how confident are you that you will be
enrolled in school?
- Do you think you will be working in a job or doing something
that makes money in 10 years from now?
- I am going to show you some drawings, could you tell me
which ones you think a girl like you can become, if any?
- And from these same drawings, which one would you like to
become when you grow up, if any?
- What does your role model do? (Occupation)
- Do you want to do what he/she (Role model) does?

Locus of Control

- Let’s say that one day when you are going to school you
cannot find a path because of heavy rain or because a tree
fell. This is a difficult situation because it is the only way to
school and you are already late to school. In situations like
this one or other ones similar to this one, you can usually find
your way out?
- There are many things that can happen to you in life. Some
of them will be good and some will be not so good. For example: falling over and hurting my knee; forgetting to prepare
for an exam or not doing well on an exam; your best friend is
upset with you and not talking to you; you were not selected
for a school team/club. Do you feel you can control what
happens to you in life?
- In general, would you say you are satisfied with your life?
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Outcomes

Variables
- I feel my life will improve in the future.

Fertility and Mar- - The number of children to have in your whole life, how many
riage
would you like to have?
- Of those children, how many girls and how many boys would
you like to have?
- Have you ever been pregnant?
- Do you have any kids?
Secondary:
Bicycle ownership - Do you have access to a bicycle that you can use?
and usage
- Does this bicycle belong to you?
- In a normal week, how many days do you use a bicycle to
go to school?
- Do you use a bicycle during the weekends? How often?
- Do you have to ask permission to use the bicycle?
- How much control do you think you have over the bicycle?
Time spent traveling to school

- Working for the school? (doing school chores like cleaning
the classes, etc.)
- Attending extra-curricular activities? (like sport, production
unit, club, drama, board games, etc.)
- Studying and doing homework outside of school?
- Helping your family at home or doing other work for them?
- Working to earn money by yourself?
- Being with friends (chatting, playing, games, visiting them
at home)?

Performance
- Overall score and
fraction in the
lowest quartile
Bargaining

Grade 7 end of year exam

English test
Mathematics test
D2 test of Focus

- Do you ever have small money of your own (K2 or K5) to
use as you would like? This could be money you have earned
or that you get from a family member.
- Can you decide on what to spend it on your own?
- Each year there are new fashions (e.g. hair pins) that come
out. If you wanted to buy something new and had the money
to do so, do you think your parents would allow you?
- Do you own a pair of leggings?
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Outcomes

Variables
- Do you wear them on their own (if yes)?
- If you don’t like what is prepared for dinner, would you tell
your mother/guardian you don’t like the food or ask them if
there is something else to eat?
- When we talked about the activities you perform at home,
like (insert activity here). Have you ever skipped doing household chores?
- How often do you say something to your parents if you disagree with what they are saying?
- Do you feel you can to talk to your parents about what you
want to be when you grow up?
- Do you think you can talk to your parents if you have problems with friends or at school?
- Do you feel you can talk to your parents about when you
wish to get married?

Self-image

- How would you rank yourself academically in your class?
- Compared to your friends, how likely are you to succeed in
life?

Identity

- Now let’s play again with some drawings. Here you can see
six drawings of roles girls usually take in society. Can you put
them in order, starting from the one you that describes you
better to the one that describes you the least?
- How much do you think you can affect what other people
think of your family?

Pro-sociality

- If you notice that one of your friends has a problem, would
you help/participate/collaborate?
- Could you tell us the name of your MP?
- What is the name of the president of Zambia?
- Are you a member of any club?
- Think about the most active person in the club and the least
active one. The most active would be a 10 and the least active
would be a 0. How active are you in this club?
- When you don’t understand something in class, do you ask
the teacher in front of everyone? (Not for out-of-school girls)
- Do friends seek your opinion about important matters?
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2.8.4

Sampling Procedure

School Sampling
For this study, we focused on public schools, which are the most common kind in Zambia. In
addition, to be able to follow our sample over several years and observe a longer-term impact
of the bicycles, all the schools selected are basic schools: Starting at Grade 1 or earlier and
going beyond Grade 7 (end of primary) up to Grade 9 (last grade before secondary education).
All basic government schools of Monze and Mazabuka (our initial catchment districts)
were asked to identify their pupils walking at least 3 kilometers to school and to generate
a list with their names, gender and grade. The research team had to find 100 schools with
at least 25 eligible girls enrolled in grade 5, 6 and 7. Many of the schools which prepared
the lists didn’t have enough of such pupils. Hence, the research team had to extend the
catchment area to a third district to find additional candidates for the sample. Kalomo, a
third district of Southern Province, was chosen to have a good number of basic government
schools, and not much prior work had been done there by World Bicycle Relief. In addition,
some schools were also automatically excluded from the sample: (i) urban schools, where the
bicycles wouldn’t be required by children to travel to school (existence of alternative public
transportation), and (ii) a few very remote schools, which created logistical challenges in
planning fieldwork. Limited by these constraints, the research team had a limited sample,
from which the 100 schools were selected.

Girls’ Sampling
Prior to randomization, the research team had to identify a sample of 25 girls in each school
to participate in the data collection activities to satisfy the power calculations. All these girls
were required to be enrolled in grades 5, 6 or 7 (grades during which the girls are considered
particularly vulnerable and likely to drop out of school).
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Among the 100 sample schools, some of them had only 25 eligible girls (girls in grade 5, 6
or 7 and walking 3km or more to come to school), while other schools had 40, 50 or more of
such girls. To build a representative sample, we generated two lists for each school. The first
list, called list A, would always contain 25 names, balanced across our 3 sample grades (with
a small priority given to the grade 7-in which the girls are more likely to drop out of school
soon - following as much as possible the pattern 8-8-9 for the grades 5-6-7). To generate the
list, we used Stata and the only variable considered was the grade, like described above.
Then a second list was generated for each school, list B. This second list was containing
additional girls, randomly selected among the remaining eligible girls (same methodology).
The second list had between 0 and 25 girls, depending on how many girls in total were
eligible in the school (in the grades 5, 6 and 7). For example, a school with 33 eligible girls
designated in grades 5, 6 and 7 might have a first list of 25 girls to be surveyed (list A), and
a second list of 8 girls (list B). If the school had 70 eligible girls in grades 5, 6 and 7, then 25
of them would appear on the list A, 25 others would appear on list B and 20 of them would
not appear on any list, the selection being entirely random.
The purpose of these two lists was so that if everything ran smoothly, our field team of
surveyors would be able to find the 25 girls of the list A in the school and survey them on
the day of their visit. If some of the girls were not able to be surveyed (absent, no consent,
transferred, fake name, etc.) then the field team would be able to replace them with girls
from the list B. The names on the list A and B were arranged in a random order.

2.8.5

Steps for Index Construction

We create variance-weighted indices following the methodology proposed by Anderson (2008)
for empowerment outcomes (also see Haushofer and Shapiro (2016); Dhar et al. (2018) for a
recent application).
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Anderson (2008) summarizes the index creating process as the following. At the most
basic level, an index created using this method is a weighted mean of several standardized
variables. More weight is assigned to measures that are orthogonal (less similar or less correlated) to other measures. The weights are calculated to maximize the amount of information
captured in the index. The index is computed using the following steps.
(i) For all variables, switch signs where necessary so that the positive direction always
indicates a ‘better’ outcome.
˜ by demeaning and then by dividing by standard
(ii) Create standardized variables (y)
deviation.
P
(iii) Compute covariance matrix c, which consist of elements:
∧
X
mn

=

N
mn
X
i=1

(yim − ȳ m ) (yin − ȳ n )
∗
y
σm
σny

where, N mn is the number of observations (total persons with non-missing data for
variables m and n).
(iv) Next, we invert the covariance matrix, and define weight wk for each variable k by
summing the entries in the row of the inverted covariance matrix:


∧
X
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(v) Finally create a new variable, ŷi , that is a weighted average of ỹik for person i. When
constructing ŷi , weight its inputs, standardized variables ỹik by the inverse of the
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covariance matrix of the transformed variables. A simple way to do this is to set the
weight on each outcome equal to the sum of its row entries in the inverted covariance
matrix for area. The index variable ŷi is called because this transformation yields a
generalized least squares estimator Anderson (2008) .

ŷi =

X

wk

−1 X

k∈K

k∈Ki
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wk ∗

yik − y¯k
σky

2.8.6

Learning Assessment
Figure 2.4: Learning Assessment Instrument
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2.8.7

Attention Test
Figure 2.5: Attention Test Instrument
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Chapter 3
Ambiguity and Satisfaction: Experimental
Evidence from Healthcare Delivery in India
(with Arul Mishra, Himanshu Mishra and Shelly Rathee)

3.1

Introduction

Waiting to see a physician is a common occurrence in life. For a majority of the patients,
waiting time is the most significant part of the physician’s appointment experience, and is
thus an important predictor of patients’ follow-up visits and health care utilization (Luigi
et al., 2013). Patients tend to leave emergency care without being seen, if they are dissatisfied
with the long waiting times (Kamali et al., 2013). In an interview with HIV-positive women
in Zimbabwe, Muchedzi et al. (2010) found that 46% of the patients surveyed were dissatisfied
with the long waiting time at the healthcare clinic, so much so that most of them did not
access the required HIV care and treatment. Thus, long waiting times in the health sector
can be a serious impediment to effective utilization of health services. The problem of waittime is aggravated further in developing countries with generally poorer health infrastructure
(Banerjee et al., 2004; Chaudhury et al., 2006), because appointments are not very common,
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patients are seen on a first-come-first-serve basis (Singh et al., 1999), and the opportunity
cost of competing life priorities is high (Peters et al., 2008).
Unfortunately, wait-times are sometimes unavoidable. Favorably, past research has shown
that when it comes to patients’ satisfaction, the actual amount of time patients wait may
be less critical than patients’ perception of wait-times (Thompson et al., 1996; Xie and Or,
2017). In this paper, we examine if it is possible to reduce a patient’s perception of the
wait-time and thereby affect their satisfaction without lowering the actual wait-time.
Providing information about wait-time can reduce patients’ dissatisfaction (Tran et al.,
2002; Zakay and Hornik, 1991). However, there doesn’t exist much research that explicitly
indicates what type of information is more beneficial to reduce the perceived wait-time and
increase patient satisfaction. In particular, we introduce the distinction between precise
and ambiguous wait-time information. We operationalize ambiguous and precise wait-time
information with alphanumeric and numeric tokens, respectively. Information contained in
numbers and letters is processed differently by humans. Numbers have cardinal information
that letters lack because numbers have a rigid rule that each succeeding number is greater
by one unit from the preceding number (Isaac and Schindler, 2014; Jou, 2003; Klahr et al.,
1983). Having a single representation makes processing numbers less effortful compared to
letters. Similar to letters, alphanumeric characters, which are a combination of numbers and
letters (e.g., C7), also need additional cognitive resources to decode their meaning (Kara
et al., 2015). This occurs because cardinality can be associated with alphanumeric numbers
only when there are changes in the numerical part but not when there are changes in the
alphabetic part. Therefore, an alphanumeric token can convey multiple representations of
queue position as there can be multiple possible token sequences, which increases the cognitive
effort, and thus the attention required to decipher one’s position in the queue.
More attention paid to a specific task takes away attention from other tasks because of
the capacity constraints of perceptual processing (Duncan, 1981; Posner et al., 1980; Yantis,
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1992). Thus, it could be that when patients are provided with alphanumeric tokens, they
will pay more attention to the token sequence and use more cognitive resources to infer
wait-time. The higher use of resources towards the alphanumeric token will distract their
attention away from their pain, reducing pain perception, as well as away from the waittime, reducing wait-time perception. In contrast, patients with numeric tokens can easily
infer their numeric sequence and will be more likely to pay attention to their pain, and to
the passage of time. On the other hand, providing ambiguous wait-time information could
be interpreted as increasing the uncertainty of wait-time. Previous research suggests that
uncertain waits could lead to a longer perception of wait-time (Maister et al., 1984; Mowen
et al., 1993). It suggests that people are averse to uncertainty when dealing with information
that is missing or absent. Thus, if patients receiving alphanumeric tokens associate it with
having no information on wait-time, their perception of the time spent waiting in the queue
could rise, decreasing their satisfaction levels.
To understand the impact of ambiguous information on wait-time information and patient satisfaction, we conduct three field experiments in two different physicians’ clinics in
India. We experimentally vary the type of token information the patients receive, i.e., they
either receive precise or ambiguous information, operationalized by the use of numeric and
alphanumeric tokens respectively. We provide evidence that when patients are given information about wait-times that is ambiguous and open to multiple representations as opposed to
being precise, patients pay more attention to figure out their position in the queue, thereby
taking their attention away from pain and the time spent waiting in line, leading to an overall increase in patient satisfaction. The results are robust to the type of healthcare setting
- private or publicly owned outpatient clinics, to shorter or longer wait-times, to patients
who come in as walk-ins or call-ins, and to a variety of illnesses that the patients might
have. However, we show that ambiguity has its limits. When ambiguous information cannot
be resolved, people focus less on the token sequence, leading to higher pain perception and
higher wait-time perception.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first describe the details of our main field
experiment, followed by a discussion of our results. We next detail the design and findings of
the additional two field experiments that supplement our main results. Section 3.5 concludes.

3.2

Study 1: Time Perception and Patient Satisfaction

The aim of study 1 was to test whether providing ambiguous information regarding a patient’s
position in the queue, operationalized by the use of an alphanumeric token, would decrease
wait-time perception by increasing the attention paid in trying to decipher the underlying
sequence in the alphanumeric token, or instead would the patients be averse to the uncertainty
in wait-time information provided by the alphanumeric token, leading to an increase in the
perception of time spent waiting by them. Further, we wanted to examine the impact of
ambiguous information on the attention paid by the patient as well as their perception of
pain. Finally, to understand if the type of wait-time information had any impact on the
satisfaction levels of the patients, we asked patients to rate their satisfaction with the visit
three days after they visited the physician’s clinic.

3.2.1

Experimental Setting and Procedure

Study 1 took place at a physician’s clinic in West Delhi (India), a district with a population
of approximately 2.5 million, in August 2017. The physician, a general practitioner, provided
private outpatient services to cover the primary healthcare needs of the local neighborhood.1
The clinic was open six days a week, in two sessions of 3 hours each in the morning and
evening. The kinds of illnesses that were treated at this clinic included flu, cold and cough,
high blood pressure, diabetes, anxiety, digestive issues, and gynecological conditions.
A waiting lobby for patients was available at the entrance of the physician’s clinic. Besides,
1

The out-of-pocket consultation charges for the physician were about USD 3 (INR 200).
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Table 3.1: Study 1: Details about Study Sessions

Token Type

Day of the Week

Session Type

Alphanumeric

Thursday, Week 1

Morning

Numeric

Thursday, Week 1

Evening

Numeric

Friday, Week 1

Morning

Alphanumeric

Friday, Week 1

Evening

Alphanumeric

Saturday, Week 1

Morning

Numeric

Saturday, Week 1

Evening

the physician’s clinic had one examination room where the doctor examined each patient
individually. The physician’s clinic had another room with observation beds for emergency
patients. The patients arrived without appointments and were seen on a first-come-firstserved (FCFS) basis. Thus, patients needed to arrive early to get into the queue earlier.
We used a 2 (token type: alphanumeric vs. numeric) between-participants design. Patients were randomly provided either an alphanumeric or a numeric token (see Appendix B).
The sequence followed for the alphanumeric tokens was A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, B1,
B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, E1, E2,
E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, H1. Whereas,
the sequence followed for numeric tokens was 1, 2, 3, 4, 5....50.
A hundred and thirty three patients participated in the study, which took place over three
days. We randomly gave out one type of token in each session (morning or evening). The
type of tokens distributed was counterbalanced between the morning and evening sessions
(see Table 3.1 for details about the study sessions). Two research assistants helped to execute
the study. The research assistants, physicians, and patients were unaware of the purpose of
the research or the role of tokens. The first research assistant handed a token to the patients
when they arrived, mentioning that the physician would see them according to the token
number.
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The research assistant also informed the patients that a research study was being carried
out to understand patients’ experiences in the physician’s clinic and that they would be asked
to fill out a questionnaire just before going inside the examination room. After the patients
gave their consent, they were provided with additional details about the study. They were
informed that along with filling out a questionnaire during the visit, they would be contacted
three days after the visit to inquire about their experiences at the physician’s clinic.
The patients then waited in the lobby for their turn. While waiting and right before the
patient ahead of them entered the examination room, the first research assistant handed them
a questionnaire (in both English and Hindi, to accommodate those not fluent in English).
The questionnaire was kept as short as possible to ensure that patients were not bothered
by filling it out when they were in pain. After completing the questionnaire and when their
turn came, they went in to meet the physician. All patients were able to complete the
questionnaire before going into the examination room.
While the patients were waiting, a second research assistant collected observational data,
such as the time the token was distributed, the time the questionnaire was given, and the time
the patient went inside the examination room. After the examination, the second research
assistant thanked the participants and reminded them that they would be contacted in three
days for a follow-up.

3.2.2

Dependent Variables

We collected information on the following variables Attention Paid - This is a self-reported measure, where we asked participants to rate
whether they found the wait-time to be engaging on a 7-point scale (1 = boring, 7 = interesting)2
2

This instrument is motivated from the literature that argues that when people successfully pay attention
to internal (e.g., thoughts, feelings) or external (e.g., environmental stimuli) information, the state is perceived
to be more engaging (Campbell, 2014), and thereby justifies engagement as a measure of attention (Campbell,
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Pain Perception - This is a self-reported measure, where patients were asked to rate the
pain they were currently experiencing on a 10-point scale (1 = very low pain, 10 = very high
pain)
Wait-time Perception - This is again a self-reported measure, where patients were asked
an open-ended measure of how many minutes they estimated they had been waiting.
Satisfaction - We measured the patient’s satisfaction of their visit to the physician’s clinic
using instruments used in the medical literature (Myles et al., 2000; Thompson and Yarnold,
1995). Three days after the visit, a research assistant contacted the patients by phone and
asked them to rate their level of satisfaction on two questions. (1) How satisfied or dissatisfied
were you with the waiting system? (1 = very low satisfaction, 10 = very high satisfaction),
and (2) How was your overall experience at the physician’s clinic? (1 = very bad experience,
10 = very good experience)

3.2.3

Results and Discussion

We first examine the impact of the ambiguity in token-information, operationalized by the
use of alphanumeric tokens, on Attention Paid, Wait-time Perception and Pain Perception
of the patients. Table 3.2 presents the results from OLS regressions. Columns (1), (3) and
(5) include no covariates, while columns (2), (4) and (6) control for the age and gender of the
patient as well as observational data collected on what the patients were doing while waiting
(using smartphones, watching television, talking with other patients, sitting or standing), the
number of patients in the queue, whether the patients came for the morning or the evening
session, and the actual time the patient spent waiting in the queue.3 See Table 3.10 for
summary statistics and balance tests for these variables.
The coefficients in columns (1) and (2) indicate that the patients found wait-time more en2014; O’Brien and Toms, 2010; Webster and Ho, 1997).
3
We have some of this information missing for 20 out of the 133 patients in the study, and they are
consequently dropped from the regressions run with controls.
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Table 3.2: Study 1: Impact on Attention, Wait-time Perception and Pain Perception

Dependent variable:
Alphanumeric
Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Controls

Attention
(1)
(2)

Wait-time Perception
(3)
(4)

Pain Perception
(5)
(6)

1.77∗∗∗
(0.30)

1.72∗∗∗
(0.37)

-10.68∗∗∗
(1.64)

-9.40∗∗∗
(1.71)

-2.24∗∗∗
(0.40)

-2.27∗∗∗
(0.46)

133
0.21
3.26
No

113
0.28
3.26
Yes

133
0.24
33.43
No

113
0.47
33.43
Yes

133
0.19
5.42
No

113
0.32
5.42
Yes

NOTES: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the
self-reported measure of attention as proxied by the engagement of the patient on a 7-point scale, in columns
(3) and (4) is the wait-time perception of the patient as measured by the number of minutes they estimated
they had been waiting, and in (5) and (6) is the self-reported measure of how much pain the patients were
currently experiencing on a 10-point scale. The regressions in columns (2), (4) and (6) control for all the
baseline covariates (see Table 3.10). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

gaging with alphanumeric than numeric tokens (Mnumeric = 3.26, σnumeric = 1.64, Malphanumeric =
5.03, σalphanumeric = 1.84, p < 0.01). The coefficients in columns (3) and (4) indicate that the
patients with alphanumeric tokens perceived lower wait-times compared to those with numeric tokens (Mnumeric = 33.43 minutes, σnumeric = 10.18 minutes, Malphanumeric = 22.75
minutes, σalphanumeric = 8.43 minutes, p < 0.01). And the coefficients in columns (5) and
(6) show that patients with alphanumeric tokens perceived their pain levels to be lower
(Mnumeric = 5.42, σnumeric = 2.61, Malphanumeric = 3.18, σalphanumeric = 1.86, p < 0.01)). The
coefficient sizes are stable to the inclusion of covariates, thereby giving evidence of internal
validity.
We next examine how patients’ satisfaction responds to the ambiguity in token-information.
We analyze the impact on the two questions asked separately as well as on the combined
satisfaction score, obtained by averaging the scores on the two satisfaction questions. Table 3.3 presents the results from OLS regressions.4 Columns (1), (3) and (5) include no
covariates, while columns (2), (4) and (6) control for all the baseline covariates as in Table
4

Some patients did not respond to the phone calls made three days after the visit to the clinic, and
consequently there is an attrition of 14% (18 out of 133) spread evenly across the two groups.
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Table 3.3: Study 1: Impact on Patient Satisfaction
Dependent variable: Experience Satisfaction
(1)
(2)
Alphanumeric
Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Controls

Overall Satisfaction
(3)
(4)

Average Satisfaction
(5)
(6)

0.85∗∗
(0.34)

0.62∗
(0.36)

1.12∗∗∗
(0.34)

0.93∗∗
(0.38)

0.99∗∗∗
(0.33)

0.78∗∗
(0.35)

115
0.05
5.58
No

101
0.21
5.58
Yes

115
0.09
5.88
No

101
0.21
5.88
Yes

115
0.07
5.73
No

101
0.22
5.73
Yes

NOTES: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is
the patients’ rating on a 10-point scale to the question “How was your overall experience at the physician’s
clinic?", in columns (3) and (4) is the patients’ rating on a 10-point scale to the question “How satisfied
or dissatisfied were you with the waiting system?", and in columns (5) and (6) is the simple average of
the response to the two questions. The regressions in columns (2), (4) and (6) control for all the baseline
covariates (see Table 3.10). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

3.2. Overall, patients with alphanumeric tokens were more satisfied with the waiting system as well as in terms of the overall experience, driving up the average satisfaction score
(Mnumeric = 5.73, σnumeric = 1.64, Malphanumeric = 6.72, σalphanumeric = 1.85, p < 0.01).
In conclusion, in Study 1, we do not find evidence that patients interpret the ambiguity of
wait-time information in alphanumeric tokens as missing information. Instead, we find that
when a patient is given a token which gives ambiguous information regarding their position
in the queue, it leads to greater attention paid by the patients to the token sequence. Paying
attention to the sequence keeps people engaged and works to distract them away from the
passage of time, leading them to lower their perception of wait-time as well as the amount of
pain they are in. Overall, this leads to an increase in the level of satisfaction of the patients.
Our results are consistent with the research in the medical field that has shown that periodic
updates of wait-time to patients increases patients’ perception of care and decreases waittime perception (Tran et al., 2002). In a study at the emergency department of the medical
center in Nebraska, patients were provided with the wait-time at 15-minute intervals versus
standard time (control) information. The results of the study revealed that patients in the
15-minute intervals condition perceived shorter perception of the wait-time than those in
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the control condition. Thus, attention to the token sequence seems to be similar to getting
regular updates of the wait-time.

3.3

Study 2: Time Perception and Patient Satisfaction in
another Healthcare Setting

The main aim of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1 in a different healthcare
setting. In Study 1, we did not take into account the influence of variables such as first-time
or repeat patients, how familiar were the patients with the token system, the particular illness
of the patients, and so on, which could affect the pattern of our results. Hence, we add these
controls in this study. Second, we wanted to increase the generalizability of the proposed
effects. And so, we utilized a different sequence of alphanumeric tokens in the study. Third,
Study 1 measured attention indirectly through engagement proxy. To address this concern,
we directly asked patients how much attention they paid to the token.

3.3.1

Experimental Setting and Procedure

Study 2 took place at a physician’s clinic in East Delhi (India), a district with a population of
approximately 1.7 million, in November 2019. This was a public outpatient clinic, under the
management of the state government, that covered the primary healthcare needs of the local
community.5 The physician was a general practitioner, who saw patients six days a week
every morning in a 3 hour slot. The kinds of illnesses that were treated at this clinic included
flu, throat infection, asthma, osteoporosis, liver and kidney problems, and skin infections
among others.
A waiting lobby was available to patients, but patients were also free to wait outside on
5

The out-of-pocket consultation charges for the physician were about USD 0.3 (INR 20).
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the porch. The physician’s clinic consisted of one examination room and other rooms that
were used as labs for blood work and other diagnostic tests. The patients could call on the
phone for an appointment to be placed in the queue or could visit as a walk-in. Patients were
placed in the queue on a first-come-first-served (FCFS) basis and were seen accordingly.
We used a 2 (token type: alphanumeric vs. numeric) between-participants design. Patients were randomly provided either alphanumeric or numeric tokens. The sequence used
for alphanumeric tokens was A1, B1, C1, D1, E1, F1, G1, H1, A2, B2, C2, D2, E2, F2, G2,
H2, A3, B3, C3, D3, E3, F3, G3, H3, A4, B4, C4, D4, E4, F4, G4, H4, A5, B5, C5, D5, E5,
F5, G5, H5, A6, B6, C6, D6, E6, F6, G6, H6, A7, B7, C7, D7, E7, F7, G7, H7. The sequence
used in this study for alphanumeric tokens is different than the sequence used in study 1.
The sequence used for numeric tokens was 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6....56.
Two hundred and twenty patients participated in the study, which took place over six days.
The study was run over 2 weeks, for three days a week (Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday).
The two conditions were run such that one type of token was counterbalanced for each day
in a week (see Table 3.4 for details about the study sessions). Further, to make sure that all
the observational data was recorded, we appointed three research assistants, unaware of the
purpose of the study, to execute the study. The first research assistant placed each patient in
the queue. For walk-ins, each patient was handed a token when they arrived. On the other
hand, for the phone appointments, each patient was given a token number on the call, which
was physically handed to them when they arrived. As a patient entered the physician’s clinic,
the first research assistant informed the patients that a research study was being conducted
to understand patients’ experiences in the clinic and that they would be asked to fill out
a questionnaire just before going inside the examination room. After patients gave their
consent, they were informed that along with filling out a questionnaire during the visit, they
would be contacted three days after the visit to inquire about their experiences at the clinic.
The patients then either sat down in the lobby or went outside on the porch to wait
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Table 3.4: Study 2: Details about Study Sessions

Token Type

Day of the Week

Week

Alphanumeric

Monday

1

Alphanumeric

Tuesday

1

Alphanumeric

Thursday

1

Numeric

Monday

2

Numeric

Tuesday

2

Numeric

Thursday

2

for their turn. This was recorded and added as a control in the analysis. The sequence of
the tokens followed an FCFS order. However, emergency patients (with a token) were given
priority and placed in the queue accordingly. For instance, if an emergency patient was given
a token #13, and currently the patient with token #4 was inside the physician’s room, the
emergency patient was allowed to meet the physician after the token #4. In this case, the
sequence of the tokens would be 1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 5, 6... and so on. That is, there were instances,
though few, when a patient was called in a non-FCFS manner. This was again recorded and
added as a control variable in the analysis.
Further, while waiting for their turn, and just before the patient before them entered the
examination room, the second research assistant handed them a questionnaire for completion
(in both English and Hindi). After completing the questionnaire and when their turn came,
the patients went in to meet the physician. All patients were able to complete the questionnaire before going into the examination room. While the patients were waiting, a third
research assistant collected observational data, such as the time the token/appointment was
given, the time the questionnaire was given, and the time the patient went inside the examination room. After the examination, the second research assistant thanked the participants
and reminded them that they would be contacted in three days for a follow-up.
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3.3.2

Dependent Variables

We collected information on the following variables Attention Paid - We asked patients directly about their attention to the token sequence
in this study. This is different from the measure used in Study 1, which proxied engagement
with attention. Here instead, we follow literature that considers attention as merely the
extent to which people perform internal processing (Muncy and Hunt, 1984; Roser, 1990)
and not how they perceive the external world. Using this definition, we asked participants
to rate the degree to which they paid attention to how the tokens progressed on a 7-point
scale (1 = no attention at all and 7 = a lot of attention).
Pain Perception - This is a self-reported measure same as that used in Study 1, where
patients were asked to rate the pain they were currently experiencing on a 10-point scale
(1 = very low pain, 10 = very high pain)
Wait-time Perception - This is a self-reported measure same as that used in Study 1,
where patients were asked an open-ended measure of how many minutes they estimated they
had been waiting.
Satisfaction - Again, this is the same measure as used in Study 1. Three days after
the visit, a research assistant contacted the patients by phone and asked them to rate their
level of satisfaction on two questions. (1) How satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the
waiting system? (1 = very low satisfaction, 10 = very high satisfaction), and (2) How was
your overall experience at the physician’s clinic? (1 = very bad experience, 10 = very good
experience)
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3.3.3

Results and Discussion

We examine the impact of the ambiguity in token-information, operationalized by the use of
alphanumeric tokens, on Attention Paid, Wait-time Perception and Pain Perception of the
patients in Table 3.5. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include no covariates, while columns (2),
(4) and (6) control for a larger number of covariates as compared to Study 1. These include
the age and gender of the patient, whether the patients had come to this clinic for the first
time or were repeat patients, whether they were walk-ins or had taken a phone appointment,
how familiar they were with the token system on a 7-point scale (1 = not familiar at all,
7 = a lot familiar), whether they were aware of the FCFS system in the clinic, what type of
illness were they visiting the physician for, as well as observational data collected on what
the patients were doing while waiting (using smartphones, talking with other patients, sitting
or standing), the number of patients in the queue, the total number of people in the clinic,
whether the patients waited in the waiting lobby or the porch, and the actual time the patient
spent waiting in the queue. See Table 3.11 for summary statistics and balance tests for these
variables.
The coefficients in columns (1) and (2) indicate that the patients paid more attention
to the tokens, when the tokens were alphanumeric as opposed to numeric (Mnumeric =
4.54, σnumeric = 1.62, Malphanumeric = 5.03, σalphanumeric = 1.42, p < 0.05). The coefficients
in columns (3) and (4) indicate that the patients with alphanumeric tokens perceived lower
wait-times compared to those with numeric tokens (Mnumeric = 30.25 minutes, σnumeric = 15.01
minutes, Malphanumeric = 25.30 minutes, σalphanumeric = 11.19 minutes, p < 0.01). And the coefficients in columns (5) and (6) show that patients with alphanumeric tokens perceived their
pain levels to be lower (Mnumeric = 5.13, σnumeric = 1.76, Malphanumeric = 4.66, σalphanumeric =
1.44, p < 0.01). The coefficient sizes are stable to the inclusion of covariates.
We examine the impact of ambiguity in token-information on patients’ satisfaction in
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Table 3.5: Study 2: Impact on Attention, Wait-time Perception and Pain Perception

Dependent variable:
Alphanumeric
Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Controls

Attention
(1)
(2)
0.49∗∗
(0.20)
220
0.03
4.54
No

Wait-time Perception
(3)
(4)

0.50∗∗ -4.95∗∗∗
(0.23) (1.77)
220
0.25
4.54
Yes

220
0.03
30.25
No

Pain Perception
(5)
(6)

-6.15∗∗∗
(1.73)

-0.47∗∗
(0.22)

-0.69∗∗∗
(0.24)

220
0.44
30.25
Yes

220
0.02
5.13
No

220
0.27
5.13
Yes

NOTES: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is
the self-reported measure of the degree of attention paid by the patients on how the tokens progressed on a
7-point scale, in columns (3) and (4) is the wait-time perception of the patient as measured by the number of
minutes they estimated they had been waiting, and in (5) and (6) is the self-reported measure of how much
pain the patients were currently experiencing on a 10-point scale. The regressions in columns (2), (4) and
(6) control for all the baseline covariates (see Table 3.10). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Table 3.6.6 We analyze the impact on the two questions asked separately as well as on
the combined satisfaction score, obtained by averaging the scores on the two satisfaction
questions. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include no covariates, while columns (2), (4) and (6)
control for all the baseline covariates as in table 3.5. Overall, patients with alphanumeric
tokens were more satisfied with the waiting system as well as in terms of the overall experience,
driving up the average satisfaction score (Mnumeric = 8.61, σnumeric = 0.89, Malphanumeric =
8.99, σalphanumeric = 1.02, p < 0.01).
So far, we have shown the proposed effects in two distinct healthcare settings. Our results
hold when the queue is longer, when the actual wait-times are higher, when there is variation
in how the patients are seen, and for a variety of patient illnesses. We also show robustness
to the sequence in which alphanumeric tokens move, that helps to establish the validity of
our findings further. In the next field study, we will manipulate the degree of ambiguity in
the information provided by the token, and demonstrate its moderating effects.
6

Some patients did not respond to the phone calls made three days after the visit to the clinic, and
consequently there is an attrition of 21% (45 out of 220) spread evenly across the two groups (19 out of 104
and 26 out of 116 for the numeric and alphanumeric groups respectively).
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Table 3.6: Study 2: Impact on Patient Satisfaction
Dependent variable: Experience Satisfaction
(1)
(2)
Alphanumeric
Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
Controls

Overall Satisfaction
(3)
(4)

Average Satisfaction
(5)
(6)

0.31∗
(0.16)

0.47∗∗
(0.18)

0.50∗∗∗
(0.16)

0.65∗∗∗
(0.18)

0.38∗∗∗
(0.15)

0.53∗∗∗
(0.17)

175
0.02
8.59
No

175
0.27
8.59
Yes

175
0.06
8.64
No

175
0.25
8.64
Yes

175
0.04
8.61
No

175
0.27
8.61
Yes

NOTES: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is
the patients’ rating on a 10-point scale to the question “How was your overall experience at the physician’s
clinic?", in columns (3) and (4) is the patients’ rating on a 10-point scale to the question “How satisfied
or dissatisfied were you with the waiting system?", and in columns (5) and (6) is the simple average of
the response to the two questions. The regressions in columns (2), (4) and (6) control for all the baseline
covariates (see Table 3.11). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

3.4

Study 3: Time Perception and Patient Satisfaction Heterogeneity by the Degree of Ambiguity

In Studies 1 and 2, we have demonstrated that the ambiguity in queue-position information
provided by the alphanumeric tokens leads to greater attention, lower pain perception, lower
wait-time perception, and higher satisfaction for the patients. An implicit assumption in our
conceptualization is that the complexity of deciphering the ambiguity in the alphanumeric
token sequence is moderate. In other words, one can infer their position in the queue by
paying attention, i.e., the sequence can be resolved. What would happen if we increased the
degree of ambiguity in the information provided to an extent that deciphering the queueposition from the token is not possible, i.e., when the sequence is unresolvable?
In a review of recent studies, van der Wel and van Steenbergen (2018) suggest that there
is an inverted U-shaped relationship between task complexity and attention paid. Intuitively,
when a task is too easy or too difficult, people lose interest in trying to solve it, and thus
stop paying attention to it. We test this proposition in our setting by varying the degree of
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ambiguity in the information provided by the token. Specifically, in Study 3, we manipulated
the tokens such that in one condition, the token sequence could be resolved. This involved
alternating sequence. That is, the sequence followed a specific rule (skipping/alternating a
letter or a number), which could be deciphered with the increased attention on the sequence.
Whereas, in another condition, the token sequence could not be resolved. This involved a
completely random sequence. That is, the sequence followed no rule and was completely
random, which could not be deciphered even with increased attention.

3.4.1

Experimental Setting and Procedure

Study 3 was conducted in the same physician’s clinic in East Delhi (India) as Study 2 in
November-December 2019. The study took place over twelve days (see Table 3.7 for details
about the study sessions). We used a 2 (token type: alphanumeric vs. numeric) × 2 (type
of ambiguity: resolved vs. unresolved) between-participants design. Patients were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions. Four hundred and sixty patients completed the study.
The procedure for the four conditions was the same as in Study 2. However, we made
changes in the token sequence. In the resolved condition, the sequence used for alphanumeric
tokens was I21, I22, I23, I24, I25, I26, I27, K21, K22, K23, K24, K25, K26, K27, M21, M22,
M23, M24, M25, M26, M27, O21, O22, O23, O24, O25, O26, O27, Q21, Q22, Q23, Q24,
Q25, Q26, Q27, S21, S22, S23, S24, S25, S26, S27, U21, U22, U23, U24, U25, U26, U27,
W21, W22, W23, W24, W25, W26, W27. Note here the letters are middle letters as well as
they are alternating, while the numbers are larger and progressing sequentially. On the other
hand, the sequence used for numeric tokens was 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43,
45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95,
97, 99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123. Note here the numbers are
larger as well as they are alternating. Importantly, both the token sequences can be resolved.
Further, in the unresolved condition, the sequence used for alphanumeric tokens was A1, A2,

148

Table 3.7: Study 3: Details about Study Sessions

Token Type

Day of the Week

Week

Numeric × Resolved

Monday

3

Numeric × Resolved

Tuesday

3

Numeric × Resolved

Thursday

3

Alphanumeric × Resolved

Monday

4

Alphanumeric × Resolved

Tuesday

4

Alphanumeric × Resolved

Thursday

4

Numeric × Unresolved

Monday

5

Numeric × Unresolved

Tuesday

5

Numeric × Unresolved

Thursday

5

Alphanumeric × Unresolved

Monday

6

Alphanumeric × Unresolved

Tuesday

6

Alphanumeric × Unresolved

Thursday

6

A12, A15, A31, B2, B3, B5, B7, B20, B25, B32, C3, C4, C7, C13, C18, C22, C25, C43, D2,
D3, D5, D9, D14, D17, D23, D29, D51, E1, E4, E5, E8, E11, E15, E19, E22, E24, E25, E29,
E32, E33, F4, F6, F8, F11, F14, F16, F20, F25, F27, F29, F43, G15, G30, G35. Note here
the letters are progressing sequentially, while the numbers are progressing randomly. On the
other hand, the sequence used for numeric tokens was 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 18, 22, 24, 26, 29,
30, 34, 36, 41, 45, 52, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 75, 79, 82, 85, 89, 90, 96, 98, 100, 104, 105, 109,
111, 114, 116, 119, 120, 122, 126, 127, 128, 130, 135, 136, 138, 141, 144, 145, 150, 151, 152,
154. Note here the numbers are progressing (in an increasing order) randomly. Importantly,
both the token sequences cannot be resolved because they are random.
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3.4.2

Dependent Variables

After waiting in the queue, similar to Study 2, patients indicated their attention to how the
tokens progressed (1 = no attention at all, and 7 = a lot of attention) and perceived pain
levels (1 = very low pain, 10 = very high pain). Further, they provided an estimate of how
many minutes they had been waiting to meet the physician. And finally, they rated their
level of satisfaction on two questions on a 10-point scale three days after the visit to the
physician’s clinic.

3.4.3

Results and Discussion

We examine the impact of the degree of ambiguity in token-information, operationalized by
the use of alphanumeric tokens with resolvable and unresolvable sequences, on Attention
Paid, Wait-time Perception and Pain Perception of the patients in Table 3.8. Columns (1),
(3) and (5) include no covariates, while columns (2), (4) and (6) control for the same set
of covariates as Study 1. These include the age and gender of the patient, whether the
patients had come to this clinic for the first time or were repeat patients, whether they were
walk-ins or had taken a phone appointment, how familiar they were with the token system
on a 7-point scale (1 = not familiar at all, 7 = a lot familiar), whether they were aware of
the FCFS system in the clinic, what type of illness were they visiting the physician for, as
well as observational data collected on what the patients were doing while waiting (using
smartphones, talking with other patients, sitting or standing), the number of patients in the
queue, the total number of people in the clinic, whether the patients waited in the waiting
lobby or the porch, and the actual time the patient spent waiting in the queue. See Table
3.12 for summary statistics and balance tests for these variables.
The coefficients in the first row of columns (1) and (2) indicate that when the sequence is
resolvable, the patients paid more attention to alphanumeric tokens as compared to numeric
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tokens (Mnumeric = 5.19, σnumeric = 1.36, Malphanumeric = 5.58, σalphanumeric = 1.21, p < 0.05).
However, when ambiguity is large and it is not possible to decipher one’s position in the
queue from the information in the token, the attention paid by the patients declined (row 3
of columns (1) and (2)) (Malphanumeric = 4.74, σalphanumeric = 1.20, p < 0.01). The coefficients
in the first row of columns (3) and (4) indicate that in the case of a resolvable sequence,
the patients with alphanumeric tokens perceived lower wait-times compared to those with
numeric tokens (Mnumeric = 29.63 minutes, σnumeric = 14.60 minutes, Malphanumeric = 24.47
minutes, σalphanumeric = 11.56 minutes, p < 0.01). But when the ambiguity is unresolvable,
wait-time perception increased for those with alphanumeric tokens (row 3 of columns (3) and
(4)) (Malphanumeric = 34.30 minutes, σalphanumeric = 15.47 minutes, p < 0.01). The coefficients
in the first row of columns (5) and (6) suggest that in the case of a resolvable sequence,
patients with alphanumeric tokens perceived their pain levels to be lower than those with
numeric tokens (Mnumeric = 4.93, σnumeric = 1.56, Malphanumeric = 4.53, σalphanumeric = 1.37, p <
0.05). But when the ambiguity is unresolvable, pain perception increased for those with
alphanumeric tokens (row 3 of columns (5) and (6)) (Malphanumeric = 5.93, σalphanumeric =
1.18, p < 0.05).
We next examine how patients’ satisfaction responds to the degree of ambiguity in tokeninformation. We analyze the impact on the two questions asked separately as well as on
the combined satisfaction score, obtained by averaging the scores on the two satisfaction
questions. Table 3.9 presents the results from OLS regressions.7 Columns (1), (3) and (5)
include no covariates, while columns (2), (4) and (6) control for all the baseline covariates
as in table 3.8. Overall, in the case of a resolvable sequence, row 1 of columns (5) and (6)
reveals that patients with alphanumeric tokens had on an average a higher satisfaction score
(Mnumeric = 8.52, σnumeric = 1.24, Malphanumeric = 9.10, σalphanumeric = 1.05, p < 0.01). This
however declined as the information became more ambiguous for the alphanumeric tokens
7

Some patients did not respond to the phone calls made three days after the visit to the clinic, and
consequently there is an attrition of 26% (121 out of 460) overall (23% for numeric × resolvable, 26% for
alphanumeric × resolvable, 33% for numeric × unresolvable, and 22% for alphanumeric × unresolvable).

151

Table 3.8: Study 3: Impact on Attention, Wait-time Perception and Pain Perception
Dependent variable:

Attention
(1)
(2)

Wait-time Perception
(3)
(4)

Pain Perception
(5)
(6)

Alphanumeric (β1 )

0.39∗∗
(0.17)

0.48∗∗∗
(0.18)

-5.16∗∗∗
(1.82)

-5.40∗∗∗
(1.77)

-0.40∗∗
(0.19)

-0.30
(0.19)

Unresolved (β2 )

0.12
(0.17)

0.02
(0.18)

1.37
(1.81)

2.12
(1.73)

0.08
(0.19)

0.14
(0.19)

Alphanumeric × Unresolved (β3 ) -0.84∗∗∗
(0.24)

-0.97∗∗∗
(0.25)

9.83∗∗∗
(2.53)

11.02∗∗∗
(2.43)

1.04∗∗∗
(0.27)

0.96∗∗∗
(0.26)

460
0.12
5.19
0.00
Yes

460
0.08
29.63
0.01
No

460
0.27
29.63
0.00
Yes

460
0.08
4.93
0.00
No

460
0.21
4.93
0.00
Yes

Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value)
Controls

460
0.04
5.19
0.01
No

NOTES: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is
the self-reported measure of the degree of attention paid by the patients on how the tokens progressed on a
7-point scale, in columns (3) and (4) is the wait-time perception of the patient as measured by the number of
minutes they estimated they had been waiting, and in (5) and (6) is the self-reported measure of how much
pain the patients were currently experiencing on a 10-point scale. The regressions in columns (2), (4) and
(6) control for all the baseline covariates (see Table 3.12). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

(row 3 of columns (5) and (6)) (Malphanumeric = 8.17, σalphanumeric = 1.27, p < 0.01).
The findings of Study 3 demonstrate the heterogeneity in the impact of ambiguity on our
variables of interest. We show that when ambiguity is resolvable, i.e., when the token sequence
was alternating, the alphanumeric token sequence led to higher attention levels, lower pain
perception, lower wait-time perception, and consequently higher satisfaction for the patients.
However, when the token sequence was random, the alphanumeric token sequence led to
lower attention levels, higher pain perception, higher wait-time perception, and lower levels
of satisfaction for the patients.

3.5

Conclusion

This paper provides field experimental evidence on the impact of ambiguity in information on
wait-time perception and consumer satisfaction in healthcare setting in India. Specifically,
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Table 3.9: Study 3: Impact on Patient Satisfaction
Dependent variable:

Experience Satisfaction Overall Satisfaction Average Satisfaction
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Alphanumeric (β1 )

0.58∗∗∗
(0.19)

0.57∗∗∗
(0.19)

0.59∗∗∗
(0.19)

0.55∗∗∗
(0.20)

0.58∗∗∗
(0.18)

0.57∗∗∗
(0.19)

Unresolved (β2 )

-0.31
(0.19)

-0.31
(0.20)

-0.14
(0.19)

-0.17
(0.20)

-0.20
(0.18)

-0.21
(0.19)

-0.88∗∗∗
(0.26)

-0.84∗∗∗
(0.27)

-0.93∗∗∗
(0.27)

-0.89∗∗∗
(0.27)

-0.93∗∗∗
(0.26)

-0.90∗∗∗
(0.26)

339
0.12
8.48
0.11
No

339
0.20
8.48
0.16
Yes

339
0.09
8.53
0.07
No

339
0.18
8.53
0.08
Yes

339
0.11
8.52
0.05
No

339
0.20
8.52
0.07
Yes

Alphanumeric × Unresolved (β3 )
Observations
R-squared
Control group mean
β1 + β3 = 0 (p-value)
Controls

NOTES: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is
the patients’ rating on a 10-point scale to the question “How was your overall experience at the physician’s
clinic?", in columns (3) and (4) is the patients’ rating on a 10-point scale to the question “How satisfied
or dissatisfied were you with the waiting system?", and in columns (5) and (6) is the simple average of
the response to the two questions. The regressions in columns (2), (4) and (6) control for all the baseline
covariates (see Table 3.12). *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.

Study 1 demonstrates that when a patient is given a token which gives ambiguous information
regarding their position in the queue, it results in greater attention paid to the token, causing
lower pain and wait-time perception, thereby leading to higher satisfaction even after three
days. Study 2 generalizes the proposed effects in a second healthcare setting. The results
are robust to controlling for a much larger number of variables that can possibly influence
wait-time perception. In Study 3, we manipulate the degree of ambiguity in the information
provided by the token. We find that the proposed effects reverse when the ambiguity is so
large that the patients cannot infer their position in the queue on the basis of the information
provided in the token.
We believe our results generate several opportunities for further research. First, we focus on take-a-number queuing system in our paper. These queues are mostly prevalent in
passport clinics, department of motor vehicle clinics, hospital emergency rooms, and so on.
Further research could examine other queuing systems to examine the impact of ambiguity
in information, such as airline systems that provide expected wait-times and arrival times.
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Second, future research could test for other mechanisms that help explain our results. For
instance, cognitive effort or other intertwined potential accounts with “attention" could provide additional theoretical mechanisms. Third, because of the complexity of a field study,
we had to keep the questionnaire and interaction as brief as possible. We were unable to
assess patients’ initial level of pain and discomfort while entering the queue. Even though
randomization in our experiments takes care of the issue of differing pain levels to start with,
pre and post measurements in the future work can provide an undisputed claim of such an
influence. Fourth, future research could also consider contexts other than hospitals in which
physical pain is not present. Last, more research could examine the effect of the impact of
other types of ambiguities in waiting-information on wait-time perception, and ultimately
patient satisfaction.
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3.6

Appendix

Table 3.10: Study 1: Balance of Covariates
Conditions

Age (in years)
Male (%)
Actual Wait Time (in minutes)
# of patients in line
Morning Session (%)

p value for test of:

Numeric
(N=72)
(1)

Alphanumeric
(N=61)
(2)

1=2

38.45
(16.70)
0.42
(0.50)
24.54
(11.15)
4.48
(1.78)
0.28
(0.45)

39.14
(16.50)
0.51
(0.50)
22.07
(10.69)
3.49
(1.63)
0.59
(0.50)

0.82

Activity type (%)
On Smartphone

0.17
(0.38)
Sitting
0.60
(0.49)
Standing
0.04
(0.20)
Talking
0.11
(0.32)
Watching Television
0.08
(0.28)
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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0.18
(0.39)
0.69
(0.47)
0.02
(0.13)
0.05
(0.22)
0.07
(0.25)

(3)

0.33
0.19
0.00
0.00

0.84
0.28
0.38
0.19
0.70

Table 3.11: Study 2: Balance of Covariates

Age (in years)
Male (%)
Actual Wait Time (in minutes)
# of patients in line
# of patients in clinic
Familiarity with tokens (7-point scale mean)
Patients waiting on the porch (%)
New Patients (%)
Emergency Patients (%)
Aware of FCFS (%)
Call-in Patients (%)

Illness type (%)
Injury/Body Pain
Flu like symptons
Lifestyle disease

Activity type (%)
On Smartphone
Sitting
Standing
Talking

Conditions

p value for test of:

Numeric Alphanumeric
(N=104)
(N=116)
(1)
(2)

1=2
(3)

40.86
(16.11)
0.50
(0.50)
43.82
(10.70)
8.32
(2.35)
9.85
(2.35)
5.31
(1.44)
0.23
(0.42)
0.62
(0.49)
0.06
(0.23)
0.96
(0.19)
0.13
(0.34)

38.92
(17.49)
0.47
(0.50)
44.88
(10.88)
9.13
(2.73)
10.92
(2.96)
5.09
(1.71)
0.20
(0.40)
0.69
(0.46)
0.03
(0.16)
0.97
(0.18)
0.19
(0.39)

0.39

0.28
(0.45)
0.40
(0.49)
0.32
(0.47)

0.31
(0.46)
0.41
(0.49)
0.28
(0.45)

0.61

0.07
(0.25)
0.66
(0.47)
0.14
(0.35)
0.12
(0.33)

0.03
(0.18)
0.73
(0.44)
0.21
(0.41)
0.03
(0.16)

NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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0.70
0.47
0.02
0.00
0.30
0.56
0.25
0.25
0.88
0.27

0.88
0.50

0.27
0.27
0.22
0.01

Table 3.12: Study 3: Balance of Covariates
Conditions

p value for test of:

Num, R
(N=113)
(1)

Alphanum, R
(N=110)
(2)

41.57
(18.29)
0.40
(0.49)
52.81
(14.91)
9.69
(3.94)
12.27
(4.23)
5.15
(1.53)
0.28
(0.45)
0.70
(0.46)
0.04
(0.21)
0.83
(0.38)
0.13
(0.34)

41.78
(17.82)
0.51
(0.50)
52.05
(15.90)
8.72
(3.62)
10.86
(3.97)
5.01
(1.51)
0.25
(0.44)
0.59
(0.49)
0.03
(0.16)
0.84
(0.37)
0.13
(0.33)

44.15
(16.87)
0.47
(0.50)
51.35
(11.86)
8.99
(5.83)
11.91
(6.10)
5.02
(1.50)
0.26
(0.44)
0.58
(0.50)
0.04
(0.19)
0.86
(0.35)
0.20
(0.40)

41.44
(17.77)
0.55
(0.50)
47.75
(13.39)
7.52
(5.05)
10.11
(5.40)
4.81
(1.52)
0.25
(0.43)
0.66
(0.48)
0.05
(0.21)
0.82
(0.38)
0.12
(0.33)

0.19
(0.40)
0.41
(0.49)
0.40
(0.49)

0.33
(0.47)
0.33
(0.47)
0.35
(0.48)

0.27
(0.44)
0.41
(0.49)
0.32
(0.47)

0.23
(0.42)
0.50
(0.50)
0.27
(0.45)

0.03
(0.16)
Sitting
0.66
(0.47)
Standing
0.29
(0.46)
Talking
0.02
(0.13)
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses.

0.02
(0.13)
0.74
(0.44)
0.23
(0.42)
0.02
(0.13)

0.02
(0.13)
0.71
(0.45)
0.24
(0.43)
0.03
(0.16)

0.01
(0.09)
0.72
(0.45)
0.23
(0.42)
0.04
(0.20)

Age (in years)
Male (%)
Actual Wait Time (in minutes)
# of patients in line
# of patients in clinic
Familiarity with tokens
(7-point scale mean)
Patients waiting on the porch (%)
New Patients (%)
Emergency Patients (%)
Aware of FCFS (%)
Call-in Patients (%)

Illness type (%)
Injury/Body Pain
Flu like symptons
Lifestyle disease

Activity type (%)
On Smartphone
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Num, UR Alphanum, UR 1=2
(N=112)
(N=125)
(3)
(4)
(5)

3=4
(6)

0.93

0.23

0.10

0.23

0.72

0.03

0.05

0.04

0.01

0.02

0.49

0.28

0.63

0.85

0.09

0.23

0.50

0.64

0.93

0.49

0.90

0.11

0.02

0.53

0.22

0.19

0.42

0.41

0.67

0.51

0.24

0.92

0.27

0.87

0.98

0.57
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